*The End of Cool Japan* is a forceful intervention into the study and flow of Japanese pop culture around the world. Taking the arousals of fandom seriously, the essays also consider the ways J-pop culture gets both manipulated and constrained (by politics, legal constricts, religion, nationalism) to make it decidedly “uncool” at various hands. Advocating for a critical pedagogy that scrutinizes Japanese pop culture in all its complexities and iterations, the volume is sharp-edged and smartly conceived throughout. This is an invaluable contribution to the field—that of Japanese studies and also beyond.

Anne Allison, *Duke University, USA*
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The End of Cool Japan

Today’s convergent media environment offers unprecedented opportunities for sourcing and disseminating previously obscure popular culture material from Japan. However, this presents concerns regarding copyright, ratings and exposure to potentially illegal content, which are serious problems for those teaching and researching about Japan. Despite young people’s enthusiasm for Japanese popular culture, these concerns spark debate about whether it can be judged harmful for youth audiences and could therefore herald the end of ‘cool Japan.’

This collection brings together Japan specialists in order to identify key challenges in using Japanese popular culture materials in research and teaching. It addresses issues such as the availability of unofficially translated and distributed Japanese material; the emphasis on adult-themes, violence, sexual scenes and under-age characters; and the discrepancies in legislation and ratings systems across the world. Considering how these issues affect researchers, teachers, students and fans in the USA, Canada, Australia, China, Japan, and elsewhere in Asia, the contributors discuss the different ways in which academic and fan practices are challenged by local regulations. Illustrating from personal experience the sometimes fraught nature of teaching about ‘cool Japan,’ they suggest ways in which Japanese Studies as a discipline needs to develop clearer guidelines for teaching and research, especially for new scholars entering the field.

As the first collection to identify some of the real problems faced by teachers and researchers of Japanese popular culture as well as the students over whom they have a duty of care, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Japanese Studies and Cultural Studies.

Mark McLelland is Professor of Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Wollongong, Australia, and a former Toyota Visiting Professor of Japanese at the University of Michigan, USA. His recent publications include Love, Sex and Democracy in Japan during the American Occupation (2012); and The Routledge Handbook of Sexuality Studies in East Asia, edited with Vera Mackie (Routledge, 2015).
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Edited by Mark McLelland

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Acknowledgement

The idea for a collection on contentious areas of research and teaching in Japanese Studies first came about at the “Teaching Japanese Popular Culture” conference convened at the University of Singapore in November 2012, at which I was invited to reflect on my experience of teaching and researching about Japan in an Australian context. This led me to begin to outline some of the legal and ethical issues raised by my research into Japanese popular culture due to some significant legislative and cultural differences between Australia and Japan. I would like to thank the organizers of the Singapore event for this fruitful opportunity.

Subsequently I put together a workshop entitled “The End of Cool Japan” which looked at growing concern expressed, particularly in the Anglophone media, about certain aspects of Japanese popular culture that are considered inappropriate for a youth audience, or even for today’s undergraduates. The workshop was sponsored by the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan in April 2014 and featured several of this volume’s contributors. We would like to thank Professor Markus Nornes, in particular, for his support for the event and his kind hospitality at the workshop.

The majority of the chapters in this volume were further developed at the conference “Manga Futures: Institutional and Fan Approaches in Japan and Beyond,” held at the University of Wollongong in November/December 2014 (mangafutures.com). This was the sixth international scholarly conference on manga sponsored by Kyoto Seika University’s International Manga Research Center (IMRC). I would like to thank the co-organizer of this event, Deputy Director of the IMRC Professor Jaqueline Berndt, and President of Kyoto Seika University Professor Takemiya Keiko, for enabling this gathering of international scholars and for providing such a fertile ground for the exchange and development of ideas in the field of manga studies. We would also like to thank the Japan Foundation for a generous grant that enabled Kirsten Cather, Alisa Freedman, Patrick W. Galbraith, Laura Miller, Sharalyn Orbaugh and Jessica Bauwens-Sugimoto to attend, and the Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts at Wollongong that provided the facilities, catering and logistics for the event. The research in this volume is also supported in part by grant FT120100388 awarded to Professor Mark McLelland by the Australian Research Council.
The research in the chapter by Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu was supported by a grant for Japan-related research projects from the Sumitomo Foundation. Ling Yang would also like to thank her students Shengjie Li and Jing Zhao for providing her insider information about Chinese fandoms of Japanese pop culture.
Note on language

All Japanese names are listed in Japanese order, with surname first, and thus appear in the references without commas; the exception is Japanese authors who usually write in English and use the Western name order accordingly.

When romanizing Japanese terms, long vowels have been represented by macrons, except in terms commonly written in English, such as place names and period reigns. Capitalization in transliterated Japanese has generally been avoided except in instances when these terms would normally be capitalized in English, including personal and place names.
1 Introduction
Negotiating “cool Japan” in research and teaching

Mark McLelland

The end of “cool Japan”

In June 2014 when the Diet, Japan’s parliament, moved finally to criminalize the simple possession of child pornography images, expanding an earlier 1999 law that had already outlawed the production and dissemination of such images, there was consternation in the Anglophone (that is, English-language) press. Numerous reports argued that Japan had not gone far enough – since the legislation was not extended to the creation or possession of fantasy images of characters who might “appear to be” children such as can be found in manga or anime. A plethora of sensationalist articles appeared over the course of a few weeks, condemning Japan as, among other things, “the Empire of Child Pornography” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014; see also Fackler 2014). Among them, an “undercover” CNN video report showed a scandalized journalist holding up a blurry image of a supposedly abusive manga cover (Ripley and Whiteman 2014). The reporter, however, chose a poor example for condemnation – the title blurred-out because it was “too graphic” to show was Dolls Fall 2, which is, in fact, a popular title in the mystery/horror genres (see Vincent 2014). Any manga or anime fan familiar with Japan would have been able to see through the CNN report as the beat-up it was, just another episode in the Anglophone press tradition of “Japan bashing.” Indeed, the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund (CBLDF) accused the CNN report of peddling misconceptions and “deliberate hyperbole” (Williams 2015).

I ended up being pulled into this controversy due to my perceived expertise in Japanese popular culture and sexuality in Japan. If you do a Google Scholar search for the terms “manga” and “pornography,” then several articles I have authored appear on the first page – alongside a good number by academic friends, colleagues and acquaintances. Since several of these scholars are also Facebook friends, I know that it is not unusual for us to be contacted, at short notice, by members of the press requesting information
about some aspect or other of Japanese popular culture – often regarding sexual content. These encounters rarely end well. This is largely to do with a mismatch of expectations: academics want to take time to define terms, introduce historical and cultural comparisons, and avoid generalizations, whereas journalists are often looking for a short soundbite – something that can be dropped into an already prefigured opinion piece about the behavior or psychology of “Japanese people.” As Atlantic journalist James Fallows portentiously observed in 1986, “the Japanese are different from you and me,” designating Japan’s “underlying social motif” as a “half-conscious, low grade pedophilia” (Fallows 1986: 35). Indeed, as I have discussed elsewhere (McLelland 2003), this journalistic interest in the sex lives of the Japanese is longstanding and seldom affirming.

It is because of perceptions like the above that I am not enthusiastic about engaging with journalists seeking out an academic opinion aimed at explaining supposed “Japanese” attitudes or behaviors. This happened most recently when I was contacted by a reporter from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (one of the country’s more reputable news sources), asking me to explain why the Japanese Diet had “failed to include” manga and anime images of sexualized characters appearing to be minors among the items prohibited in its newly drafted legislation. I tried to explain that there have been ongoing media panics about sex and violence in comic books since Frederic Wertham’s now discredited study, Seduction of the Innocent: The Influence of Comic Books on Today’s Youth, was first published in 1954 (Tilley 2012). In response to the misleading but oft-repeated charge that the failure to include manga and anime images was “a concession to the nation’s powerful publishing and entertainment industries” (Fackler 2014), I pointed out that legislators could not simply introduce a blanket ban on fictitious images for constitutional reasons, and in this respect Japan was in a similar position to the United States, where attempts to regulate “virtual” (that is fictional/unreal) child-pornography images have proven controversial (Akdeniz 2008: 15). It is significant that in their efforts to brand Japan as a pariah in failing to abide by “international standards,” not one report mentioned the challenge by The Free Speech Coalition to the 1996 US Child Pornography Prevention Act, which had sought to include fictitious images in its purview. In 1999 this court challenge was successful in overturning prohibitions on “images of fictitious children engaged in imaginary but explicit sexual conduct” in the United States (Akdeniz, 2008: 102, my emphasis).

It became clear after a few minutes into the conversation that the journalist was fixated on a story about Japanese exceptionalism and uniqueness. He was uninterested in the fact that even in the context of comparable societies such as the United States and Canada, “there has been competition between legislative and judicial decision-makers regarding the appropriate limits of freedom of expression, with differences of opinion amongst the judges and between courts and legislatures” around the issue of what constitutes child pornography, and that it is a “myth” that any jurisdiction has “the right
answers” (Johnson 2006: 378; see also Orbaugh in this volume). It became obvious that the journalist had stopped listening to my attempts to add nuance to his rather reductionist assumptions about the situation in Japan. The account I offered was simply too long and complicated, too full of historical and inter-cultural comparisons, and would have proven impossible to summarize in the word limit he had available for the article. As soon as he could politely do so, he exited the conversation.

The chapters in this collection challenge the kinds of attention-grabbing, pearl-clutching perspectives on Japan that are so common in today’s media reports. All the authors in this collection – as students, researchers and teachers – have been caught up to varying degrees in debates around these contentious issues – aspects of Japanese popular culture that are judged “not cool.” Because of persistent press beat-ups of Japan, these issues cannot be sidelined or ignored as they now constitute part of a growing public consensus that there is a “dark side” to Japanese popular culture that is evidence of a distinctly Japanese pathology (see for example, McGinty 2000; McLeland 2003). The purpose of the collection is not to offer exculpatory readings of these less attractive aspects of Japanese popular culture but to place these issues and themes in an academic – not a journalistic – frame, and in so doing add the nuance and context so often lacking in the latter.

From salarymen to Sailor Moon: changing representations of Japan

In keeping with the personal tone of many of the contributions to this volume, I would like to start by explaining how the idea for a volume on the pleasures and perils of teaching and researching about popular culture in Japan first arose. The original idea came about at the “Teaching Japanese Popular Culture” conference convened at the University of Singapore in November 2012, where I was asked to reflect on my experience teaching undergraduates in Australia. This necessarily led me to reflect on my own experience as a student of Japanese, and the ways in which my subsequent teaching and research have changed over time. As part of these reflections I engaged some of my senior colleagues in conversations about how they first encountered Japan, how they came to study Japanese language and culture, and how they thought the role of teacher or researcher had changed over the course of their careers.

It became apparent during these conversations that there were a number of similarities in our experience, largely due to the ways in which the image and appeal of “Japan” has changed drastically since the 1970s, at least for students in Europe, North America and Australia. During the 1970s and 1980s, it was Japan’s economic performance that was attracting interest – as well as some anxiety. It was during this time that the term “Japan bashing” gained currency, referring to a range of representations across film, news and other media that represented Japanese salarymen, in particular, as fanatical workers whose selfless devotion to the company and the nation gave them an unfair
edge in global exports (see Freedman, this volume; also Morris 2011). At this time if you had expressed an interest in “manga” or “anime,” people would have looked at you blankly. In fact, in 1983 manga translator and scholar Frederick Schodt wondered, “Will Japanese comics now follow Toyotas and Sony overseas?” finding it unlikely, since their style and content was so alien to the American comics tradition (Schodt 1983: 153; see also McLelland 2016a).

As far as university teaching on Japan went, courses were heavily weighted toward history, political economy and literature (of the Canonical kind). If you were lucky and studying at a major hub for Japan Studies, you might have got to do a course on film (also of the Canonical kind), but none of the offerings could really be described as involving anything “popular.” Discussion of the popular, including Japanese TV, manga and music, tended to happen in the Japanese language classes with the native-speaking instructors, but the information shared there was not the kind of knowledge tested in examinations and the use of the colloquial expressions picked up from these sources was actively discouraged.

My experience as a student of the Japanese language and later a researcher and teacher about Japan dates from the peak of Japan’s “bubble economy” in the late 1980s when perceptions of Japan revolved around business acumen and gadget fetishism – spurred on by the recent success of Japanese car exports and the miniaturization boom in mobile electronics symbolized by the Sony Walkman. I first went to study in Japan in 1988 as a graduate student and my reason for going was to research Japanese religion (I had been a Religious Studies major). For the 18 months of the fellowship I dutifully traveled around Japan interviewing rural Buddhist priests about their changing roles, identities and job requirements at a time of rapid industrialization and urbanization when the role of the local temple seemed to be reduced to a place that family members only thought of in terms of funerals. The son of one of my informants, destined to inherit his father’s job as local priest in an out-of-the-way village in Oita, confided that he really had no interest in following the priestly profession, but would rather become a travel agent. Another young man, the nephew of a priest who had only daughters, let me know with some relief that he had managed to avoid being forced into taking over his uncle’s position by landing a good job in one of Japan’s top film production companies. Not finding my orientalist enthusiasm for “traditional” Japan mirrored by my informants, suddenly Japanese religion did not seem all that interesting any more.

Upon returning to undertake a postgraduate degree in Japanese Studies at a UK university in the early 1990s, there was no mention of anything vaguely “popular” in the curriculum (one reason I dropped the course to return to Japan). I had become interested in pursuing research into sexual minority history and identity in Japan but had been discouraged from doing so by professors in the UK due to a supposed lack of original source material in Japanese. I knew, however, from experience of watching Japanese television
(including anime) and reading manga, in particular, that there were multiple representations of gender and sexual nonconformity in popular culture – it just seemed that academics were not talking about these issues. Yet, such representations were unavoidable – as brought home powerfully in 1988 when watching, for the first time, at my host family’s home in Oita, the annual New Year’s Eve show, the Red and White Song Contest (Kōhaku uta gassen). The show featured as the highlight of the men’s team the cross-dressing enka singer, comedian and actor Mikawa Ken’ichi.

Back in the late 1980s, there were few scholars in Japanese universities, either, who were able to comment on issues of sexual and gender non-conformity in the media. For instance, my native Japanese-speaking teachers were unable to help me with my question about how to talk about sexual minorities in Japanese in a non-discriminatory way. Their advice was simply not to discuss the topic at all. My understanding of the role and place of sexual and gender diversity in Japanese media and society more generally was almost entirely picked up from watching TV, reading manga and interacting with gay men in Shinjuku’s ni-chôme area that is chock full of specialty bars, cafés and bookshops. Although I did subsequently learn a great deal from two early pioneers of media representations of homosexuality in Japan, James Valentine (1997) and Wim Lunsing (1997), the historical material I later uncovered (McLelland 2005) was largely based on my own archival research.

Not finding the aspects of Japan that had most intrigued me included in any course offerings available in the UK, I returned to Japan in 1991, a period that saw the beginning of a “gay boom” in media coverage, when interest in male homosexuality escalated across various media including film, magazines and literature. From this point on it became impossible to argue that there was insufficient material to support PhD research on the topic. I went on to document the gay boom in my first book, Male Homosexuality in Modern Japan: Cultural Myths and Social Realities (McLelland 2000). In my subsequent, more historical works, Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age (McLelland 2005) and Love, Sex and Democracy in Japan during the American Occupation (McLelland 2012a), I went on to show how this interest in sex and gender nonconformity was hardly a contemporary trend but had been evident across a range of Japanese media since content restrictions (excepting politically sensitive issues) were lifted in the Occupation period in 1945. A close engagement with and study of the “popular” has been central to my academic career from the very beginning.

Today, driven by student demand and new media networks that make Japanese culture so much more accessible, Japan Studies must necessarily engage with the popular in a manner that simply was not on the horizon back in the 1980s. Although niche interest in aspects of Japanese popular culture had existed among some people since the initial export of Japanese animations to Western countries in the 1960s, from the 1990s onward Japanese anime, in particular, has gained a mainstream audience. Anime and associated merchandise (games, manga, figurines, cards, cosplay) linked to
globally successful franchises such as *Sailor Moon*, *Naruto*, *Power Rangers* and *Pokémon* (Napier 2010; Allison 2006; Tobin 2004) have become part of the childhood experience of many children in Australia, the United States and elsewhere, and the animated feature films of Studio Ghibli have also attracted a widespread adult audience.

As a result, across the last two decades, no matter what their original discipline, due to student and institutional demands, many of my colleagues with Japan Studies expertise have ended up teaching into or devising courses built around Japan’s “popular” culture, most usually involving manga, anime, gaming, music, food and fashion. Institutions in Japan are also offering such courses, serving both study-abroad as well as local Japanese students. Such courses include a very different kind of content from the curricula predominant in the 1970s and 1980s that my colleagues and I first encountered.

From the early 2000s, emphasizing “Japan cool” (McGray 2002) has also become a common marketing strategy on the part of Japanese businesses and government agencies (McLelland 2009). Drawing on Joseph Nye’s (1990) notion of “soft power,” referring to the ways in which a positive interest in and appreciation for a nation’s culture can also support that nation’s broader political agenda, the Japanese government has increasingly been investing in “cool Japan” strategies and programs, especially in Asia, where there still exist tensions between Japan and neighboring countries as a consequence of Japanese imperialism in the last century. Koichi Iwabuchi (2010) argues that Japanese government investment in cool Japan, which he terms “brand nationalism,” is an attempt to deploy this soft power as a kind of cultural imperialism. He points out how the aim is to promote an image of Japan, in Asia in particular, that is more “‘liberated’ and ‘humane’” (ibid.: 72). This strategy has been met with suspicion in some contexts in Asia (see Santos and Sihombing in this volume).

Yet despite the embrace of “cool Japan” marketing tactics on the part of universities attempting to attract increased student numbers, and by Japanese agencies looking to capitalize on the positive ambience generated by young people’s interest in and affection for Japan’s popular culture, there are a number of factors complicating this strategy. These are to do with the manner in which students and fans access Japanese material (seldom through official channels), the kinds of material that they choose to access (often involving controversial imagery and scenarios), and how audiences use these materials. As outlined below, neither the Japanese content industries nor the Japanese government (nor indeed classroom instructors) have any control over how, in today’s “remix” world, cultural content is accessed, (re)interpreted and (re)distributed among networks of fans and consumers (McLelland 2009).

What is “cool” about Japan for young people often includes aspects of the culture that are different and disapproved of by authority figures. Ian Condry, pointing to the subcultural manner in which these texts circulate, argues that “cool” is not really the best moniker to capture the range of fan interests, suggesting instead “geek Japan,” a far less upbeat label (Condry 2013: 205).
As is pointed out by several of the contributors to this volume, it is the “virtual” (deliberately non-realist) manner in which manga and anime worlds are presented that allows characters to go beyond conventional depictions of gender, sexuality and embodiment. The fact that these texts are usually consumed in the context of vibrant fan communities also captures young people’s imagination and engages them in a process of mutual exploration and self-fashioning. As well as the edgy characters and plots that fans find exciting, the “disjunctive imaginaries” on offer also appeal to young people precisely because they are “in sync with lived experiences of fragmentation, mobility and flux” (Allison 2006: 11) in our increasingly globalized world.

It is this instability of both the image and the content of “cool Japan” that has seen the development in recent years of a new kind of “Japan bashing,” this time it being certain content that is supposedly alien or “other,” particularly in manga and anime (Hinton 2014: 93–94), that is judged harmful for youth audiences (McLelland 2009). These anxieties are, of course, not particular to material from Japan but have been a recurring feature in journalistic reports about the “effects” of popular culture more generally for over a century. As Kristine Santos and Febriani Sihombing point out in their chapter, popular culture is “formed always in reaction to, and never as part of, the forces of domination” (Fiske 2010: 43). There has been a long history of pundits happy to point out the supposedly deleterious effects of such things as the novel, the movies, radio, comic books, television, rock music, video games, the Internet (the list goes on) on “the masses” and on “juveniles” in particular. Yet, as Williams and Zenger argue, these days “popular culture” has become a crucial resource that “young people are appropriating and reusing … to perform identities and make meaning in their own lives” (Williams and Zenger 2012: 3), and as such, pop culture materials are an appropriate and important resource in the humanities classroom. Although each author in this collection engages with these ongoing debates in order to frame their analysis, their chapters all adopt a personal tone. These are chapters by (and for) scholars and students who have a deep investment in and enthusiasm not only for Japanese culture but for “popular” culture more broadly defined.

Teaching Japan Studies in the convergent classroom

In recent decades interest in “cool Japan,” particularly young people’s engagement with animation, comics and gaming, is widely acknowledged to be a driving factor in recruitment to undergraduate Japanese language and studies courses at universities around the world. Unlike the 1980s when obtaining original Japanese-language materials outside Japan was time consuming and expensive, contemporary students now live in a convergent media environment where they occupy multiple roles as fans, students and “produsers” (producers + users; Bruns 2008) of Japanese cultural content that is available via the Internet. The field of Japan Studies has seen not only a
transformation in the kinds of students attracted to the discipline, but also in the modes of engagement that these students have with Japanese popular culture more generally.

In comparison with the large numbers of manga and anime produced and made available in Japan, only a very small proportion of titles are ever commercially released in English. Furthermore there can be a long time lag between the original Japanese release date and the licensing of an English translation, which makes fans impatient. Also important is the fact that many Japanese anime are altered in the localization process – most often sexual references are edited out and any violence is toned down so as to fit with local notions of what is acceptable for a young audience (see for example, Fujimoto 2015: 38; Hinton 2014: 99–100; Parini 2012; Allison 2006: 150–151). This frustrates many die-hard fans who are eager to view the original undulterated series (Daniels 2008: 710). As a result, as well as the mainstream products that have been officially licensed to overseas companies, translated into English, given appropriate viewer ratings and conventionally distributed, an enormous amount of unofficially translated and transmitted material also exists on the Internet, driven by fan demands. Original Japanese anime titles are dubbed or subtitled (so-called “fandubs” and “fansubs”), and manga scanned and translated (so-called “scanlations”) into English and other languages by circles of fans, and distributed via fan sites and peer-to-peer networks (see Freedman, in this volume; Lee 2012; Condry 2010; Hatcher 2005).

New technologies not only enable the spread of these unofficial versions of Japanese media products to a wider audience but they break “the link between media content and delivery platforms” (Flew 2012: 7). Accordingly, fans themselves have taken on “active roles as mediators and distributors,” and facilitated the “bottom-up spread of culture across geographical and linguistic borders” (Lee 2011: 113) in a manner that evades industry, government and censorship board regulation. The ease of manipulating digital content in today’s “remix culture” (Lessig 2008) has also resulted in an equally voluminous amount of fan-generated content based on Japanese originals. Known in Japanese as dōjin (coterie) products, these “transformative works” are also widely available online and popular among fans (Lam 2010; Hatcher 2005).

New circuits of distribution enabled by social media, including sites like Tumblr, Facebook and Reddit as well as video-sharing sites such as YouTube and the Japanese site Niconico, have made this remixed material widely available. Despite the fact that fansubbers evince a “strong desire to support the local animation industry by promoting anime culture and widening anime’s accessibility” (Lee 2011: 1138; see also Hatcher 2005), their activities can impact negatively on sales. Also, given that these circuits of production and redistribution are illegal in terms of international copyright law, they have at times resulted in the Japanese manga, anime and gaming industries taking legal action (Lee 2012). Hence, students’ easy access to and manipulation of Japanese cultural content through sites that offer scanlation and
fansubbing hosting services, as well as sites that enable the production and dissemination of derivative *dōjin* works, raises a number of ethical and legal issues, not least infringement of copyright. As a student pointed out to Alisa Freedman (see her chapter in this volume), drawing on unlicensed and unregulated material in the classroom can result in activities that are “all kinds of illegal,” and this challenge requires that academics help students think about source materials in new ways, including a range of ethical positions regarding fansubs (Condry 2013: 174–176).

In addition to concerns over copyright, there are problems to do with the increased flow of Japanese cultural materials that are treated differently by various viewer-ratings systems. A clear example of these inconsistencies is the treatment of the parody anime *Puni Puni Poemy* (2001), directed by Watanabe Shin’ichi (who also made the popular *Excel Saga*). This title has received an MA15+ rating in Australia, a TV-MA rating in the United States, an R18+ rating in the United Kingdom, but was banned in New Zealand in 2004 in what has been described as a “standard-setting case” over concerns about “gateway scenes” depicting rape (ECPAT International 2012: 35). This example illustrates Murray Eiland’s (2009: 406) point that “obscenity is based upon cultural norms,” which can differ even among societies as closely related as those mentioned.

In fact, in recent years, the violent and sexualized content of some Japanese media, particularly in regard to representations of characters who may “appear to be” minors, has caused considerable concern in some countries, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia, where fictional depictions of child characters have been included in the definition of “child-abuse publications” (McLelland 2012b; Eiland 2009; Zanghellini 2009). The ever-expanding scope of this legislation has led to serious charges being laid against some manga and anime collectors in these and other jurisdictions. In 2010 in Sweden, a professional manga translator was prosecuted over cartoon images stored on his computer which appeared to depict minors in sexual contexts (Orange 2012). Although this conviction was later overturned in Sweden’s Supreme Court, it demonstrates how fans, academics and students alike should exercise extreme caution over which images they choose to archive, since it is not uncommon for the media to contain sweeping judgments about the connection between anime and actual child-abuse material. One judge observed in a recent Australian case, “those who view anime will go on to view images of actual children being sexually abused” (Marcus 2015). Hence Eiland advises that, “[n]o one with comic images in their possession – which can include viewing them on a computer – can afford not to know the law” (Eiland 2009: 396).

Furthermore, while anime such as *Puni Puni Poemy* that have been licensed and distributed through official channels at least have ratings attached, *dōjin* works, which might have received a PG rating for their official versions, are often “sexed up” in fan creations to an extent that they would receive adult-only ratings or be banned altogether in some jurisdictions. Take for example
the *Harry Potter* franchise, the movie versions of which are variously rated PG (parental guidance) or M (mature) in Australia. M for “mature” is the highest unrestricted rating, meaning that children under 15 may legally access it, although parents are advised that it contains scenes of “moderate impact” (Australian Classification Board n.d.). Young people, who may initially consume the official *Harry Potter* texts in books purchased from the store or by viewing the movies on DVD, if they were to follow their interest online would encounter thousands of fan creations specializing in *Harry Potter* “slash” (sexualized fan-authored stories and artwork). Indeed, highly sexualized *Harry Potter* manga are a major *dōjin* genre in Japan and internationally (Orbaugh 2010). Concerns about children accessing this material while searching for official *Harry Potter* stories on the Internet have prompted the author J.K. Rowling to send a cease and desist letter via her publisher to at least one *Harry Potter* fan site hosting such “sexually explicit content.”

Hence, although official ratings systems may be useful for gauging what material is suitable to use in class or as the basis for student research projects, students do not only access officially distributed merchandise, but also download other material directly from the Internet. The irony of the New Zealand ban on *Puni Puni Poemy*, for instance, is that the DVD set can be ordered via Amazon and episodes from the series can be viewed for free on YouTube. The ban is only likely to increase the series’ notoriety and therefore people’s interest in the title. Working out what is and is not legal to view in different locations is an unreasonable expectation for most viewers (who bothers to check ratings before viewing or clicking on embedded links?), and yet the consequences for having “refused classification” or “objectionable” materials on one’s devices can be serious when crossing borders, as detailed below.

**What are the legal concerns?**

Inconsistencies in the ratings of Japanese pop culture content across jurisdictions, as mentioned above, is a problem that can arise as students and academics move across borders. This problem is enhanced these days since travelers move around with all their “stuff,” including image and music files, as well as work- and study-related materials, on devices such as phones, laptops and tablets. People are increasingly reliant on an Internet environment that enables “multi-tasking and mobility” (Han 2011: 73), and yet the archiving of all users’ media on convergent devices exposes them to increased surveillance. Carolyn Guertin has noted how since 2008 in the United States, border guards have been given increased oversight of copyright infringement and “have the right to seize any digital devices or files without suspicion of wrongdoing” (Guertin 2012: 13). Guertin queries whether these “copyright cops” are able to distinguish between academic fair use and piracy. The intellectual property provisions in the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are also of concern for fan activities such as scanlation given
that “significant willful copyright or related rights infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain” are also targeted (TechnoLlama 2013; see also the discussion in Phro 2015).

One more contentious issue regarding the kinds of material that students use in their assignments and show in class concerns sexual explicitness. As Joseph Tobin points out, “there is much less concern in Japan than in the West about the presence of sexual themes in media texts enjoyed by children” (Tobin 2004: 284; see also Fujimoto 2015: 38; Daniels 2008: 721–722; and Orbaugh, this volume). In addition, unlike most Anglophone jurisdictions, Japanese child pornography legislation does not target purely fictional images of characters that may “appear to be” underage. In a situation similar to the United States, such images can only be captured by the law if they are first judged to be “obscene” and thus outside of constitutional protection. There is a growing discrepancy between the treatment of fictional child-like characters in Japan and some Western countries in relation to scenes involving sex or violence (see Orbaugh, Galbraith and Stapleton in this volume). While early child pornography legislation dating from the 1970s in Anglophone nations aimed to stop the production and circulation of images of harm and abuse of actual children, since the digital revolution of the 1990s this definition has been expanded to include “virtual” (that is, unreal, fictitious, manufactured) images including manga and anime representations (McLelland 2012b; Johnson 2010; Eiland 2009; Akdeniz 2008: 15). Just some of the various legislation and case law that captures these purely fictitious representations includes:

- **Canada:** in *R. v. Sharpe* (2001) the presiding judge found that “‘person’ includes both actual and imaginary human beings.”
- **United States:** the PROTECT Act Section 1466A (2003) criminalizes possession of “a visual depiction of any kind including … a cartoon” that depicts “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” that is also “obscene.”
- **Australia:** in the case *McEwan v. Simmons & Anor* (2008) the presiding judge found that “the word ‘person’ includes fictional or imaginary characters.”
- **United Kingdom:** the Coroners and Justice Act Chapter 2 (2009) “requires that a person in an image is to be treated as a child … despite the fact that some of the physical characteristics shown are not of a child”; subsection (8) “makes it clear that references to an image of a child include references to an imaginary child.”

As the case of *Puni Puni Poemy* discussed above shows, even material that most anime fans would consider fairly uncontroversial (it currently has a 7.4 rating on popular online movie database IMDb and 3.7 stars on Amazon) can fall foul of country-based legislation on child pornography. Specifically sexual genres within Japanese manga and anime, including *loli/rori* (Lolita),
hentai (perverse sex) and yaoi (slash) and the “boys’ love” (BL) genres, are thus clearly at risk, as are regular manga titles that may include only a few pages of risqué “fan service” (Russell 2008).

Even in the United States convictions have occurred in relation to the import of manga from Japan. In February 2010, Christopher Handley, an avid manga collector living in Iowa, was sentenced to six months in prison after pleading guilty to possessing manga supposedly featuring “obscene visual representations of minors engaged in sexual conduct.” I insert “supposedly” here, since Handley accepted a plea bargain and the case was never tried in court, so the obscenity of the material in question was based on a presupposition of the arresting officers, not a finding by a jury or magistrate.

Handley was prosecuted under provisions of the 2003 PROTECT Act, which widened the list of crimes related to the sexual exploitation of minors to include possession and distribution of “obscene” fictional images. The emphasis on obscenity here is significant because in 1999 the Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeals had found provisions in the 1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act that prohibited depictions that only “appear to be a minor” (thus potentially capturing fictional material) to be “overbroad.” The Ninth Circuit “held that the First Amendment prohibits the US Congress from enacting a statute that makes criminal the generation of images of fictitious children engaged in imaginary but explicit sexual conduct” (Akdeniz 2008: 102). This ruling was later endorsed by the Supreme Court in 2002 (Akdeniz 2008: 106). The addition of a section entitled “Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children” to the PROTECT Act which, among other things, specifically identified obscene cartoons as a prohibited item, was an attempt to capture fictional images – since obscenity is not covered by First Amendment protection (Akdeniz 2008: 129). Hence the situation in Japan concerning fictitious minors is similar to the United States, given that American advisors authored the Japanese constitution during the 1945–52 Occupation of the country at the close of the Pacific War and included in it a robust defense of freedom of expression in Article 21. In a manner similar to the United States, in order for fictitious images of minors to be prohibited, they must first be found to be obscene.

Handley’s prosecution was the first time in the United States that a comic book collector was sent to prison for owning comic books when there was no further evidence that he also collected or accessed real child pornography (see the summary of the case in CBLDF n.d.). This case was paralleled recently by the well-publicized prosecution in the United Kingdom of Robul Hoque on child pornography offences. Hoque was, apparently, “the first British man to have been convicted on the basis of cartoon images alone” (Edmunds 2014; see also Gomez 2014; Lightfoot 2014). His defense lawyer argued that Hoque had obtained the images from a “legitimate website” where there was “no indication at all” that certain images could “fall foul of legislation in any country.” However, ignorance of the law is not a defense and Hoque was sentenced to a nine-month prison term (suspended for two years). His lawyer
concluded that “[t]his case should serve as a warning to every Manga and Anime fan to be careful” (cited in Edmunds 2014). As the CBLDF has pointed out, the problem with provisions that ban sexualized depictions of minors in cartoons, paintings, sculpture and other art forms is that they do not protect victims of actual crimes, but instead criminalize speech (CBLDF n.d.).

The Handley case has serious implications for students, researchers and fans of Japanese popular culture. As one colleague working at an institution in Japan pointed out to me when discussing Handley’s prosecution:

> We have items on the open/public shelves here like the ones that were described in the Handley case. I have a lot of Japanese students going abroad, and tell them to not take anything explicit, and to make sure they have none on their computers either.

(Personal email communication from an academic at a Japanese university that offers courses in Japanese popular culture for overseas students)

My colleague is right to recommend caution as the CBLDF website lists a number of cases where US citizens crossing the border into Canada with print copies of Japanese pop culture content or digital copies on their electronic devices have been detained and questioned on child-pornography charges relating to purely fictional materials. As Sharalyn Orbaugh points out in this volume, Canadian legislation was among the earliest specifically to target fictional representations of minors and this legislation has been referred to in legal cases elsewhere, including Australia. Details of the arrest of one US citizen at the Canadian border, Ryan Mattheson, including reproductions of the contentious material in his possession, are available on the CBLDF website which contains a link to an audio account by Mattheson recounting his ordeal for a New York comic convention.10 Indeed, confiscation of comics at the Canadian border is becoming so common that there are online articles advising travelers on the kinds of material most likely to be targeted and their citizens’ rights if challenged (Schwartz 2014; Gomez 2013, 2012).

Despite the severity with which Customs, law enforcement officers and the courts can treat these kinds of fictional cartoon images, I have never encountered an undergraduate student in Australia who has been morally outraged by fictional scenes of sex or violence in manga or anime. On the whole, my Australian students do not attribute moral seriousness to deliberately non-realist cartoon depictions. Students feel that since they do not depict real people, they are not really pornographic, and not that shocking. Indeed, as also observed by Orbaugh in her chapter in this collection, many students specifically mention “(age-appropriate) sexuality and frequent queering of normative assumptions as reasons for their appreciation of Japanese popular culture.”

I usually frame the contemporary panic about Japanese manga in the context of earlier concerns about the deleterious effects of comic books
generally – concerns that seem hyperbolic, even absurd, today (Tilley 2012). After all, in the 1950s Australian journalists were already criticizing the excessive sex and violence in comic books, but at that time the dire influence on Australian youth was feared to be coming from American culture (Osborne 1999). It has always been my experience that each year, when I outline the breadth of child pornography legislation and make clear the limitations on the kinds of images they can discuss or show in class, my students express incredulity. Yet the penalties for not being aware of and compliant with the law are severe. As legal studies scholar Maureen Johnson points out regarding the situation in the United Kingdom, “[cartoon] images widely available on the Internet and often passed between friends, particularly young men[,] as ‘a bit of a laugh’ are now capable of giving those individuals a criminal record for possession of child pornography” (Johnson 2010: 15).

The situation in Australia is particularly fraught since Australians have no Bill of Rights and there are no constitutional protections concerning speech. The chill effect of child-abuse publications legislation targeting fictional characters is discussed by Adam Stapleton in his chapter in this volume. Stapleton, one of my PhD students, had art books relevant to his thesis, which he had ordered online from a supplier in Japan, refused entry by Australian Customs. The legal procedure he then had to go through to gain access to the material can only be described as fraught (as well as expensive and time consuming). The contentious images in question involved the “baby art” of a British artist resident in Japan, Trevor Brown. Again, it is ironic that the material deemed too dangerous to enter Australia in printed book form by Customs can be viewed on the artist’s website or on the sites of galleries that exhibit his work in Japan (Liddell 2009).

To get a sense of the widespread confusion over what is or is not permissible to view in terms of manga or anime across different jurisdictions, one only needs to Google a question such as, “Is yaoi [an erotic genre of BL manga] illegal?” This search turns up multiple discussions across a range of fan spaces, and it becomes clear after just a few minutes of browsing that few fans have any real sense of the issues involved. Some of the misconceptions expressed in just one such discussion11 include:

- **Yaoi is legal but shōta [BL featuring prepubescent characters] is not.** In fact, the relevant legislation refers to characters who are or “appear to be” under the age of 18, thus capturing a lot of yaoi/BL content.
- **The Canadian and United States legislation is the same and yaoi is not considered illegal in either jurisdiction.** In fact, the Canadian legislation is much more inclusive than that in the United States, which is tempered by constitutional protections on freedom of expression – see Orbaugh’s chapter in this volume for a discussion of the very real differences. *Yaoi* is potentially illegal in both countries depending on a range of factors (including artistic merit) that are treated differently across these jurisdictions.
• *Yaoi is only illegal if the viewer is below the age of 16.* In fact, the age of a person viewing an image designated as child pornography does not affect the designation of the image as such, although the viewer’s age may affect the likelihood of prosecution as well as the severity of sentencing.

• *In Japan all manga and anime are legal.* This is not the case, as detailed by Kirsten Cather’s analysis of the successful prosecution of the manga *Misshitsu (Honey Room)* in this volume.

Such misconceptions are understandable given the complexity of the issues involved. These include the relevant law, which differs in many details across jurisdictions and may capture contentious images under legislation relating to child abuse materials or that relating to obscenity (see Gomez 2013). There is also the importance that even minor emphases in wording in different laws can have – whether the legislation uses terms such as “describes” (hence potentially capturing text) or “depicts” (implying an image), for instance. The “context” in which a contentious image appears (whether the work as a whole has “merit”) can also be given more or less importance across different legal interpretations. Added to these factors are codes governing mode of access – whether the image appears online or in print, is considered to have been “published” or is solely for private use, and whether it has previously been rated by a government-approved agency. Also of significance is the supposed “purpose” of the image – whether it has been created predominantly for the sake of sexual arousal, or if it can be considered to have some artistic or other value. The main obstacle to understanding the legislation is, perhaps, the fact that it is difficult to know in advance whether a particular image or text will fall foul of the law. This is due to the fact that most legislation rests upon notions of “obscenity” or “offense” which rely on the fiction of the “reasonable” or “ordinary” person as arbiter. In situations where a case proceeds to court, it is a jury, judge or magistrate who determines an item’s offensiveness, based on their particular interpretation of reasonableness. Although it is possible to make inferences from previous prosecutions about what material may be caught, as Adam Stapleton makes clear in this volume, it is hard to be definitive. This makes the collecting and viewing of manga, anime and other fictional images a risky business given that it is not possible to know in advance if specific scenes or depictions may cause offense. As Eiland (2009: 406) points out, “[t]here are many collectors of Japanese manga who may unwittingly have material that would be considered illegal.”

Although the chapters in this volume (outlined below) can give no definitive guidance on what is or is not considered objectionable in specific jurisdictions (legislation is constantly being revised and expanded and is subject to contrasting judicial interpretations), they do serve to bring awareness to the complex legal and ethical concerns that come with sourcing and using Japanese popular culture materials in a classroom or research setting. They are offered here as part of an ongoing discussion I have been having with...
academic colleagues, students and fans in a wider international context as to how to deal with these concerns in research and teaching environments.

**Outline of the chapters**

The collection opens with Alisa Freedman reflecting on how today’s convergent media environment has made all aspects of Japanese culture much more open and available to a variety of audiences, both popular and scholarly alike. Taking a single case study – students’ multimodal engagement with the manga and anime series *Death Note* – she discusses the various affordances as well as ethical and legal issues that arise from unhindered access to media texts. Freedman notes that an issue with a lot of manga and anime series from Japan, as I discussed earlier, is the ambivalent moral universe of these texts, and the inclusion of themes and actions that can be considered unsuitable for children. As she points out, *Death Note* contains “characters that can be read as either heroes or villains,” and advocates for the power of youth over conventional adult authorities – no doubt part of its attraction for a youth audience and a source of anxiety for those who would like to see the title banned from school libraries.

Not only is the world of the original text dark, complex and nuanced, but as Freedman observes, *Death Note* is an excellent example of how texts are constantly reworked and recirculated in today’s “remix” culture. A ban on the title in school libraries would achieve little, given that unlicensed versions of the series are available online. Indeed, research indicates that fans are much more likely to access manga and anime content online and for free than they are through official distribution systems. Not only are young people breaking copyright through accessing this material online and unsupervised, but they are actively reworking the texts and re-circulating their own derivative fan works. *Death Note* has been a particularly fertile source text for what Freedman refers to as “slash,” or the reimagining of original characters in male-male romantic pairings. It is through this kind of slash fiction that *Death Note*, originally marketed to boys, has picked up a significant female following.

Freedman’s case study of *Death Note* makes the important point that popular culture is inherently unstable, given that these texts are available for multiple readings and purposes. Although undoubtedly a key example of a media series that has played into the image of “cool Japan” internationally, *Death Note* has been put to uses that are unlikely to be endorsed by those lobbying to have the title removed from schools, nor, one might suppose, by some in Japan who would prefer to have Japanese culture represented through a less controversial text.

The next chapter, by Laura Miller, also affirms how this new media environment makes learning and teaching about Japan, including the language, much easier since students have more direct access to original Japanese sources and are able to follow their interests. This is a welcome development and a
very different situation from those of us first encountering Japan as students in the 1970s and 1980s. However, as Miller points out, this situation also brings its own challenges and these include negotiating the different types of “knowledge” about Japan that students bring to a classroom or that circulate in a local community. One issue that often comes up in the classroom is conflict between students’ (the “manga maniacs” of whom Miller speaks) very detailed knowledge about specific manga or anime series, including their characters and plot lines, and the standard academic requirement to develop advanced analytical skills in relation to texts. These days many students come to Japan Studies out of their love for these pop culture texts and may show some resistance to subjecting them to analytic inquiry, particularly if this involves exposing aspects of the text that are problematic, including their treatment of gender, sexuality or race.

Other problems can arise when the kinds of topics studied in class, or made available to students and the wider community through extra-curricular activities such as public talks or workshops, are deemed unsuitable by native Japanese speakers, who perhaps feel uncomfortable about less “cool” aspects of their society being widely discussed. Anyone who has lived in Japan for a time will have a list of topics that are best avoided. These kinds of sensitivity are not, of course, limited to Japan. Every nation faces uncomfortable issues from its past or in relation to its current social structure, from the fall-out of colonialism to issues of classism, sexism, racism and homophobia.

Miller mentions a number of incidents when her research topics were disapproved of by native Japanese speakers, a situation with which I am all too familiar (I remember being told that it was inappropriate to research homosexuality in Japan since there were no Japanese gay people). For instance, Miller’s recent research into the Japanese divination industry (worth more than a trillion yen annually) was dismissed as insufficiently serious by a group of business studies professors from Japan. Clearly, basing a Japan Studies curriculum on safe topics of which “normal Japanese people” would approve would serve our students very poorly – given that the idea of “normal Japanese” is a contested cultural construct that has been criticized by native-speaking (Befu 2009: 21) and overseas scholars (Lunsing 2001: 7) of Japan alike. Since Japan is a country that has been on the receiving end of a great deal of orientalist projections, including no small amount of self-orientalization in the context of Nihonjin-ron (Japanese uniqueness) debates, the scrutiny of any homogenizing claims about what “normal Japanese people think or feel” is important.

In addition, another important point about cultural gatekeeping touched on by Miller is the way in which students themselves can resist new ideas or new analytical approaches because these conflict with their own closely defended (often religious) worldview. The situation in Missouri, where Miller teaches, is particularly fraught, given that state legislation exists which allows students to opt out of assignments that conflict with their religious faith. Arguably, a student with such an attitude to education should not be in an
anthropology class where the entire point of the course is to examine how all beliefs are historically and culturally constructed. However, the growing sensitivity, particularly in the United States, around students being “exposed” to unwelcome arguments or information, does point to the need identified by several of our authors, to provide clear statements regarding content in course outlines, as indeed Miller does. This does not, however, preempt the possibility of student complaints, and may lead to self-censorship in the treatment of certain topics. The fact that some people may find some material confronting is not a reason to avoid discussion in the classroom. Indeed, the sense of discomfort around certain areas can itself become a productive issue for collective inquiry, as discussed in our next chapter.

Kirsten Cather’s chapter on *eromanga* (erotic manga) brings into sharp focus issues already raised by Freedman and Miller. The topic of her discussion is the manga *Misshitsu* (*Honey Room*), by the artist Beauty Hair, which in 2004 was the first manga in Japan to be successfully prosecuted on obscenity charges. The sexualized violence that Cather describes in the manga makes challenging reading (without even being exposed to the visuals), but she is adamant about the value of studying the text, not so much for its content, but rather for the way in which its prosecution tells us about how the limits of representation are debated in Japan and the kinds of arguments that are used to endorse certain representations of sex while disallowing others. There is nothing plebeian in Cather’s analysis. She is not interested in arguing whether the text in question is “art” or whether its prosecution is an infringement on freedom of expression. Rather, she is interested in the various reading strategies that an audience brings to a pornographic text – not what it means so much as how it means – and how these different interpretations play out in a court of law, in the media and in the classroom.

As Cather points out, she introduces the analysis of pornographic materials into her classes because she is interested in how deconstruction of these texts can become “a pedagogical, not an ideological, exercise.” Cather argues that we must be open to looking at all texts, not just “ones that might suit our own particular agendas,” and we should look at how texts work for different audiences. Hence, although *Misshitsu* is unlikely to fit the official agenda of “cool Japan,” the debate and commentary its prosecution occasioned in Japanese society is an extremely interesting entry to understanding how the concept of “obscenity” works in a Japanese legal and social context. This is a pressing issue given the ongoing case that Cather mentions, of the female artist “Rokudenashiko” (Good-for-nothing kid), who is currently on trial for obscenity in Japan for making available the data from a digital scan of her vagina, which she had used to fashion various items, including a kayak and some decorative figurines (see also McLelland 2016b).

It would be easy to imagine a polarization in classroom debate whereby the harmful effects of the circulation of a violent pornographic text authored by a male seemed self-evident, whereas sexual self-expression by a female artist is something to defend and celebrate. However, Cather is interested in opening
the text of *Misshitsu* to a range of interpretations, including positive readings by feminist manga scholars stressing how scenes of sexual abandon can be liberating to some women since they challenge ideologies of feminine modesty and restraint. Her point here is not so much to argue that sexuality is a complex and contested realm of human experience where pain and pleasure can be co-present (it clearly is), but to draw attention to a rhetorical strategy that, through disavowing any pleasure expressed by female characters in *Misshitsu*, posits them as victims of a “false consciousness.” This of course raises questions about the relationship between fantasy texts and real life, and the politics of that relationship where sexualized violence is involved – all important issues that require nuanced debate, a debate that would not be possible were such texts not made available for classroom use. In her class Kirsten is not teaching pornography but modes of literacy.

In her chapter, Sharalyn Orbaugh points to how very different legal and cultural differences between the United States and Canada make the use of manga and anime to open the kind of nuanced classroom debates about gender and sexuality called for by Cather a fraught and difficult process in the latter country. As she notes, Canada has detailed restrictions on pornographic material, including the prohibition of depictions that involve the “undue exploitation of sex” in a manner that is “degrading and dehumanizing.” Although there is also a requirement to consider the “author’s artistic purpose” in depicting the sexual activity, it is unlikely that *Misshitsu*, a text that Cather has found so fruitful for classroom analysis in the United States, could be viewed in Canada. The legislation in Canada is also much more comprehensive than that in the United States in its treatment of fictional minors (remember that in 2002 the US Supreme Court confirmed that a blanket ban on depictions of fictional minors engaged in sexual acts would be “overbread”). As Orbaugh points out, in a 2001 ruling that was to go on to be influential in the interpretations of similar Australian legislation, in the case of *R. v. Sharpe* the term “person” was found to include “both actual and imaginary human beings.” This judicial interpretation was one of the first in the world to bring manga and anime representations of young characters under the purview of the law.

In an engaging and highly personal account, Orbaugh shows how the breadth of Canadian legislation seriously diminishes the kinds of representations of sexuality available for public scrutiny and discussion. As she notes, it is precisely the complex and at times confusing nature of the depictions of sexuality in manga and anime aimed at a youth audience that captures the interest of young people – not just as consumers, but also as active agents in their own *dōjinshi* (fan works). Echoing points also made in an Australian context by Maria Pallotta-Ciarolli (2010: 89), Orbaugh argues how these at times “queer” representations of sexuality can help young people navigate their teenage years, pointing out that “sampling and consuming a wide range of complex manga narratives allows [young people] to make informed and independent choices about their own sexualities in a safe space” (emphasis in
the original). The Canadian laws governing representation of sexuality tend to posit young people only as potential victims of adult exploitation and not as active agents in their own self-fashioning. Orbaugh finds this positioning problematic – viewing it as a paternalistic attempt to protect young people and women, despite the fact that young people and women are key demographics in the reception and promulgation of the complex sexual narratives contained in many manga and anime worlds.

Patrick W. Galbraith’s chapter also opens with very personal reflections on what it means to teach and research on “unpopular topics” in a university context. Galbraith notes how the term “lolicon” (Lolita complex) in particular “has become a keyword in global criticism of ‘Japan’s child porn problem’” and expresses frustration at the manner in which media reports (usually written by those with scant knowledge about Japan) routinely conflate fans’ attraction for highly stylized two-dimensional manga and anime characters with a pathological desire for actual children. The meaning of any representation is, of course, multiple and always contested, and it is the job of academic analysis to provide historical and cultural contexts to explain not so much what things mean but how certain representations become meaningful. As well as having a close understanding of the development of lolicon imagery across Japanese popular culture from the 1980s onward, Galbraith has also interviewed and presented the viewpoints of numerous key Japanese figures who work as artists, editors and critics in the manga and anime industries. However, as he points out in his chapter, these attempts to provide nuance to the discussion of the role and place of lolicon imagery in Japan are frequently understood as an apologia for child abuse and any scholar working on this topic is liable to be personally compromised by association with an “unpopular topic.” Indeed, even publishing an interview with one of the originators of the lolicon style was considered too controversial by the editor of a previous collection (see Appendix I). Yet, as Galbraith points out, “[r]efusing to look at lolicon material and listen to people involved not only closes down the space for discussion and debate, but also actually prevents understanding of the issues at hand.” As a consequence, his chapter puts forward a compelling argument for the inclusion of controversial topics in both teaching and research because as academics we have a responsibility to challenge the naive and reductionist views of Japan circulated in the media and promote debate based upon understanding, not ignorance.

The next chapter is by Adam Stapleton, a Media Studies graduate and the only non-Japan Studies contributor to the collection. Stapleton carries on this theme of how texts are given meaning when subject to different types of gaze (including those of a fan, a researcher, a Classification Board official, a magistrate, a Customs officer). Stapleton discusses some of the legal issues he has faced in pursuing his PhD studies into “contentious images of minors,” which he describes as freely circulating depictions of child-like characters whose appearance has generated controversy due to the manner of their depiction – sometimes in ways that are arguably sexualized. He argues that
the recent widespread denouncement in the Anglophone press of Japan as an “Empire of Child Pornography” serves to disavow and obfuscate the manner in which Euro-American depictions of children might also be erotically invested. As he points out, the much discussed prevalence of “lolicon” imagery in Japanese popular culture is not a Japanese innovation – indeed, the term “Lolita complex” was coined in 1966 by an American author with reference to the 1955 novel *Lolita* by Russian émigré to the United States Vladimir Nabokov. The Lolita figure is not an artifact of Japan but the result of “transnational bricolage.”

Stapleton notes how the Japanese authorities have come under increasing criticism in recent years for failing to legislate against purely fictional representations of apparently under-age characters in manga and anime. Complaints have also been made concerning the failure to extend existing child-pornography laws that target explicit nudity and actual sex acts, also to include “sexual contexts,” thus potentially capturing many examples from Japan’s “junior idol” industry depicting child models. However, as Stapleton notes, not only does the ever-expanding scope of child-abuse publications legislation, which now includes purely fictional images that might only “appear to be” minors, take the focus off the very real and necessary requirement to prevent the abuse of actual children, but it also closes down public scrutiny and debate. Stapleton argues that an understanding of the Japanese idol industry can inform our perspectives on contentious images closer to home, such as the child modeling pageants made popular through series such as *Toddlers & Tiaras* (originally from the United States). He questions how it is possible to examine the different ways that the image of the child is constructed and offered up for the appreciation of an adult gaze in a transnational framework, if certain representations are excised from the public sphere.

So far in our discussion, contentious issues in the reception of Japanese popular culture outside Japan have been looked at from an implicitly Anglophone perspective. This is to be expected given that the above authors have been writing about their experiences as students, researchers and teachers in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia. However, significant though the impact of Japanese popular culture has been on fans throughout these Western countries, it is in East Asia that Japanese culture has had the greatest impact, influencing not just local manga and anime styles, but popular music, fashion and lifestyles more generally. Despite the popularity of originally Japanese styles, themes and images in the countries of East Asia, due to lingering memories of Japan’s colonial incursions during the last century there exists an uneasy tension between “political Japan” and “cultural Japan.” The ability of some fans to hold these two visions of Japan apart was severely tested recently when protests broke out in South Korea over the manner in which their country had been anthropomorphized in the web manga *Axis Powers Hetalia*. Questions were even raised about the manga in the National Assembly, with one congresswoman labeling the depiction “insulting to the Korean people” and a “criminal act” (Miyake 2013).
Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu’s chapter on the reception and transformation of Japanese BL manga in mainland China highlights how “Japan” is differently received in a Chinese context due to the contested history between the two nations. As Yang and Xu point out, some Japanese media were welcomed into mainland China after the end of the Cultural Revolution when relations between China and its former enemy Japan began to thaw. This included many Japanese anime series that were imported at low cost. In the 1990s this receptivity to Japanese media continued with trendy dramas based in Japan that portrayed beautiful people and lifestyles that were popular among the aspiring Chinese middle classes. However, in addition to these officially imported products, from the 1990s a huge underground market for Japanese anime began to develop, originally circulating via counterfeit VCDs (video CDs) and DVDs, and from the late 1990s via digital files on the Internet. The new availability of Japanese pop culture content enabled by digital technologies came at a time when Sino-Japanese relations began to deteriorate and the Chinese government began to place quotas on the kinds and amount of Japanese media that could be officially imported and screened. This made little difference to the availability of material, however, given that most of the titles circulating on the Internet bypass these official circuits (as they do elsewhere – see Freedman’s chapter in this volume). Indeed, there exists today very little content in Japan that is not also available in China, often with almost no time lag due to the practice of “0day” fansubbing, meaning that episodes of the latest anime aired in Japan are made available on the Internet in a matter of hours with subtitles provided by fans. Hence the quarantining of titles or themes disapproved of by the Chinese authorities is mostly impossible.

There is, however, another layer of anxiety about media emanating from Japan. China was, of course, subject to Japanese colonial incursions before and during the Second World War, and millions of Chinese people died and suffered in other ways as a result of Japanese military action. As Yang and Xu point out, Japan’s ambivalence around issues of war guilt and ongoing territorial disputes with China have meant that for many young Chinese there is a split between “cool” cultural Japan and “bad” political Japan. This adds a different layer of identification with and resistance to Japanese culture not apparent in responses from students with a Euro-American heritage, although it may be a complicating factor for North American or Australian students of Asian descent.

As the authors point out, there has been a recent media panic across the Chinese-speaking world about problematic media content originating in Japan, but the anxieties raised have been rather different from the child-pornography scare reported in Anglophone media. While the audience for sexual and violent manga and animation is usually imagined to be male in a Western context, and so far it is only men who have been charged with import and possession of obscene manga images, in China the supposed negative impact of manga and anime on Chinese girls and women has also been
highlighted. A number of Chinese women have even been charged and imprisoned for participating in fan activities involving the circulation of sexualized texts and images related to the Japanese BL genre, known locally as danmei. Of interest are the charges on which the women have been arrested. Unlike the context in Anglophone nations where the age of the characters depicted in these kinds of fantasy narratives would be a point of particular scrutiny, in China there are no specific laws targeting child pornography, although there are provisions against making pornographic material available to minors. What has given danmei such a high profile is, as the authors point out, that “it breaks two social taboos at one shot: pornography and homosexuality.” The case study provided by Yang and Xu is significant in that it provides further evidence that there are no accepted “international” standards governing the activities of fictional minors and it also points to how obscenity legislation can be used to prosecute women for the exercise of their sexual imagination (see also McLelland 2016b).

The legacy of Japanese imperialist ambitions during the Second World War is also a conditioning factor in the reception of the “cool Japan” image in contemporary Southeast Asia, as argued by Kristine Santos and Febriani Sihombing in their chapter. The authors point out how the recent success of Anime Festival Asia in a range of venues across the region is a clear indication of the enthusiasm with which Japanese popular culture, particularly manga and anime, is received by young fans. However, both authors point out that the widespread introduction of manga and anime into the Philippines and Indonesia in the 1990s, partly as a result of counterfeit and bootleg copies facilitated by the advent of digital technologies, was contested by older comics fans who saw the popularity of “cool Japan” with young people as an affront to existing indigenous comics traditions. The development of a mangaesque genre that melded local and Japanese influences in the Philippines was not welcomed by some existing fans and critics who saw this as a corruption of comic art. As the authors point out, it was specifically the Japanese influence that was criticized, since local comics were already a hybrid genre that had been influenced earlier by comic styles originating in the United States. There has been a perception in these countries that the Japanese government’s various cool Japan initiatives, conceived as a form of soft power in the region, were a form of cultural imperialism. This criticism has been particularly severe in Indonesia, where specific styles associated with manga – big eyes and lanky bodies – have been accused of stripping “Indonesian identity” from local comics. In both countries, mangaesque works have been denied exhibition space and overlooked or treated negatively in comics criticism and theory because they are seen to threaten local identities.

The way in which certain aspects of Japanese popular culture, rather than appearing as seductively cool, can be seen as threatening, is also discussed by Jessica Bauwens-Sugimoto, who looks at the intersections of religious belief and fans’ participation in contentious Japanese fandoms such as that surrounding yaoi (a genre of BL manga and anime). As already discussed by
Laura Miller in her chapter, Japanese popular culture contains many themes that challenge established worldviews, especially conservative religious ones. However, this is not a topic that has been much discussed in the literature surrounding Japanese language and studies pedagogy.

Bauwens-Sugimoto points out that there is a considerable amount of fan activity around BL across Southeast Asia which involves negotiating at times conservative religious influences such as that of Catholicism in the Philippines and Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia. Given that these religions tend to have a very critical stance toward homosexuality, and sexual expression outside marriage generally, women fans who engage with this genre are confronted with a certain amount of guilt – guilt about hiding their activities from friends and family and guilt about enjoying stories about forbidden relationships. Unlike some students in the United States discussed by Laura Miller who use their religious beliefs as a reason for not engaging with challenging ideas or relationships, Bauwens-Sugimoto found that BL fans who were religious were able to hold both their identities as fans and as religious believers in a state of creative tension. Some negotiate this tension by seeking guidance in prayer (but not receiving any clear answers about the ethics of BL), whereas others, interpreting religion more liberally, see the common BL themes of the pursuit of love and non-discrimination as being compatible with their religious beliefs.

Bauwens-Sugimoto makes the interesting point that women's participation in BL fandom does not seem to correlate directly with the strength of antipathy toward same-sex attraction apparent in a particular locale, but is more to do with availability of Internet access. Ironically, as she also points out, conservative ideas about women's sexuality and interests in some societies form a kind of protection for these fans, allowing their activities to fall under the radar, given that few would suspect them of having an interest in “gay porn.” The secretive and underground nature of some women's participation in the fandom has enabled the development of BL communities in unexpected places, including Iran and Qatar. However, as discussed by Yang and Xu earlier, when women's participation is exposed, they can be met with harsh judgments and even criminal penalties under some regimes.

The final entry in the collection, included here as an appendix, reproduces Patrick W. Galbraith’s interview with pioneering manga artist Uchiyama Aki who was instrumental in developing stylized shōjo (girl) figures in what became known as the loli/lori (Lolita) style in the 1980s. The interview appears here since it was excised from a previous collection of interviews with manga artists and professionals published by Galbraith. The editor of that volume felt that publishing an account by an artist so closely associated with lolicon manga could potentially alienate readers and reviewers of the volume – despite the fact that Uchiyama makes it clear that the development of his artistic style was more the result of editorial intervention than an expression of his personal tastes.

This decision points to the chill effect noted by several authors in this volume who argue that the ever-expanding parameters of child-pornography
and child-abuse publication legislation are feeding into a generalized panic about childhood in the modern age. As James Kincaid points out, narratives of child abuse are like a “Gothic story” that appeals because it requires us to “look no further” (Kincaid 1998: 12) – one has simply to adopt a position of condemnation and outrage. Any more nuanced position that tries to situate the implications of legislative creep in an historical or socio-cultural context runs the danger of being interpreted as providing an apologia for actual child abuse. As both Galbraith and Stapleton point out, the personal consequences of pursuing this line of enquiry can be confronting.

What is the future for cool Japan?

This introduction opened with a discussion of the ways in which “Japan” has been viewed by students, fans and researchers as well as the general population over the past half-century. The 1970s and 1980s were decades when Japan was associated with a certain “techno-cool” given the innovative design of music and gaming hardware, but this was also a time of “Japan bashing” due to widespread anxieties about the strength of the Japanese economy (particularly its exports) and the threat this represented to local industries. The 1990s and early 2000s saw the advent of “Japan cool” where the original enthusiasm for Japanese hardware gave way to an even greater enthusiasm for cultural content, particularly manga, animation and games. The spread of Japan cool was quite different from the earlier success of Japanese manufacturing, given that alongside officially licensed and distributed cool Japan merchandise, a far greater amount has circulated via fan-driven distribution networks on the Internet. It is through these unofficial channels that Japanese popular culture has had a massive influence on youth culture generally, across Anglophone societies as well as in East and Southeast Asia. As several authors have pointed out above, the widespread disregard for copyrighted material, the uncertain legal status of derivative or fan-created works, and the edgy and sometimes contentious nature of the content that drives fan engagement with Japan raise ethical issues, especially when it comes to the use of such material in the classroom.

Despite attempts by various Japanese agencies and programs to harness the interest generated in Japan by the attraction exerted by its cool content, it has proven impossible to restrict the kinds of material in circulation. The sheer range of pop culture content – and the very different kinds of themes, aesthetics and storylines available in manga and animation – have raised concerns about the suitability of some content for youth audiences. Moreover, the treatment of child-like figures in some manga and anime has been widely criticized by overseas governments, international aid organizations, members of the judiciary and moral entrepreneurs as promoting or at least normalizing child abuse. In addition, in some countries in Asia, the memory of Japan’s past colonial aggression has meant that “cool Japan” initiatives are received warily, with some cultural commentators fearing that the popularity of some
Japanese themes and styles with young people will lead to the loss of authentic local content. In a way, former imaginings of Japan as the politically suspect “Empire of the Sun” have morphed into images of Japan as the morally dubious “Empire of Child Pornography.”

As I hope is clear, the authors of the chapters presented in this volume, several of whom have engaged with Japanese language and culture over the course of three decades or more, offer a much more complicated picture of Japanese culture than we can ever hope to discover in a newspaper report or a CNN soundbite. Learning Japanese is difficult and time consuming, as is gathering a variety of evidence before making any kind of conclusion or generalization. The classroom environment is where different kinds of knowledge claims about Japanese culture – those made by the media, by Japanese native speakers, by manga and anime fans, by area studies and topic experts, by members of the judiciary (the list goes on and on) – are aired and brought under scrutiny. The classroom is not a place where we should try to close down conversation or limit expression to safe topics. As persuasively argued by Laura Miller, Kirsten Cather, Sharalyn Orbaugh and Patrick W. Galbraith in this volume, academics are employed to examine the nature of all knowledge claims – and this they must do, no matter how unpopular some of the evidence and viewpoints they bring to the table might be. What academics can and must bring to “cool Japan” is a set of enhanced literacy skills that can help students understand how and why texts become meaningful for different audiences and critique the all-too-simple attention-grabbing slogans prevalent in media discussions.

Notes

1 I use the term “Anglophone” here as there is a commonality among press reports on Japan across most English-speaking nations (primarily the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), and these countries also have comparable legislation prohibiting certain kinds of fictional representations of minors. I largely avoid the term “Western” as that would include European and South American nations whose media do not repeat this pattern of reporting to the same extent and many of these nations have not so far included fictional images in their child pornography legislation.

2 I would like to thank Patrick W. Galbraith for alerting me to this error on the part of CNN.

3 A synopsis and readers’ comments can be viewed here: mangafox.me/manga/dolls_fall/ (accessed January 25, 2016).

4 See the detailed report of an applicant who contested the ban on this website: www.hikari.org.nz/stuff/otaku/ppp/ (accessed February 4, 2015).


References


Many kids growing up in the 2010s have the Internet literally at their fingertips. They are able to connect themselves to a global network much more readily than I was at their age. Additionally, they have a tremendous amount of online resources to entertain, educate, communicate, and collaborate. My cousins are able to build the future city of their dreams with their friends online in Minecraft. Schools across the globe have begun providing tablets for student use. YouTube is being used as an educational aid. The Internet has become a truly integral part of youth culture, feeding from the ideas and enthusiasm of young minds.

(University of Oregon student)

This class is all kinds of illegal.

(University of Oregon student)

Teaching Japanese popular culture to digital-age students

One reason for the current proliferation of university courses on Japanese popular culture has been increased access to the Internet. Perhaps more than in any other nation, developments in computer and mobile technologies have influenced cultural production in Japan and have given rise to a new form of superpower based on the export of popular culture. Women and men of different age groups around the world have used Japanese trends to form communities, make statements about gender and identity, and resist cultural stereotypes. The Japanese government has leveraged the popularity of global fandoms to improve the domestic economy, as exemplified by the 2010 “Cool Japan” policies (Iwabuchi 2010; Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry 2010). News about Japanese trends has attracted large online readerships. In August 2014, the global press picked up the story that Sanrio had corrected Professor Christine Yano’s script for the Los Angeles Japanese American National Museum exhibit on “Hello! Exploring the Supercute World of Hello Kitty” (October 2014–May 2015), to read that Hello Kitty is in fact a girl (named Kitty White) and not a cat. This item became the most circulated news story on the Internet until January 2015 when it was
surpassed by the wedding of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie (i.e. Miranda 2014). These days, most American universities teach Japanese popular culture, and Japanese institutions, including Kyoto Seika University and Meiji University, have curricula in manga studies. My home school—University of Oregon—has started new degrees that include Japanese popular culture, including the Minor in Comics and Cartoon Studies. At least two academic conferences (hosted by National University of Singapore, 2012, and Elizabethtown College, 2013) have focused on pedagogical approaches based on Japanese popular culture. Students use their knowledge of Japanese popular culture to pursue careers in fields as diverse as business, law, computer science, art and journalism.

Whether teachers and students realize it or not, Japanese popular culture courses often rely on unlicensed, even illegal, materials. The Internet is usually the first place to encounter manga and anime because of instant accessibility and the fact that fans have historically promoted these media more thoroughly than publishers and distributors (i.e. Huang and Archer 2012). Arguably, students have engaged with manga and anime more intimately than with other cultural forms; they have copied their visual styles, translated and extended their narratives, and circulated their creations for other fans to appreciate. In May 2015 University of Oregon freshmen organized the campus's first anime convention, “Carson Con” (named for the Carson Residence Hall), showing the significance of fan culture in student life. On one hand, students have been collaborators in the global spread of Japanese popular culture, turning niche media into mainstream trends. On the other hand, students, while mostly in search of community rather than profit, have been unintentional pirates, disseminating culture without official permission (i.e. Lee 2009).

Fans challenge the dominant strategy of Japan’s culture industries of successfully adapting international formulas but not internationalizing their own products because the domestic market is strong enough, as evident in cell phones and television series made for domestic consumption (i.e. Iwabuchi 2002, 2010; Allison 2006). The term “Galapagos Syndrome” (garapagou-so-ka), denoting a strain of a global product with features only found locally, was coined in reference to Japanese 3G phones that were too advanced to be used elsewhere. This syndrome reflects both Japan’s reputation for fashionable technology and anxiety about being an isolated “island nation” (Tabuchi 2009). In the 1990s fans in Hong Kong, Taiwan and other parts of Asia watched pirated Japanese dramas on the then new technology of VCD (video CD) (Hu 2004; Davis and Yeh 2004); some serials, such as Tokyo Love Story (Tokyo rabu sutorı̃, 1991) became more popular in Japan after gaining audiences abroad (i.e. Freedman 2015). Before the Internet, fans helped to revive programs canceled by commercial television. In the United States, “SOS” (Save Our Sailor Moon) campaigns helped return the English-dubbed Sailor Moon to commercial broadcast (1997 on the USA cable network and then the Cartoon Network in 1998), and later promoted its syndication (2003 on the
Cartoon Network) (Allison 2006: 154–159). While many of these earlier fan efforts have supported corporate systems, the spread of popular culture online has circumvented standard licensing, marketing and classification.

In this chapter, I argue that despite recent efforts by Japanese government agencies to use the popularity of “cool Japan” products as a form of soft power, increasing Japan’s cultural visibility and influence, a number of factors work against this goal. First is the fact that the traditional export and licensing models of the cultural industries have broken down in the digital age, and authors, corporations and governments have lost control of the distribution of their cultural products. Connected with this point is the fact that new modes of distribution, reception and remix mean that corporations also can no longer exercise control over which texts are circulated and picked up by audiences or monitor the meanings associated with these texts. This makes it very hard to establish “cool Japan” as a form of “brand” power.

With the above points in mind, I argue that teachers need to make students aware of how they have collaborated in the global spread of Japanese popular culture and how they have challenged copyright and other laws governing the dissemination of media products. To illustrate, I will explain the moral, ethical and cultural issues involved in teaching and researching Japanese popular culture, and the fandoms it inspires through the well-known, transmedia example of Death Note (Desu nōto).

Death Note – consisting of a manga series (2003–06), television anime (2006–07), three films (2006, 2008), “light novels” (2006, 2009), and videogames (2007, 2008), all commercially available in several languages – is the story of a bored male student who kills criminals by writing their names in an old notebook dropped by a death god and the characters who pursue him. Adapted at a time when online developments were promoting manga yet print media still remained a powerful force, Death Note exemplifies how the Internet has changed the relationship between fans, corporations and governments, and how mainstream trends are now being globalized more by fans than by commercial efforts. The international popularity of Death Note is largely thanks to social media and video-sharing sites, which have enabled fans to expand the trend’s meanings. Death Note appropriations represent primary ways that fans have used digital media to personalize popular culture, including fanfiction, slash, scanlations and fansubs. These fan creations have inspired commercial products, having the unintended effect of furthering the significance of the Japanese publishing industry in the digital age.

In my classes, we both analyze and create fan appropriations of Japanese trends. Our goals include seeing how fan cultures extend over national boundaries and legal limits to better understand the role of the Internet in the globalization of Japanese culture. Accordingly, we discuss various aspects of Death Note: content, aesthetics and authorship; cross-media promotion; moral ambivalence and notions of justice; and gender issues, to name a few. We question why people become avid fans of fictional characters and if being a fan could become an economically viable profession. This chapter was
inspired by my experiences teaching Japanese popular culture at all levels, from freshmen-only seminars and large survey courses to graduate colloquia, at the University of Oregon, Waseda University, and Sophia University, especially between 2010 and 2015.¹

**Students’ changing impressions of Japan**

My courses are premised on the notion that students born since the 1990s have consumed popular culture differently from those born in earlier decades, in part due to their lifelong access to digital media. The generation we teach grew up with YouTube (launched in 2005), NicoNico Douga (2006), Facebook (public in 2006), and Tumblr (2007); the generation before them did not. Another reason worth acknowledging is the change in Japan’s international image from aggressor nation in Asia, defeated nation in the Pacific War, and 1980s economic superpower, to “gross national cool” in the 1990s, to borrow the term from Douglas McGray’s seminal 2002 article on Japan’s globalization patterns after the bursting of the economic bubble in 1991.

Members of the American generation who came of age in the 1980s, like me, grew up in an era of “Japan bashing,” incited by fears of Japan’s financial domination exemplified by the acquisition of US institutions by Japanese companies (Columbia Studios by Sony in 1989, Universal Studios by Matsushita in 1990 [selling all its stake by 2006], and Rockefeller Group New York real estate by Mitsubishi in 1989). We heard news of Vincent Chin’s murder in 1982 by Chrysler workers Ronald Ebins and Michael Nitz, who mistook him for a Japanese American and blamed Japan for the troubles facing US automakers. We saw the film comedy *Gung Ho* (Ron Howard, dir., 1986) about the Japanese takeover of an American automobile plant. The title derives from an Americanized Chinese expression, reflecting the conflation of Japan and other parts of Asia in the American imagination. We learned about Japan through books that promoted Japanese business models, such as the manga textbook *Japan, Inc.: An Introduction to Japanese Economics* (1988), and Ezra Vogel’s *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (1979). We encountered a Japan different from that promoted through Miyazaki Hayao anime (the English dubs of which did not screen in mainstream theaters in the United States until the late 1990s), as exemplified by *Kiki’s Delivery Service* (created in 1989 but not dubbed until 1998) and *Shojo Beat* magazine (marketed in North America by VIZ Media from 2005–09).

Although Transformer toys proliferated in the United States around 1984, Japanese electronics (i.e. Sony Walkmans and Betamax, and JCV VHS players) and cars were more prevalent than Japanese popular culture. The Japanese anime series that aired on commercial television were dubbed into English and localized to the extent that they did not seem “Japanese,” as evident with Tezuka Osamu’s *Astro Boy* (*Tetsuwan Atomu*, the most popular program on American television in February 1963), *Speed Racer* (*Mach GoGoGo*, US premiere in 1967), and Haim Saban’s *Mighty Morphin Power
Rangers, set in California in 1993, two years before Pokémon became a global fad. Japan was perceived as an “outsourcer” of children’s culture, as Anne Allison (2006) carefully explains, which then needed to be “neutralized” of its “cultural odor,” to borrow Iwabuchi Koichi’s phrase (2002). Early manga translations were localized by being “flipped” so that Americans could read them from left to right, rather than from right to left as the Japanese artists had drawn them, a practice now more the exception than the rule (McLelland 2016).

Thanks to innovative global marketing campaigns by Nintendo and other Japanese companies that combined American and Japanese strategies like parades, giveaways and cross-media promotion, better international relations between Japan and the United States, and occurring at a time of global popularity for hand-held videogame devices, Pokémon and Yu-Gi-Oh!, both initially released in 1996, sold because of their caché of being from Japan (i.e. Allison 2006; McLelland 2016). These franchises also attracted fans with their complex characters and narrative arcs not often found in American cartoon and game series (i.e. Napier 2005). Adult Swim, which has used the channel space of the Cartoon Network at night since 2001, aired English-dubbed Japanese anime series known among American audiences, including Inuyasha (2002), Gundam (2002), and Death Note (2007–10) on its “Toonami” program block. On April 28, 2015, President Barack Obama greeted Prime Minister Abe Shinzō on his visit to address the US Congress about increasing Japan’s military role Asia, by thanking Japan for karate, karaoke, manga, anime and emoji (DelReal 2015). In part said in jest, Obama’s statement demonstrates the political role of popular culture in shaping national images and erasing historical memories.

**Death Note as morally ambiguous, transmedia text**

In many cases, Death Note was one of the first manga that my students read; several were inspired to read it by watching the anime on Adult Swim. In addition to being a gateway into the study of fandoms, Death Note encourages students to reflect on their own childhoods and the meanings of manga and anime in their lives. Arguably, there have been more student projects on Death Note than published academic research (i.e. Nystrom 2013).

Written by Ohba Tsugumi and drawn by Obata Takeshi, Death Note was serialized in Weekly Shōnen Jump, Japan’s most influential manga magazine, in more than 108 installments (December 2003–May 2006), and then published as a 15-volume book series (May 2004–October 2006). The temporal overlap demonstrates the Japanese custom of first publishing literary works in magazines, newspapers and other “disposable” subscription media, and then, if they are well received, releasing them as books. Later collectors’ editions of Death Note in global languages (English in 2008) show the enduring significance of the book as a cultural artifact. Obata Takeshi, who won the Shogakukan Manga Award and Tezuka Osamu Cultural Prize for Hikaru’s Go
(Hikaru no go, 1998–2003) based on the board game Go, and Ohba Tsugumi, whose real identity and gender have been kept secret from readers, were paired by a Kodansha publishing company editor and did not meet while they were creating Death Note. The two also collaborated on Bakuman (2008–12) about ninth graders striving to become manga artists (mangaka), a series that comments on participatory culture and other aspects of fandoms. As of April 2015, around 30 million copies of the Death Note manga have been in circulation worldwide (Mantan-web 2015).

Adaptations have been made available commercially in several languages and countries, timed to maintain the popularity of the phenomenon. Death Note has been adapted into three feature films, made for audiences already familiar with the story: Death Note (Desu nōto) and Death Note: The Last Name (Desu nōto: The Last Name), directed by Kaneko Shūsuke and released months apart in 2006, and the 2008 spin-off film, L: Change the WorLd (Nakata Hideo, dir.). The first film had a theater release in more than 28 countries. Rumors of Hollywood remakes have circulated; one of the most recent, in July 2014, named director Gus Van Sant with a completion date in 2016 (Crump 2014). The 37-episode Death Note anime series aired from October 2006 to June 2007 on NTV, the Japanese television network that funded the film productions; a live-action television drama aired on NTV in July 2015. Death Note and L: Save the WorLd were made into a series of “light novels” (raitō noberu, that is, easy-to-read fiction with tie-ins to films, manga and other media), especially between 2006 and 2009, and videogames (Nintendo DS, Konami, 2007, 2008). Death Note the Musical – originally written in English and then translated into Japanese (opened in Tokyo in April 2015) and Korean (Seoul in July 2015) – continues the trend of adapting manga into musicals and costume dramas, as exemplified by the all-female Takarazuka revue’s Rose of Versailles (Berusaiyu no bara, 1974–) and Sailor Moon (1993). Although there are differences in content between the media forms, the general story is the same.

In this psychological thriller with elements of horror, an attractive male student named Light, nicknamed “Kira” (for Killer), advances his own form of social justice through killing criminals by writing their names in an old notebook (“Death Note”) that he received from a bored death god (shinigami), and elaborately evades his pursuers. (In the manga, Light is a bored high-school student. In the films, he is a university student majoring in law.) Other “kira,” death gods and pursuers emerge, and story arcs take place in Tokyo and Los Angeles (conveying negative views of the United States), and involve international police. The story dramatizes the coexistence of old and new media; screens (of computers, televisions, cell phones, videogames and more) are a plot device and visual motif. L and the other prodigy children of the Wammy’s House, some of Kira’s quirkiest pursuers, have the ability to watch more than one monitor at once. “Old” media (the notebook) are more powerful and sinister than “new” (digital) media, which are used to find Kira. Death Note has attracted fans because of its genre-bending narrative, puzzles,
multifaceted beautiful boy (bishōnen) characters, dramatic artwork, commentary on justice and surveillance, and advocacy of the power of youth, among other reasons.

This story that makes killing a means toward power and includes characters that can be read as either heroes or villains raises moral questions. Death Note has been cited as a source of real-life crimes. Most notoriously, on September 28, 2007, a male corpse was found in Brussels with a note reading “Watashi wa kira desu” (or “I am Kira,” the incorrect romanization of a phrase used in the Japanese manga), a crime nicknamed the “manga murder” (de mangamoord). Three years later, in 2010, four suspects were arrested; among them, Sidi Mohamed Atir and Abdessamad Azmi, were convicted for 20 years in prison, and Zacharia Benaissa for 23. School bullying involving writing names in “death notes” has been reported worldwide, including at least eight cases in the United States. Perhaps more humorously, a 14-year-old eighth grader was suspended in Pennsylvania in May 2010 for writing the names of her classmates along with that of Canadian singer Justin Bieber. Proposed bans of the Death Note manga by parents’ groups were voted down by school boards in New Mexico and other states (Anime News Network 2010), unlike the passage of the ban in Japanese elementary schools in Osaka, Shimane and Tottori prefectures in 2013 on Nakazawa Keiji’s autobiographical, anti-war, anti-nuclear, manga Barefoot Gen (Hadashi no Gen) because of its disturbing images. A 2007 Chinese journalistic exposé about students in Shenyang Province using toy Death Note notebooks (sold commercially since 2005), led mainland Chinese authorities to confiscate 6,000 copies of the manga as part of a nationwide crackdown on horror publications (Comi Press 2007). Almost 12,000 other “illegal horror books” were seized and banned in China out of the belief that they harmed children’s moral development, but only Death Note was cited in news reports by name (Japan Times 2007). Spokespeople from the Japanese Shueisha publishing company stated that they did not officially market Death Note in mainland China, and the confiscated copies had been imported from Hong Kong. Although Ohta commented in interviews that the story was meant for entertainment and not for serious discussion, Death Note demonstrates the power of popular culture to inspire lived behaviors (SJ Profiles 2008: 69).

Of course, most Death Note fans did not act on, or even ponder in great detail, its moral message. Some students said that they decided to read and watch Death Note as preteens and teenagers because their friends were talking about it. They bonded over in-jokes from the story and by imitating the characters’ gestures, such as L’s habit of perching atop chairs and Light’s munching on potato chips while murdering people by writing their names in the Death Note. As one student remarked, “[i]t was harmless fun, really. Just making fun of the dramatic-ness of certain scenes and ideas because the actual content of the show can be hard to handle.” As another student commented, “I held my morals that killing no matter what was bad, but I was intrigued and entertained by the show. I, too, sat like L, along with my sister,
and laughed at the chip-eating scene … I never took away any lesson from it, just entertainment and a way to bond with my sister.” This perhaps comments on how popular culture can desensitize youths to violence. Yet arguably *Death Note* has inspired more crimes than other series, further showing how producers cannot control how consumers use their texts, a fact that is not new but takes on extended meanings in the digital age.

**Copyright crimes**

Less fatalistic but still legally problematic, *Death Note* fans have created *dōjinshi* (fan zines), fictional stories, flash novel games, digital art, animated music videos (AMV), Internet memes, tattoo designs and other media based on the story, furthering the franchise’s global presence without permission from the rights holders. In Japan, an almost inconceivable variety of *dōjinshi* and other fan art have been sold in stores and at Comiket (Comics Market), held in Tokyo twice a year since 1975. At the three-day Comiket in August 2014, almost 12,000 groups of fan creators attracted around 550,000 people (Brady 2014). The guide to Comiket rules emphasizes the goal of providing a space for creativity, self-expression, and cooperation between corporations and fans. It also idealizes inclusiveness and community building and fan stakes in commercial products through such statements that everyone involved is a “participant,” not a customer (Comics Market 2013). Remaking *Death Note* has allowed fans to have an increased stake in anime they love. They have “mashed up” *Death Note* with global texts as diverse as *Naruto*, *SpongeBob SquarePants*, *Harry Potter* and *My Little Pony*, using techniques of juxtaposition for parody, humor and empathy. Remixes have arguably increased the value of *Death Note*, solidifying its significance in the global “canon” of young adult fiction and making it a creative force. The commercial success of remixes was demonstrated by the 2009 American bestselling book *Pride and Prejudice and Zombies* by Jane Austen and Seth Grahame-Smith, and subsequent publications in the Quirk Book series that used other novels available in the public domain, including *Sense and Sensibility and Sea Monsters* (2009) and *Android Karenina* (2010). Japanese videogames companies have offered officially sanctioned mash-ups, a form of remix that provides fans with chances to see characters from different works interact, as evident by Nintendo’s *Super Smash Bros* series (begun in 1999). Fan manga are different from *Death Note* promotional texts, such as the four-panel comic parodies of the story published by *Weekly Shōnen Jump*.

Narrative production in Japan has historically depended on fans, a process openly recognized through reader response columns in literary magazines since the 1920s (i.e. Frederick 2006) and manga magazines especially since the 1960s (Prough 2011). These columns have allowed fans not just to review serialized stories but also to offer suggestions on their development. The Internet has expanded this process by providing more immediate ways for fans to engage with texts and write collaboratively. Online stories that bring
authors and readers into close proximity have expanded offline, extending the artistic range of older media and providing new consumer bases. Prime examples are the novels written to be read on cell phones (keitai shosetsu), and Train Man (Densha otoko), the collaborative effort of 2channel participants, which became bestselling books between 2004 and 2007 and grabbed the attention of the international press (see Freedman 2015).

Fan appropriations have challenged copyright laws, which differ slightly according to nation; fan writers in one country might not be aware that they are violating laws in another. According to the United States Copyright Law, governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of copyright for a work depends on several factors, including its date of first publication. In general, for works created after January 1, 1978, copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus 70 additional years; for anonymous and pseudonymous works and those made for hire, the term extends 95 years (United States Copyright Office 2011). In Japan, works authored by an individual, under his/her own name or a penname, are protected for 50 years following the individual’s death; works authored anonymously and by corporations are protected for 50 years following publication. Films in Japan are protected for 70 years following their creation. In Japan, there are “neighboring rights”: rights of performers, broadcasters and other individuals who do not author works but are instrumental in publicizing them. After the copyright expires, the work enters the “public domain.” “Fair Use” permits limit free utilization of copyrighted materials for commentary, criticism, news reporting, research, teaching or scholarship. Although a student claimed that our seminar on “Digital Age Stories in Japan and the United States” (winter 2014) was all kinds of “illegal,” I asserted that we are within fair use for educational purposes. Proposed pacts, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), in negotiation since 2005, have tried to standardize international intellectual property laws, in the face of opposition from creative producers and other parties. In part through efforts by Akamatsu Ken, manga artist and editor of Weekly Shonen Jump, who also produced fan works, and Creative Commons, the Dōjin Mark (logo with a D modeled on the nib of a pen that perhaps unintentionally resembles a breast or buttocks) was created in August 2013 to be placed on licensed texts that indicate that fan creations are permitted. Fan producers worry that the Dōjin Mark will result in a crackdown on culture that had been tolerated for decades.

Fan producers worry that the Dōjin Mark will result in a crackdown on culture that had been tolerated for decades.

The globalization of culture has long called copyrights into question. For example, Tezuka Osamu copied images from Walt Disney by sketching while watching the films in theaters and sold books based on these sketches in the 1950s, reprints for which Disney now receives royalties. Disney’s 1994 animated musical film Lion King, with its protagonist Simba, bears a strong resemblance in content and the visualization of scenes to Tezuka Osamu’s 1950s Kimba the White Lion (Junguru taitei, manga from 1950–54, anime from 1965–67, broadcast in the United States in 1966). In August 1994, 158 manga artists sent a letter to Disney protesting The Lion King. In June 2011,
Sanrio and the Dutch company Mercis settled a lawsuit over the Sanrio rabbit character Cathy (ended in 2009) resembling Dick Bruna’s Miffy. The November 2010 ruling was in favor of Mercis, but Sanrio appealed. In June 2011, both companies agreed to drop the lawsuit and donate the money they would spend on court costs to victims of the March 11, 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown in Japan (Dutch News 2011).

**Slashing enemies**

In class, we analyze two of the global appropriations of *Death Note* that most overtly question laws governing the circulation of texts: fanfiction and “scanslations.” We focus on English-language texts to see how far Japanese stories have traveled and how much they have become ingrained in American youth culture. Like *dōjinshi*, fanfiction (also called fanfic and fic, and abbreviated in Japanese as FF), is the creation of stories using someone else’s characters or other content, often without permission and in ways originally unintended. Fanfiction authors can take stories in directions discouraged by authors, commercial markets, genre conventions and other established forces. According to Oregon students, reasons people write fanfiction include: the desire to get more out of a literary work; self-expression; connection with authors and readers; writing practice; enjoyment of a challenge; and the possibility of fame. As professional novelist Lev Grossman (2013: xi) wrote, fanfiction authors do what avant-garde artists have always done: they “break down [a] long-standing state of affairs that made stories and characters the exclusive province of their authors, and that locked readers and viewers into a state of mute passivity.” Fanfiction has expanded literary vocabularies. For example, “canon,” customarily used to denote the masterworks of a society or genre, has been used for fan works that uphold the integrity of the source texts. “Canon” is contrasted with “crack” (*kuraku* in Japanese) – stories enjoyable because of the extreme liberties they take.

*Death Note* features attractive characters, sexual tensions, emotional conflicts, physical battles, supernatural powers and open-ended subplots, all aspects that encourage fanfiction. Fanfiction relies on an established reading community that understands references and inside jokes. Most authors adopt pseudonyms, a literary custom in Japan especially before World War II and a practice still common among writers of popular fiction, such as those of light novels and cell phone novels. *Death Note* is part of a huge digital world of fanfiction based on Japanese fictional and real characters. As of April 2015, fanfiction.net, a popular online storytelling site, had 1,053 narratives of various lengths in English based on *Death Note*. Among them, the novel-length *Genius is a Curse* (serialized 2008–14) by Bloodshot Eyes had more than 2,438 reviews, 2,120 favorites and 2,006 followers. On ToastyStats, a blog that meticulously quantifies fanfiction, guest blogger “Shay Guy” (sic. “shy guy”), tracked the number of stories on fanfiction.net over time and noted spikes in popularity when their series began or finished airing on television or with the
release of new official adaptations, among other factors (Shay Guy 2015). He found that English-language *Death Note* fanfiction was most prevalent around 2008, when the series aired on Toonami. This further attests to how images cannot be controlled in the remix culture facilitated by the Internet.

Fanfiction.net offers an unbelievable diversity of *Death Note* crossover fanfiction, a fan-favorite form of remix that pays homage to multiple literary works. The most prevalent were *Naruto* (221 stories), *Harry Potter* (169), *Inuyasha* (143), *Bleach* (89), and *Code Geass* (53). Some of the most unexpected were *Pokémon* (9), *My Little Pony* (8), *Book of Mormon* (1) and animated Vocaloid singer Hatsune Miku (1) (Fanfiction.net). According to Shay Guy (2015), crossover fanfiction is not as temporally bound as fanfiction using characters from the same series. Fanfiction based on celebrities (idol fanfiction) has proliferated especially across Asia, as evident in the many websites devoted to stories about Johnny’s Jr. boy bands, raising legal questions about control over public images in addition to ethical concerns. Celebrities have claimed unlawful use of their images in games and anime, such as spoon-bending psychic Uri Geller’s lawsuit against Nintendo for the resemblance in Yungerer (English: Kadabra), which resulted in the removal of the character’s playing card from distribution. My students’ ideas for *Death Note* fanfiction include stories about Light’s little sister, the death god Ryuk, and people who react with Light and L on a daily basis.

*Death Note* has been a major inspiration for the subgenre of “slash,” the pairing of (usually male) characters in erotic situations. (“Shipping,” from “relationship,” is the pairing of two characters in a romantic or sexual relationship; “slash” refers to same-sex pairings.) Most slash uses male characters either because of the lack of more than one strong female character in popular narratives or the popularity of BL (boys’ love) as a well-known manga and anime genre. However, AKB48, the girl band with more than 48 members, has been a prime source of idol fanfiction. Especially since the 1990s, Japanese television dramas have revolved around love triangles between one woman and two men, and several popular American young adult series over the past decade have featured one strong female character with two male love interests, as exemplified by the *Twilight*, *Matched* and *The Hunger Games* series. Yet this pattern has not been prevalent among popular manga and anime. Arguably, slash has been a primary way female fans have engaged with *Death Note*, originally marketed to Japanese boys. Sharalyn Orbaugh’s analysis of *Harry Potter* fanfiction as feminist resistance to male domination of the publishing world applies here: “If the traditional idea of literature was based on a capitalistic notion of property (through copyright) and a phallocentric idea of intellectual ownership and creative authority (through the idea of the male *auteur*), contemporary fan fiction is anarchic, hyper-democratic in that anyone at all can participate, and feminist in its resistance to phallocentrism” (Orbaugh 2010: 178–179).

Because the number of online readers dwarfs that of most print books, high-profile professional authors have used fanfiction to vet ideas, and...
amateur writers have earned book contracts for original works inspired by their fanfiction. Snowqueen Icedragon (E.L. James) and Sebastien Robichaud (Sylvain Reynard), both writers of Twilight fanfiction, became the first fanfiction authors to receive seven-figure contracts from mainstream publishers. James, author of the bestselling Shades of Gray series, has downplayed her origins in fanfiction, while Reynard has publically acknowledged them (Jamison 2013: 224–231). Harry Potter and Twilight have helped to “mainstream” fanfiction and have taught that the afterlife of characters often has little to do with authorial intent (Jamison 2013: 153). American young adult novelist Marissa Meyer explains on her website that for ten years she wrote more than 50 stories, many novel-length, about Sailor Moon under the pen name Alicia Blade, an experience that shaped her career: “I met a lot of great people through the fanfic community, received tons of encouragement, and was able to learn about the craft and discipline of being a writer. I know that my writing has benefitted from it immensely” (Meyer n.d.).

As an analogy, many professional manga artists drew dōjinshi, including the collective of female artists CLAMP and Takahashi Rumiko, who is known for creating Ranma ½ and Inuyasha.

While publishers have allowed certain fanfictions and dōjinshi to exist, others have resulted in website closures and bans. In 1999, Nintendo sued the creator of a pornographic Pokémon dōjinshi, claiming damage to the image of the characters. In 2006 a 20-page dōjinshi written by a 37-year-old male fan under the pseudonym Tajima T. Yasue that added a final chapter to the well-known children’s anime series Doraemon sold more than 10,000 copies. Tajima was subsequently sent a warning from the estate of the author duo Fujiko F. Fujita, because his chapter fitted too seamlessly into the original and was not transformative enough, thus taking dōjinshi out of a gray area of tolerance and deeming it copyright infringement. Tajima ceased distribution and shared profits with the publisher (Yomiuri Shinbun 2007). Yet several websites sell pornographic dōjinshi (ero dōjinshi) about Misa, a female Death Note character in love with Light, showing perhaps that the idea of protecting children might be behind the closure decisions. The same logic was at work in J.K. Rowling’s closure of a Harry Potter site she thought was too pornographic (Angelan 2004). This raises the question of whom cultural producers are trying to protect— their characters, readers or assumed audiences of fanfiction?

While dōjinshi have been made commercially available at Comiket and on the Internet, most fanfiction has been available for free. Publishers worldwide have realized that fanfiction is not merely derivative and is virtually unstoppable, and have made efforts to brand and license fanfiction—for example, via Amazon.com’s Kindle Worlds, established in 2013 with ties to a limited number of American entertainment companies, such as Warner Bros Television Group. Amazon receives 35 percent of the net sales for works longer than 10,000 words and 20 percent for those of 5,000 to 10,000 words, which they price between US$0.99 and $3.99 (Kindle Worlds). Amateur works have
inspired commercial versions by professional authors, such as the Sueisha Jump Remix mook series on *Death Note* (2012–14) (“mook” is a Japanese industry term for a publication more substantial than a magazine and thinner than a book).

**Fan translations**

Scanlation (from “scan” and “translation”) entails scanning a manga, erasing the original Japanese language text, and then translating into local languages – a process usually done in a group and without permission from the copyright holder (i.e. Hatcher 2005). Scanlation is related to “fansubbing” (fan subtitling) of anime and other visual media. Scanlations are published on specialized websites; the largest, such as Manga Fox, OneManga and Crunchyroll in English, have had heavy traffic and sold much advertising space. *Death Note* scanlations circulated on Manga Fox from at least from 2007 to 2010. Scanlations have been a means for fans to share texts since the 1970s, before manga was professionally translated (i.e. Reid 2010); the practice spread with the development of the Internet. Reasons fans scanlate include unavailability, poor professional translations of licensed versions, resistance to censorship or alterations of the originals, desire for free downloads, and creative inspiration. Scanlations provide “sample pages” of manga, which is usually sold shrink-wrapped, for fans to preview before deciding to buy books. As a University of Oregon student remarked, “I think that, for the most part, things that are circulated online are much less localized compared to what would be sold in stores. They stay truer to the original, and often end up with truer translations.” Publishing companies perhaps concur in part with this sentiment, for they have contracted some fans to translate manga, believing that they know the texts more intimately than other translators and can be paid less.

Publishers have blamed scanlations for declining sales of licensed print and digital manga. In June 2010, 36 Japanese and American publishers (Japanese Digital Comic Association, including Kodansha, Shueisha, Square Enix and VIZ Media) threatened legal action against 30 websites that offer pirated manga. For example, OneManga, which had ranked in the top 1,000 global websites in terms of viewer traffic, closed in August 2010 (Melrose 2010). DMHY (2002–08), one of China’s oldest fansub groups that allowed other groups to publish on their forums, was shut down by the Chinese government in August 2008 due to the ban of *Death Note*, but it now seems active again.¹ Crunchyroll, partnered with TV Tokyo and other investors, was redesigned as a subscription site for accessing licensed English-subtitled and -dubbed anime.

Scanlations perhaps serve as an unintended archive when distributors go out of business, as Kodansha International did in March 2011, and encourage publishers like VIZ Media (which released *Death Note*) to offer legal digital downloads of manga. Yet VIZ Media editor Nancy Thistlethwaite has stated that her company pays more attention to other factors, such as online
discussions about anime, than they do scanlations (i.e. Thistlethwaite 2015). As explained on the official Tumblr for Kodansha Comics (2014), editors decide which titles to translate and market in the United States by researching the most promising works in Kodansha’s Japanese magazines, taking requests from their company about series to promote, and those with anime adaptations, and tend to prefer manga by authors and franchises with proven success rates. They deny that scanlations are a factor:

Though there was a time when most publishers referred to scanlations during licensing, and maybe some still do, we don’t. The other manga publishers I’m familiar with don’t either. This is not because we don’t pay attention to our fans. It’s because we’ve learned from experience that highly requested series usually produce sales that come in under expectations. The biggest reason is that, unfortunately, heavy social media users are just not representative of a majority of English-language manga fans. But it can’t help that most of the target audience has already read the series online, and thus isn’t very motivated to buy.

(Kodansha Comics 2014)

Nonetheless, my students say that scanlations were their access point to Japanese popular culture. When asked to suggest titles for collective reading, members of the University of Oregon Manga Group all suggested illegally scanlated works, not taking into account legality as an issue. Their main issue was ease of access. In addition, I have heard that scanlations have been assigned in Japanese-language classes as a means to engage students and teach translation.

Increased commercial efforts to market digital versions similar to those fans have been creating have met with mixed success, in part because they cannot offer anything better than what fans circulate for free. Failures include Jmanga.com, backed by the Japanese Digital Comic Association of 2010 and involving Crunchyroll, which folded in 2013. An example of corporations acknowledging the role of scanlations in globalization is Manga Reborn (2013), launched by Kumagai Naotaka and run by Beyond Perspective Solutions (BPS) in Tokyo, to provide a legal space for fans to read, translate, localize and share manga, and to ensure that manga artists and corporations receive profits. During their successful Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign in September through November 2013, the organizers appealed to donors by echoing prevalent sentiments:

Manga fans around the world have worked very hard to share the love, but how did Japanese publishers approach them? “Hey, all you people out there reading illegal manga, we’re the ones who actually own all that! We’re going to start releasing our stuff at proper prices with DRM protection now, so buy it and be grateful!” The backlash should have been no surprise … Yes, there may have been illegal activities involved in
manga’s rise in popularity around the world. But through that rise, publishers gained a wealth of possible customers without having to lift a finger. Maybe they’re the ones who should be grateful.

(Kumagai 2013)

Kickstarter (started in 2009) has been used to fund professional translations of manga, as well as to produce new series. For example, in 2012, Kansai Club Publishing raised over $25,000 to cover royalties and other costs of translating Tezuka Osamu’s early collection, *The Crater* (*Za kurētā*, 1969), into English (Romaro 2013).

**Death Note in the classroom**

My classes not only discuss fan cultures but also engage directly with them through *Death Note*. I use innovative assignments that test legal boundaries to teach the relationship between corporations and fans, changing notions of texts in the digital age, and various forms of translation. For example, students write fanfiction and create fan art, spread memes and search the Internet for scanlations. I require students to post their projects publically online for at least six months to emphasize that they need to be responsible for their ideas and to see how their texts interact in the world. Some have used the comments they received to improve their works. (One student was able to launch a legal, original Japanese language-learning program for American elementary school children by the support she received from online readers.) One student went as far as to create a website to help fans translate online materials considered fair use. To explore modes of adaptation and the gender assumptions of *Death Note* and manga marketing in general, a student drew a *dōjinshi* titled “Love Note,” in the aesthetics of *shōjo manga* (manga targeted at girls) in which Light was a female high-school student (Figure 2.1). Students have also designed lesson plans using scanlations and fansubs as means to teach Japanese language and culture to elementary school students. Students explored the limitations of academic conventions, finding that there were no guides to citations for fan-produced texts – a problem I have encountered in this chapter.

Grounded in Japanese culture but with a narrative understandable to audiences worldwide, *Death Note* is an instructive text to make students aware of how they have collaborated in the global domination of Japanese popular culture and have challenged laws governing the dissemination of texts. *Death Note* has been globally popular thanks to fans, and thus is a means to assess the impact of transnational communities on commercial texts, existing laws and national images. The series was marketed when Internet developments were making manga and anime more accessible, and its many appropriations evolved with digital media. *Death Note* represents a different pattern of globalization from large-scale Japanese commercial phenomena preceding it, such as *Sailor Moon* (which represented the power of
Figure 2.1 Penny Booth, “Love Note”  
(Image reproduced courtesy of the artist)
television) and Pokémon (which was marketed to a younger demographic with the invention of handheld game consoles in the mid-1990s). Online, images circulate more rapidly, are more quickly removed from their original home and placed in new contexts. Internet appropriations have both blurred and cemented the boundaries between artistic genres, and between creators and consumers. Fan appropriations provide insight into why certain texts more easily “translate” across nations and time periods than others.

The growing influence of Japanese popular culture franchises in the United States also demonstrates changing relations between the two countries and how popular culture is political. Japan is an important case study in how transnational fandoms shape national images. As Death Note illustrates, one reason why “cool Japan” has ended is the instability of the signifier, for nobody can control its image. What has “ended” is corporate and government control over content and its circulation, but “cool Japan” lives on in a radically decentered way in the lives and imaginations of consumers. The uses to which they put content and the methods they employ challenge traditional power and meaning-making structures. As stories change in the digital age, so do the ways that we study and teach them.

Notes
1 As noted throughout, this study has benefited from the insights of University of Oregon undergraduate and graduate students. Special thanks are owed to Akiko Hirao, Marissa Chizum, Eoin O’Neill, Kyle Nystrom, Edwin Wang, Ken Ezaki, Tania Seese, Dana Macalanda, Bram Rickett, Marie O’Brien and Penny Booth. I am grateful to Mark McLelland for feedback on various versions of this chapter.
2 The dōjin mark is available for download at: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Symbol_of_the_Doujin_Mark_License.jpg (accessed February 8, 2016).
3 I thank Marissa Chizum for telling me about ToastyStats and Nancy Thistlethwaite’s blog.
4 I thank Dana Macalanda for this insight.
5 I credit this fact to Edwin Wang.
6 I thank Akiko Hirao for alerting me to Manga Reborn.

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3 Scholar girl meets manga maniac, media specialist, and cultural gatekeeper

Laura Miller

Introduction

It may seem an odd career trajectory that someone trained as a linguistic anthropologist who collected the empirical evidence of recorded conversations (used as a corrective to folk theories about language), eventually began using material from the fascinating realm of manga and anime for research purposes. Over the years my interests have greatly diversified, and increasingly, I find that insights gained from popular culture help me understand current issues of language commodification, language and gender ideology, and language and youth cultures. In other words, I was not trained as a scholar of popular culture and did not use material from popular culture in my research for many years. As I began gradually to include examples from popular culture to illustrate key points in the course of doing research, teaching and presenting talks on social, cultural and linguistic issues, I found that it was not all smooth sailing. There have been many rocky storms to deal with. Despite the attraction, ubiquity and consequential nature of Japanese manga, for instance, using them for research and teaching introduced me to a new set of unexpected difficulties and considerations. This volume asks for an explicit discussion of problems, so although my comments may appear to be one long rant, the negative experiences I relate are overshadowed by predominantly positive ones.

I have found that in the case of manga, for example, they have the power to transport us, to lead us into alternative worlds. In manga we visit odd ravaged realms where mermaids buy fancy parfaits by the sea, as in Mizuno Junko’s (2002) grotesque cute story. Manga allow us to enter imagined arenas where handsome wizards cast fortunes and divine the future with assistance from adorable spirit helpers (Okano and Yumemakura 1999–2005). Some manga are intended to disturb us or to arouse us, while others might evoke a strong emotional response, as seen in the concept of moe explored by Galbraith (2014). Manga and anime seep into our minds, casting luscious spells. Manga power is so irresistible that universities around the world currently offer courses, sponsored talks and international conferences devoted to manga, anime and other forms of Japanese popular culture. Although it might seem
that teaching about and doing research on so many intriguing topics would be an enjoyable and easy task, this is not always the case. Each year news reports and conservative blogs bemoan or make fun of the lineup of new course offerings that focus on Euro-American popular culture, including courses entitled David Beckham Studies, Politicizing Beyoncé, Philosophy of Star Trek, and Film as Literature. Innovative classes that use popular culture as the vehicle for teaching about society are targeted as “fringe, questionable, biased or pointless” (Kabbany 2013), or are viewed with guardedly bemused interest (Georgiou and Hawkes 2014). Aside from the dismissive attitudes that greet scholars who teach about or use any type of popular culture, there are some additional issues for those who use manga, anime and other media products from Japan in their teaching and research. My goal in this chapter is to bring attention to a few of these problems.

University administrators outside Japan gently pressure Japan Studies professors to include manga, anime and other forms of Japanese popular culture in our teaching menus in order to tempt the growing troops of fans. It is obvious to most of us that in an era of shrinking student enrollments, we owe the allure of manga and anime for bringing fresh faces into our classrooms. The number of people studying Japanese increased worldwide by 9.2 percent, to around 3.98 million language learners in 2009 (Japan Foundation 2012). Landsberg (2011) notes that over half of those studying Japanese in the United States said they wanted to be able to read manga and understand anime. Although there has been a slight decrease in numbers of university students enrolled in Japanese classes in the United States, Japanese remains the sixth most popular language taught, after Spanish, French, American Sign Language (ASL), German and Italian (Rollins 2015). Yet, even with the arrival of avid student-fans eager to learn more about Japan, the truth is that some of us with traditional discipline-based training in the social sciences encounter popular culture enthusiasts with very different aims and assumptions about how such material should be used in a university setting. As McLelland (2017) points out, because of the quick accessibility of Japanese content (including books, films, manga, anime, music and other media), our jobs as educators have in many ways become easier. Students will often have a better knowledge of the stories and characters found in the latest offerings than those of us who are teaching the courses. Yet there still remain problems when students are not only oblivious of the ethics of acquisition (such as scanlations, see Freedman this volume), but also the critical rationale for why we use such material in a university curriculum. In addition, many of our colleagues sneer at our attempts to incorporate manga and anime into coursework, as if it is only a matter of exploiting some low-brow products.

In recent years I have been including discussion of selected manga, comic drawings and anime in my own research. Japan specialists like me who are not trained specifically in “manga studies,” have our own particular ways of thinking about and using these texts in our projects. Yet, specialized media scholars who use manga as the primary object of study have their own aims
and standpoints. Some scholars are most interested in the history of production, or the aesthetic and artistic features of manga as a commodity and an art form (Berndt 2002). For others, especially social scientists, an interest in manga might be focused on what selected or particular stories and images tell us about things like ethnic discrimination or gender politics. Given the explosion in manga-related scholarship and even specialized scholarly courses and training, we might wonder if non-specialist efforts are even valid. Does one really need to be trained in manga studies before we discuss manga in scholarly work?

Finally, when publically presenting our research using manga or other popular culture imagery, now and then we face protests from audience members who object to material they find offensive. There are several types of gatekeepers, including native Japanese observers who wish to “protect” the image of Japan, and persons with strong religious views who want to protect students from being exposed to values or viewpoints they disagree with (see Bauwens-Sugimoto’s chapter in this volume). Is there a process or strategy for responding to colleagues, native Japanese observers and other gatekeepers who complain that our material or programming on contemporary Japan is presenting a negative or tainted image of the nation and its people, or is poisoning the minds of innocent young students?

These three types of audiences – manga specialists, manga fans and cultural gatekeepers – present distinct challenges and opportunities for Japan studies scholars. I will begin with the least problematic, the manga scholars and fans, to the most vexing, the cultural gatekeepers, including the religious extremists found in that category.

Some Japan scholars now feel compelled to include forms of manga and anime in their research projects due to its cultural ubiquity, and because of its critical role in mass consciousness, not only in Japan but in global youth culture as well, where consumption and familiarity with manga and anime is widespread. Scholars in history, anthropology, sociology and other fields include manga in their work in order to support claims about cultural trends and beliefs, just as scholars have used literature and film in the past. For example, David Plath (1980) wrote an innovative study of ageing in postwar Japan which combined four interviews paired with four popular novels. Increasingly, popular culture awareness and competence is something most people in Japan possess, so not mentioning or including discussion of its role and impact might be viewed as a marker of scholarly obliviousness to “real” culture. I ask students to analyze manga and other forms of popular culture using the theories and concepts from different academic disciplines. This means that our concern is not necessarily the story, the grooviness of the characters or the literary worth of the text, but rather the cultural and social contexts in which the text was produced, whose interests are served by it, and the “ideological work” it aims to accomplish. These different ways of “reading” popular culture are why we study these texts in academic settings.
Media and popular culture specialists

In my research I occasionally use popular culture products to help me understand current thinking about gender and other social issues. I believe it is worth looking at because, as many scholars have noted, it is a shared cultural space where social and political life and events are represented, debated or problematized. Popular culture such as manga encodes cultural values and meanings, and therefore it provides remarkable and sometimes startling insights into a range of topics. I do not start out with a particular manga or cultural product or artist to examine, but rather with an issue or subject that interests me. In the past I have included discussion of selected manga in my studies of elevator girls, Cinderella, the historic wizard Abeno Seimei, and contemporary etiquette. I find that comics and comic drawings are useful to consider as subsidiary visual material that adds a deeper understanding to these subjects. However, I have faced criticism from other scholars for doing this. The following example illustrates how challenging it is to navigate mutual respect among scholars who hold diverse perspectives and aims in using manga in their research.

This example relates to Tezuka Osamu (1928–89), perhaps one of the most famous manga artists who is often acclaimed as the “godfather of manga” or the “god of manga.” While manga scholars appear to have nothing but extreme reverence for him, I have no such obligation, and have criticized some of his representations of female characters as sexist. Defenders protest that I am overlooking Tezuka’s noble intentions in creating such images, as well as his total body of work. I have been studying media representations and cultural activities related to Himiko, a third-century shaman ruler in Japan described only briefly by Chinese historians (Miller 2014a). What little we know about her is that she was the ruler of a confederation of chiefdoms, and that she was a shaman queen who was buried in a lavish tomb. For any historical event or person, there are numerous narratives to tell, and these different approaches and perspectives are all insightful in their own ways. Himiko is most often presented in postwar literary treatments and in visual culture as either a cute girl shaman or a demonic witch crazed with power. She is found in Tezuka’s (1967) much-lauded manga series The Phoenix, in the first volume. In those pages she is a vain despot obsessed with her ageing appearance and with finding the phoenix which will restore eternal life and youthful beauty. Sugino (2004) later directed an anime film based on Tezuka’s manga, and retained his negative image of Himiko, who similarly appears as a ruthless tyrant.

Manga scholars and Tezuka fans believe that he represented Himiko as an evil oppressor because he wished to criticize prewar and postwar totalitarianism and emperor worship (Hutchinson 2012). I understand that perhaps this was his aim, but nevertheless believe that he demonizes Himiko in a sexist manner. One can easily portray a woman as a wicked ruler without resorting to stereotypes about female obsession with youth and beauty. Surely someone...
as creative as Tezuka should be able to express his viewpoint without resorting to gender stereotyping? However, the responses I generally get from manga scholars (through article reviews, personal communications and audience responses) is that I am not according Tezuka the respect he deserves, and that his project was an honorable one that we must prioritize. Yet, at the end of the day, some of Tezuka’s work tells me that there were occasions when he was unable to make his ideological point without resorting to tired gender essentialisms.

Manga fanboys and fangirls

A great number of manga and anime fans populate my classes and attend some of the invited lectures I give. It is not surprising that they have deep investments in the material and its associated fan apparatus. I constantly learn new things from my students and other fans, and respect their expertise. However, there are sticky patches related to their narrow expectations about what counts as worthwhile manga, their disinterest in doing scholarly analysis of their beloved manga products, and their ethnocentric views that surface in discussions about Japanese culture and its media.

Is there room for consideration of a range of comic genres that are not modern-times sexy or fantastical? Galbraith (this volume) asks if there is room for consideration of “Lolita complex” manga that depict cute and cartoonish schoolgirls, but it is not only the potential for sexualization that might lead fans and others to exclude certain genres or to sanitize them. Some manga are humdrum and fusty, but still worth looking at for what they tell us. I like to contemplate types of comics that my manga fan students do not care about at all. For example, there are those marvelous Jiji manga political cartoons that appeared as a color supplement to the Sunday edition of the daily newspaper Jiji shinpō, published between 1921 and 1931. Many of its illustrations were done by the extraordinarily talented Kitazawa Rakuten. In one comic drawing he made for the cover of the October 9, 1921 issue of Jiji manga, we see a man and a woman engaged in an Olympics-style race. The issue looked at women’s entry into the public workplace, and Kitazawa illustrated this as a battle between men and women for limited jobs. This gives us a hint about how female labor was viewed in that period, as competition for limited slots. For me Jiji manga illustrations are gold ore that enrich my research and lecture material, but most students greet these insightful images with bored expressions and yawns. Apparently, old-fashioned comics fall short of their expectations of what Japanese manga are supposed to look like.

I also provide students with examples of another genre of manga they do not recognize — yonkoma, or four-cell manga strips that frequently skewer contemporary anxieties and problems. For example, I find that selections from the series of yonkoma on female office workers by Akizuki (1999) are excellent accompaniments for our reading of Ogasawara’s (1998) book on office politics and covert forms of power. I have also introduced students to
selections of single-frame comic drawings from etiquette books and magazine articles. In discussing contemporary worries about manners, I like to show them images of “bad manners” and unacceptable behaviors that are found in a range of media (Miller 2011a). My fannish students do not want to see or learn about historical manga, yonkoma or other genres of non-narrative manga such as daily life cartoons, spoofs of manners and political manga. They only want to talk about One Piece (Oda 2003) or Death Note (Ohba and Obata 2005; see also Freedman, this volume).

Additionally, many students do not seem able to analyze popular culture products as anything other than fantasy leisure entertainment. I have been incorporating an assignment into courses which asks class members to evaluate a manga or anime of their own choice using the anthropological concepts and tools learned in the course. In particular, I want them to recognize that popular culture does “ideological work.” In other words, it is motivated by the creator’s particular interests or beliefs. Elements of representation in popular culture point to a range of ideological meanings. For example, a simple black-and-white comic drawing from a book on manners for female office workers shows a woman wearing typical clerk’s attire in an office, sitting with her feet up on her desk with a pencil in her mouth as she daydreams (Zennikkū Eigyōhonbu Kyōikukunrenbu 1991: 171). She thinks she is alone, but a suit-clad male co-worker with a scowl on his face peeks in the doorway at her behavior. The text explains that good office behavior requires that women always be on guard to display their best manners, even if they think they are alone. The comic teaches us that in gender ideology, surveillance of women and how they comport themselves is constant, and that there is no place where unladylike infringements are allowed. I wish students could “read” their favorite comics and manga texts through an analytical lens. Instead, they only seem interested in providing extensive discussion of narrative plots and character traits, with little or no thinking about what the representation of these might mean. I do not expect students necessarily to arrive at a feminist or radical sociological interpretation, but would be thrilled if more of them looked beyond their enjoyment of manga and anime in order to interrogate some of the goals and functions that drove their creation.

Additionally, looking at manga from another society is one method for getting students to reflect on their own cultural values and assumptions, which are normally below a level of conscious awareness. Cather (this volume) notes this same function in her discussion of using erotic manga in the classroom, that it highlights different standards and logics involved in considerations of obscenity. Often, though, students ignore any cultural underpinnings and focus on the narrative plot and the seemingly unique (to them) visual idiosyncrasies.

Unlike fans, scholars are expected to come up with academic interpretations. Whenever I note that certain manga or anime contain sexist and misogynistic imagery, I infuriate some male J-pop fans. Introducing a feminist perspective on Japanese popular culture to non-academic groups (and to a few academic ones, as well) has proven difficult. Manga and anime fanboys
bristle when I point out that much of what they consume as “cool Japan” is actually narrowly androcentric, and not representative of the range of creativity found in Japanese popular culture (Miller 2011b). Fans often insist that sexist and misogynistic imagery found in Japanese manga and anime is merely fantasy and entertainment, and therefore somehow exempt from criticism. Feminists and critical scholars who interrogate such manga are accused of lacking a sense of humor, or of being staid and uptight prudes. Fans want a free pass to enjoy any images or material whatsoever without being asked to consider the gender ideology that makes them appear normal or enjoyable and completely apart from the society where we find them. Perhaps in blogs and fanzines one may sidestep these issues, but in an academic setting it is our job to make these observations.

Returning to my project of looking at the third-century shaman queen Himiko, I often share a spectrum of Himiko images taken from manga, anime and gaming, tracking how often she is depicted as a busty young seductress. On one occasion when I gave a public lecture about Himiko, a young man in the audience claimed that the reason Japanese manga so often feature young women with enormous breasts is because it is fantasy material, and since “all men” adore this type of eroticization, of course such images are plentiful. He said it was “only natural.” As an anthropologist, this type of claim is usually seen as emblematic of Euro-American ethnocentrism and assumed universal heterosexuality, a reflection of culturally based erotic tastes rather than anything universal about sexual desire or female beauty. Despite what evolutionary psychologists want to believe, female breasts have not been universally eroticized either in history or cross-culturally. In addition, even in societies where breasts are seen as erotic, not “all men” will find them so. In my research on Japanese body aesthetics, for instance, I traced the eroticization of breasts in Japanese cultural history, noting that it is a postwar phenomenon (Miller 2003). During the early postwar, some women who catered to the erotic tastes of American Occupation personnel injected paraffin or silicone into their breasts, a technique borrowed from outside Japan. Cosmetic surgeons trained in the United States also played a role in the promotion of breast consciousness in Japan (McLelland 2012: 137).

In any case, the young man who insisted that desire for big breasts is universal completely missed my point that the manner in which Himiko is either eroticized or cute-ified as a dim girl is not really about male sexual obsession at all, but rather about fear of female political power. In addition, going back to the problem of what actually gets exported from Japan in “cool Japan” ideology, we know that only a fraction of what is produced is selected for translation and importation (either by fans or corporations), and thus a certain proportion of Japan’s diverse universe of interesting offerings is left behind. Media products that depict Himiko as a ditzy girl or a steampunk streetwalker with hints of the dominatrix are plentiful, but manga, books and other media (such as new Tarot cards) that depict Himiko as a wise, competent ruler rarely make it outside Japan.
Despite these small irritations, the majority of student fans of Japanese popular culture are wonderful to have in the classroom. Their hot interest in manga and other media keeps them engaged in course material, enriches our course discussions, and contributes to my own knowledge of various products and interpretations. Any aggravations I have experienced are minor compared to the more serious issues of cultural gatekeeping, which I will discuss next.

Cultural gatekeepers

The days when “anthropologist” meant a white person (usually male) studying an exotic group of isolated “native” people are long gone. Members of global cultures write their own ethnographies, read scholarship about their own culture, and attend talks and lectures by experts from around the world. The field of Japan Studies in particular has a long history of dialogue and awareness of the issues of positionality and subjectivity, while also acknowledging that long-term ethnographic experience and the ability to produce insightful research is unconnected to the scholar’s ethnicity or nationality (Robertson 2008: 10). Although differences remain among scholars about how to juggle these issues, their debates take place in arenas apart from the local occasions when we speak to audiences about our work. In the case of research about Japan, the reluctance of local community members, colleagues, attendees at talks, and others to acknowledge anything that does not accord with folk models of Japanese middle-class homogeneity is something frequently faced by scholars of contemporary Japan. How do we respond to protests that our research and lectures are presenting an “incorrect” image of Japan?

Other anthropologists have written about the politics of doing fieldwork in communities where members consume the resulting published research findings. Handler (1993), for example, found that his study of Canadian nationalism in Quebec enraged the local subjects, who vented their fury at him in countless reviews, news items and letters. Handler was accused of being a pompous outsider who could never understand French Canadian culture. He was also condemned for what local people felt was a condescending rejection of local essentialisms. Most of us in Japan Studies similarly deal with entrenched cultural essentialisms. Academic institutions, local Japan societies, and community groups claim they want more J-pop programming, but what they appear to envision is “safe” Miyazaki Hayao anime films and Sanrio’s Hello Kitty. They approve of the tea ceremony but not maid café enactments. The reluctance of some audience members to consider material that does not correspond to their folk models of Japan is something many of us face. Anthropologists try to recognize that culture is not unchanging tradition but is always changing, and that all societies have forms of social diversity. Yet, many people in our audiences instead understand “culture” as essentialized and unchanging tradition, tea ceremony, flower arrangement and other elite pursuits, rather than the anthropological meaning of implicit knowledge.
about everyday behaviors. These attitudes are seen in native gatekeeper responses to our research and the types of Japan-related programming in which we participate. These attitudes are also seen in how our research topics are evaluated.

When I was a visiting professor at an engineering university in Japan one summer, I used my free time to do research for a book on the beauty industry. At a dinner party hosted by the university president, he took me aside and admonished me to study something important and useful like “real” business, and to stop wasting my talent and time on such a trivial topic. (Implicit in his advice was also the notion that studying forms of culture identified with women is not proper scholarship, either.) That was more than 20 years ago, but I still receive similar comments and insinuations. A group of business school professors from Japan joined me for a more or less obligatory lunch not so long ago. They asked what sort of research I had been doing, and when I mentioned the divination industry, they snickered and made dismissive asides. Although I explained that the divination industry yields more than a trillion yen annually, they did not seem to think it a topic worthy of serious study.

A professor originally from Japan who teaches in my city severely criticizes me for inviting outside speakers and giving public talks on things that she insists are not about “normal Japanese people.” She often complains that I am teaching odd classes that include material on forms of social and ethnic diversity, and not courses on stereotypical middle-class salarymen, hard-working students and diligent housewives. On one occasion, I had the opportunity to host an internationally famous Japanese scholar from Waseda University to speak on our campus. After this respected anthropologist finished his talk, in which he offered a critique of widespread exploitation of the concept of tabunka-kyōsei (multicultural co-living) in public discourse, the local Japanese professor severely (and naively) criticized his negative representation of Japan during the question and answer period. Later, she chastised me privately for allowing him to report on things that “made Japan look bad,” which were not about “normal Japanese.” Similarly, some Japanese audience members feel offended when I give invited talks in which I claim that young Japanese women use creative displays in self-photography in order to resist compulsory femininity and class-based norms (Miller 2005). They ask why I am talking about and showing images of young women who, according to them, cannot possibly be considered normal because they are not bashful, reserved and well-behaved.

In other cases, we might receive criticism from members of the community in less direct ways. My efforts to provide interesting and relevant events are not always appreciated, nor are the ways in which I go about trying to promote Japan-related programming. For an invited lecture by a scholar on tattoo in Japan, I designed a provocative poster that depicted a kimono-clad woman baring her back to expose an ornate tattoo. An anonymous caller contacted my university to complain, describing in creepy detail about how
“titillating” the poster was. The continuous scrutiny and monitoring of my programming efforts indicates that, at least in this region, material about Japan is often subject to attempts at suppression or outside control.

Other cultural gatekeepers endeavor to block or censor edgy or controversial subjects from being the topic of talks or events. I include them anyway because I think they are critical aspects to understanding Japan. On one occasion when I gave a talk on Cinderella in Japan, I wanted to show how the meaning of Cinderella had shifted to encompass a range of meanings, including transformation (Miller 2008b). One example is a manga by artist Yoshiki Aya (2003) in the “boys’ love” (BL) genre popular with girls and women, who created a story that features a beautiful male Cinderella. The character, Takami, who is over 18, is a sweet-natured construction worker who captures the attention of two wealthy executives who see him perched on high-rise scaffolding while on a job. By the end of the story he falls for both men and cannot decide which one to bond with, so he stays with both. He leaves his construction worker life to become an adored Cinderella in an upscale apartment shared with the two wealthy men. I think her story about Takami is a great example of the “transformation” meaning of Cinderella in Japan.

After one local talk on the subject of Cinderella in Japan, in which I mentioned Yoshiki’s BL manga and showed an image of its cover, a woman in the audience announced, “I was born in Japan and I never heard of BL manga so I don’t think you should be talking about something so weird.” This type of response – “I’m Japanese and I don’t know about X, so you shouldn’t study it/talk about it/teach about it” – is not uncommon. In 2014 there was an organized session at the Association for Asian Studies, where several scholars gave presentations on the legal and cultural issues we face when teaching and doing research on Japanese popular culture. At that time I included the above comment from the woman “born in Japan” who had never heard of BL manga. At the conclusion, a scholar from Japan in the audience accused us of being “colonial orientalists” who were telling undergraduate students “weird” things about Japan, thus reinforcing what we had expressed as one of the many problems we face. She questioned our interest in “trivial” aspects of Japanese culture which, she claimed, are unfamiliar to most Japanese. She later complained that it was wrong for us to present such “misleading visuals” to innocent students and to conference audiences. It is not often that our presentations are matched with unscripted criticisms that unintentionally yet so perfectly substantiate our arguments.

I have mentioned reports that indicate that fan interest in Japanese anime and manga bring many students onto our courses, but there are other non-fan students who populate our classes as well. A different category of cultural gatekeeper is the religious fanatic who would like all university classrooms to conform to their own belief system. Many students in the United States take Asian culture-related courses because they fulfill diversity or multicultural requirements, not because they have any particular interest in Japanese popular culture. For these students, course material related to Japan might be met
with responses ranging from disdain to active protest. As Bauwens-Sugimoto’s chapter in this volume shows, instructors of Japan Studies classes will have different experiences depending on what part of the world and what communities they live and teach in.

For most of my academic career until 2010, I taught in liberal urban centers in the United States, and rarely encountered student gatekeepers who objected to course content. From 2010, however, with a move to the state of Missouri, I began to encounter a much larger percentage of very conservative Christian students in my public university classes. It became clear that in Missouri, as well as in several other conservative states, the ideologies of the far Christian right have made inroads into determining what is appropriate to teach or not teach in public schools. For example, several states have passed laws restricting the teaching of evolution, or allowing teaching to include creationism in science instruction. Given this climate, the idea that one might blithely walk into a university classroom and start showing images or using text from some of the most popular forms of Japanese popular culture is naive and possibly career-endangering. We do not need to bring in material such as the sexually explicit award-winning novel *Snakes and Earrings* (Kanehara 2004), a story about extreme body modification and sexual abjection, for this to be an issue.

In 2012 Missouri passed a state amendment giving students the power to reject any part of their academic assignments (including reading assignments) that contradict or offend their religious beliefs. The law was buried in the “Religious Freedom in Public Places” amendment, commonly known as the “Right to Pray” amendment. It passed with 83 percent of the vote. The part of the law that concerned educators the most states: “No student shall be compelled to perform or participate in academic assignments or educational presentations that violate his or her religious beliefs.” Even though the existing Missouri Constitution had already contained protections that prohibit religious discrimination, the law was sold as necessary to “protect Missouri’s Christians.” A Republican state representative named Mike McGhee reportedly proposed the amendment partly because of something that happened at Missouri State University relating to an unwelcome class assignment (Hood 2012). A graduate student in social work named Emily Brooker was in a class in which the professor asked students to pen a letter to the state legislature expressing support for adoption rights for same-sex couples. Brooker refused to do the assignment, claiming it was against her Christian beliefs to condone gay families. She later filed a lawsuit against the university, and won a generous settlement, which launched her into the role of brave defender of religious freedom. After the passage of the amendment, the University of Missouri system asked its General Counsel to look into what this law means for professors if students begin to object to course assignments, but so far there has been only discussion regarding the teaching of evolution, with no general policy yet proposed (Silvey 2012).

In his essay in this volume Galbraith talks about “unpopular topics” in Japan studies. Some unpopular topics may relate to everyday issues that
people would rather not know about or talk about, particularly body functions or beauty and bodywork procedures. I have been criticized by many (mostly male) scholars for writing about one specific topic. Known as *futae mabuta* (double eyelid) in Japan, it is a subject that seems to create intense emotional response, even though in my fieldwork I found that for most women it was just another type of beauty regimen (Miller 2006). The critique is that I am participating in the production of “weird Japan” by writing about this type of beauty work. My decision to explore it was not driven by its weirdness factor but rather its total ubiquity and normalness within Japanese women’s lives. Nearly every Japanese woman I have ever met over a 40-year period has admitted to at least experimenting with eyelid tapes and eyelid glues in their youth, and many had taken the next step of getting the relatively benign and non-invasive surgery of adding the additional fold. Eyelid beauty work is very much like the hair removal beauty work done by Euro-American women – it is secret from men, and yet it is something most heterosexual women have done to create normalized gendered bodies. For the most part, although my fellow scholars object to the way I write about this issue, generally my students do not find it very disturbing. However, when it comes to anything having to do with religion, they struggle to look beyond their own belief system and cultural assumptions.

Although scholars have usually focused on problems relating to the sexual content of manga and anime that might be objectionable (such as Cather and Galbraith in this volume), in my experience it is also non-Christian themes and symbols, as well as liberal political perspectives, that are disturbing to conservative students and consumers. Christian advocacy groups in the US support websites and organizations to monitor popular culture for its suitability for viewers or consumers worried about exposure to content regarded as conflicting with their values and beliefs. One group named the Christian Answers Network sponsors reviews and comments about a range of anime, films and TV series on their website. Japanese anime film and TV have received negative reviews such as the following:

On *Pokémon The Movie*: The underlaying [sic] tones of witchcraft and demonic activity is apparent to anyone blessed with discernment. We as parents must protect our innocent children from being exposed to this kind of subtle programming. The devil himself wants us all to believe the [sic] all these types of movies are just harmless entertainment. When in fact it undermines the authority we Christians have in Christ our beloved Savior to overcome the spirit world and all its works. Stand guard parent’s [sic] there is nothing innocent about such movies.

(Roxanna, age 33, Christian Spotlight on Entertainment n.d.)

On *Sailor Moon*: There are lesbian characters, homosexuals, transvestites and other gender-benders. The Sailor Scouts are usually wearing skirts that would reveal private body parts, if they actually had any … I’m also
sorry that I believed that having an internet filter on my computer would filter out this kind of filth. It doesn’t always. Better to not let your kids get hung up on the show.

(Maria, age 37, Christian Answers Network n.d.)

It is clear from many of the posted assessments that what disturbs the fundamentalists more than anything is material they interpret as having associations with witchcraft, Satanism and the occult, even when those associations are completely alien to the Japanese context. In the website’s “positive” comments sections, fans of Japanese anime, including Spirited Away, associate Bible passages with particular themes or narrative segments, thereby attempting to exorcize and Christianize the product.

In the classroom, conservative students also occasionally assign Christian meanings to material, completely ignoring the cultural context and historical setting that are provided. For example, in my lectures about Abeno Seimei, the medieval astrologer-wizard mentioned above, I talk about how he is usually associated with the pentagram, called gobōsei in Japanese. It is a symbol borrowed from Chinese Taoism that represents the balance of the Five Elements. Although I provided an extended history of the symbol in East Asia, a student in my class insisted that the pentagram is the sign of the devil and of witchcraft. He stated that because he did not believe my explanation, he was going to “do some research on this” in order to contest what I had said.

It is not surprising that students who believe that my lectures contain material offensive to their religious sensibilities occasionally end up in my classroom. What has been a shock is the lengths to which they go to try to prevent me from teaching material that I select for its feminist message. One semester I began the class by asking students not to use cell phones, and promised to take points off their grade if their phone disrupted my lecture. I said that I would ask them to sign a sheet with a comic of a Japanese couple having sex while one person is talking on the telephone. The comic tells us that in Japan people are also concerned about when and where cell phones are used. I described the comic but did not show it. I also let all the students know that I would be teaching the course from a feminist perspective. A male student left the classroom and went to my Chair and the Dean of Students to complain that I was showing pornography. He also objected that I was “forcing” him to listen to a feminist perspective. The student ended up dropping the course because I refused to “bargain” with him about use of feminist materials or feminist analysis in the class. How do we negotiate protests from students such as this one who object to aspects of our course content?

I mentioned before that I have been tracking images of the third-century shaman ruler Himiko. I want students to understand the extent to which her image has been sexualized. I show them images of Himiko from films, games, manga and anime. Some students protest when I include the covers of Tani-guchi Chika’s (2012) manga. My only solution so far has been to add a
paragraph to my syllabus warning students about course content from the start. I state that it is an anthropology course that includes analysis and discussion of all aspects of human language and culture, and that material they may find explicit or offensive may come up at any time in the class lectures, films and readings.

Along with student sensibility issues there is another angle on the teaching of Japanese popular culture. At another university in Missouri, a Japan Studies student group decided to host a “maid café” reenactment event at which members would dress up as Maid-san and serve food and coffee. The exercise would allow students to practice their newly learned polite language known as keigo that is routinely used in the service industry. The native Japanese librarian rallied the language teachers to her cause, and with vocal support from a white male graduate student and a few others, protested that it objectified them personally, and supposedly that it reproduced something negative from Japan’s stigmatized entertainment-sex industry. Evidently, not knowing what a maid café was, she had consulted a relative in Tokyo who told her that they are part of the mizushōbai, the “water trade,” which includes a spectrum of sex services. Her relative is not alone in confounding and misrepresenting this type of enterprise. In the same manner in which the media misrepresented the nature and prevalence of enjo kōsai (compensated dating), journalists such as Ryall (2015) now use the maid café boom as a wedge for articles that contain lurid descriptions of Akihabara and joshi kōsei osanpo (high school walking dates). Other faculty supported the students’ right to “play” at maid work, knowing that students understand some of the variations on cosplay culture. The students held the event anyway, with at least a few of the male students dressing up as “maids.” In any case, the debate raised some interesting issues.

**Conclusion**

We ask of popular culture that it take us out of our everyday mental groove and dissolve our concerns through hazy twisted empires of the imagination. Manga, film, anime and other media superbly serve us in just this way. They are incredible resources for scholars to use in teaching and research because of their ability to capture attention and focus our gaze on representations. For both fans and non-scholarly audiences, popular culture helps bring to their consciousness some of the pressing social and political issues we want to explore. However, we should not assume that using forms of popular culture in our teaching and research is always unproblematic.

Over the years of teaching that incorporate material from popular culture I have learned that students must be made aware that the reason we use popular culture is because it is a vehicle for learning about other things, such as gender construction, religious values, attitudes about minorities and so on. In order to do that we should try to present a strong theoretical stance that provides the reasons for studying popular culture beyond student interest in
remarkable texts. Aside from enticing students with interesting material, we need to make it clear that we study popular culture because it encodes cultural values and meanings, that it is motivated by particular interests or beliefs and thus is an index of contemporary debates and values. In addition, through popular culture we can understand the issues that concern different sub-groups of people, and it is a space where social and political life and events are openly expressed and debated. For junior academics planning to introduce popular culture and cool Japan material into their courses, I would suggest that they also learn about local laws and the cultural climate first. They might also find out about other classes that have challenging content, and ask instructors for advice. At some universities the film studies and art history faculty have dealt with similar issues in the past and may be a resource for learning how to present controversial material in coursework.

There exists a range of understandings about the nature of cool Japan, some more nuanced than others. From the fabricated “Ambassadors of Cute” (kawaii taishi) promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to amateur BL manga exchanged globally, cool Japan helps to draw people to our classrooms, lectures and campus events. The great diversity in the meanings of cool Japan gives us freedom to explore many rich domains and remarkable texts. Thus, beyond obvious culture products such as Hello Kitty and Death Note, I am able to include a Heian-era wizard and a third-century shaman queen in my cool Japan scope simply because they surface in contemporary popular culture. At the same time, the looseness of the cool Japan concept, which is not only manipulated for government soft power initiatives but also used as a catchphrase in titles for books, talks, conferences and courses, can easily become hollow as a way to organize academic knowledge. For those of us in traditional disciplines, our goal is to promote appreciation and knowledge about Japanese language and culture, so we want to exploit interest in popular culture as a means for doing that. However, the potential value of studying cool Japan for theoretical or academic reasons is complicated by existing assumptions about its trivial status. It is not always easy or possible to counter the widespread and denigrating attitudes towards popular culture in order to make a case for its study as a valid academic subject.

In the early 1970s I remember seeing images of Japanese shunga (erotic woodblock prints) in my undergraduate college classroom in California. I do not recall complaints about this material from students, other faculty or people in the community. Perhaps the difficulties I have experienced when dealing with less explicit images and material can perhaps be attributed to changes in the US educational climate, the differences between West Coast and Midwest populations, altered expectations held by students and audience members, and a shift in the political environment. Whatever it may be, I do not think that scholars should ever self-censor their work out of fear of receiving negative feedback. In the same way that scientists and historians teach historical facts despite someone’s unwillingness to learn them (such as
evolution, the Holocaust, genocide, slavery), scholars of Japan should similarly reject efforts to sanitize or suppress their work.

Notes

1. The elevator girl, often considered an exemplary service job, was one of the conspicuous new urban occupations for women from the late 1920s. She became the subject of multiple fantasies and eroticized attributions in comics, novels, television, films and costume play (Miller 2013).

2. Abeno Seimei (921–1005) was a medieval court magician who became the focus of intense cultural energy from the 1990s, becoming a modern icon and folk celebrity through his reintroduction in numerous manga, films, a television series, novels, anime and books (Miller 2008a).

3. Similarly, manga scholars and fans go to great lengths to explain and justify some of Tezuka's truly gruesome products, such as his disturbing Ayako (1972), a story of incest and murder.

4. In Tarot cards made in Japan, the High Priestess is sometimes replaced by an image of Himiko (Miller 2011b).

5. Maid cafés are trendy coffee shops where young women dress up in frilly maid costumes.

6. Divination is one of the largest untracked business domains in Japan (Miller 2014b).

7. Interestingly, the same person finds acceptable a group of middle-aged white women who dress up as putative geisha in St Louis and insert themselves into various cultural events in their yellow-face attire.

8. One year I invited a scholar to give a presentation and show a documentary film on the massacre of Koreans in Tokyo after the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. A member of the community contacted us to protest this event, suggesting that showing the film would result in anti-Japanese sentiment and the bullying of Japanese exchange students by Korean students.

9. The Cinderella talk had additional problems: parents in the area just assumed that even though the talk was on a university campus, the material would be suitable for children, so they brought their offspring to it. The material had much adult content. Even a true assessment of the Cinderella tale in Europe would most likely terrify most Americans.

10. Another problem associated with using manga in our research might have to do with obtaining permission to include images in our publications. I wanted very much to use an image from this manga to illustrate the main point of an article. I wrote to Yoshiki's publisher, who replied that she had given permission for use of some of her BL images to other Americans in the past, but that it only caused her grief later, and she would never give consent again (Miller 2009).

11. It is not only Japan studies classes where this is an issue. A student and her parents at a college in California tried to get four graphic novels banned from a course (Schaub 2015). In another case, first-year students at Duke University were given a summer reading list that included a graphic novel that they refused to read because of the depictions of sexuality. One student said he would be willing to read the text but that looking at the images, which he characterized as “pornographic,” would violate his religious beliefs (Ballentine 2015).

12. The conservative ethos is also seen in attacks on labor studies (see American Association of University Professors 2011).

13. I show a mascot that was created for the Original Onmyōji Goods (Orijinaru Onmyōji Guzzu) shop in Kyoto. The owner, Tajima Hisashiho, converted his textile/tie store into a souvenir shop that sells items related to Abeno Seimei and divination.
This supposedly pornographic comic was published in an essay on images of bad manners (Miller 2011a).

The Ambassadors of Cute were a trio of performers in costumes, carefully coached and packaged for their Cool Japan roles by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They labored to present specific types of acceptable femininity.

References


Scholar girl meets manga maniac


4 Must we burn *eromanga*?

Trying obscenity in the courtroom and in the classroom

*Kirsten Cather*

**Introduction**

Several years ago I was invited to join an event sponsored by a student organization at my university called Lifeboat. The exercise imagines a scenario in which four professors are on a boat that is sure to sink within the hour, unless three of the four disembark. Or, more accurately, are thrown overboard. Each passenger-professor, I was told, would be allotted ten minutes to plead their case, to explain to a jury of student panelists what about their work deemed them worthy of being the sole survivor. At the time, my research focused on the censorship of obscene literature, film and manga in Japan. My fellow passengers included a constitutional law scholar, a specialist in childhood education policy, and a geneticist. I declined the invitation. I told myself that I refused on principle. I balked at the neoliberal premise of the exercise. I bemoaned the utilitarian bent of education today and wistfully thought back to my small liberal arts college days. But in reality, I knew it was because I’d be the first to go.

When formulating my imaginary defense for this exercise, I planned to stress the importance of free speech for the arts, cherry-picking from my texts to highlight the complex legal and artistic issues involved in censoring highbrow literary pornography by famed authors from long ago: the works of Nagai Kafū or the translations of Marquis de Sade or D.H. Lawrence. I might touch upon softcore Pink and Roman Porno films, and maybe even hardcore ones since these were decriminalized in favor of a ratings system in most nations decades ago. What I would most certainly not do was mention erotic manga (*eromanga*) that features young female characters engaged in explicit, and often violent, sex.

I was reminded of this exercise by the question posed by this volume – to investigate the legal, cultural and ethical challenges of teaching and researching Japanese popular culture. It asks those of us who work in this area to develop a proactive stance, a manifesto of sorts. However, like the Lifeboat exercise, its premise also suggests the defensive posture of humanities and area studies in crisis today, under attack by neoliberal forces that demand utilitarian justifications for research and teaching agendas (Davis 2015).
Knowledge for knowledge’s sake no longer holds, and the boundaries of acceptable knowledge are shrinking in the face of an increasingly conservative and even litigious climate that puts a premium on avoiding offense, be it legal, moral, religious or simply a matter of taste (see Laura Miller’s and Patrick Galbraith’s essays in this volume).

In such a climate, popular culture is especially vulnerable because it appears too trivial to constitute serious inquiry. A recent posting for a conference called “Hello Kitty and International Relations” drew the scorn of one listserv member who anticipated, and lodged, precisely this criticism:

While calling a conference “Hello Kitty and International Relations” is undeniably catchier than calling it something more anodyne such as “Popular Culture and Cross-Cultural Communications,” the fact is that it is like throwing bait to the conservative politicians who are cutting funding for the humanities worldwide, because it sounds so aggressively trivial. (Harris 2015)

It was not just foregrounding Hello Kitty as an object of study that was problematic, but rather the “way it is all put” which “invites satire. And worse than satire: it invites the political equivalent of being whacked with a two-by-four” (Harris 2015).

For this critic, what invited satire (and funding cuts) were both the cutesy, catchy Kitty reference of the title and the language of the conference website, which took the opposite tack by employing dense theoretical Cultural Studies jargon. After citing Barthes’s concept of “the empty sign” and Christine Yano’s reference to “the ‘thingness’ of the ‘thing’” in her monograph on the icon, the conference organizers justify the conference by stating: “Hello Kitty is then a ‘liminal space’ to posit academic conjectures on the everyday and the international.” The listserve respondent concluded his post by warning that “Academics who use such language … are harming their profession, and making it less likely that others will get to practice it in the future. It puzzles me that they do not see this” (Harris 2015). The criticism here seems to be that Japanese popular culture studies is opening itself up to an attack along the lines of the much-publicized 1996 Sokal hoax when a physics professor published a bogus article that claimed quantum gravity was a “physical ‘reality,’ … [which] is at bottom a social and linguistic construct” (Sokal 1996: 217) in order to test the academic rigor of a leading postmodern (pomo) cultural studies journal.

It is the juxtaposition of two seemingly disparate spheres – pomo cultural studies and hard science in the Sokal hoax, pop culture and the academy – that engenders such attacks and defense mechanisms. If an earlier generation of scholars had to defend against accusations of ivory tower elitism for taking refuge in esoteric subjects that rendered them and their scholarship out of touch with the everyday world, now the problem is the everydayness of the subject matter dressed up in highfalutin jargon. This is something of a
chicken and egg situation. The perceived lack of academic rigor of the subject matter engenders attempts to overcompensate for its lowbrow content by appealing to highbrow form.

The questions raised by the Hello Kitty critique are similar to those that drive this volume: what do we study and how do we justify it? Are we merely pandering to the need for student numbers in our classes by exploiting lowbrow pop culture tastes? Or does Japanese popular culture constitute a legitimate scholarly field of inquiry? Perhaps most importantly, how do we talk about what we study? In other words, what belongs in the academy and in what form? Such questions suggest our anxieties about the perceived lack of value and legitimacy of certain texts, disciplines and methodologies.

Hello Kitty makes us anxious. And if this is true of a relatively innocuous icon like Kitty-chan, then what of even more contentious cultural products, like boys’ love (BL), eromanga, or lolicon – or, as Patrick Galbraith puts it, “unpopular” pop culture. Here the challenges of introducing such potentially illegitimate, illegal and unethical materials to the academy come to the fore. How do we defend, much less advocate for, the study of such materials?

In the case of my own research, the materials are often illegal, in Japan at least. In my book, I looked at the censorship of obscene (waisetsu) art in the second half of the twentieth century (Cather 2012). In what follows, I make a pitch for the value of researching and teaching such sexually explicit materials precisely because they have run afoul of the law. Although elsewhere I argue that much is lost by isolating one medium for discussion, here it is useful to focus on manga, the gateway subject for Japan Studies these days. As a medium that is increasingly garnering the interest of students as well as censors internationally, eromanga clearly demonstrates the competing pushes and pulls involved. It also, I argue, illuminates the productive possibilities of exploiting student interest in this thorny medium.

These materials are not without their difficulties, especially from a feminist perspective. They beg the question of what kind of attitudes are being promoted toward female bodies, especially those of young women. Their plots and themes often revolve around illicit sex, incest and pedophilic fantasies, rape and torture. They are indeed trying, but this is what makes them such rich material to explore. As limit cases that tested censorship law in Japan, they can help us and our students understand our own internalized standards, or where each of us draws the line in the sand and why. Since these materials originate in a nation and culture distinct from our own, we can also probe our beliefs about the applicability of international norms, our stance on moral and cultural relativism. Thinking through our own personal censorship standards is particularly crucial at this time when national and international censorship standards are becoming more and more uniform. Moreover, as fictional works of art, they demand we explore our beliefs about the effects of reading on our attitudes and behaviors, or the relationship between reality and representation. In other words, they can expose our own deeply held, but oft-unexamined beliefs about the powers, and dangers, of art.
Such cases offer a productive collision that brings together legal and educational settings, public and private realms, intellectual and bodily concerns. The very bodily nature of the materials is what makes this subject such a minefield. It tests the limits of which subjects can, or should, be introduced into the intellectualized setting of the academy. The question, again, is not just what topics we introduce, but how we do so. As one critic has noted:

Pornography seems to encourage the worst intellectual qualities in nearly everybody who writes about it. This is doubtless because it’s extremely difficult to maintain a disinterested, reflective attitude toward imaginative work whose chief, indeed only, purpose is to cause sexual excitation.

(Gilman 1979)

Conversely, when scholarship on pornography does adopt a disinterested scholarly tone, it is again subject to criticism, this time because it teaches “understanding and critical distance, but never adoration or delight … theory without practice” (Newtz 2005: 79).

Such criticisms reflect the growing pains of a relatively new field of study struggling for legitimacy – Porn Studies, a designation that itself is the subject of much debate. As Linda Williams writes in her inaugural article for the new journal Porn Studies in 2014, what we name what we study deserves deeper reflection. She criticizes the widespread use of the terms “porn” and “porno” as reflecting a vernacular approach to the field, “as if to say that after 10 years of study the object had been with us long enough to have a nickname that signals our new comfort with it.” She worries that “The moniker ‘Porn Studies’ makes a judgment … It signals that such a work is not obscene to me, and for me at least – if not for those of you who call it by its more formal term pornography – I approve of bringing it not only into the home, … but also into the academy” (Williams 2014a: 33, 35).

Porn Studies makes us really anxious. The juxtaposition of the two distinct registers of “porn” and “studies” signals their “pedagogical incommensurability” or, to use an alternative register, “the labours of the fucking body in tension with the classroom body,” as W.E.B. Dubois has put it (Noble 2014: 103, 107). How to make this bodily medium into an acceptable academic subject matter? Do we take refuge in the neutrality of scientific language and method that distances the offending materials from their bodily nature and safely allows us to “maintain a disinterested, reflective attitude”? Or do we embrace the embodied experience of consuming these very bodily works? We must tread a fine line between the two registers. We want to avoid opening ourselves up to a critique of ivory towerism, on the one hand, and of being purveyors of pornography, on the other. We must avoid being irrelevant, and all too relevant.

These are tricky problems when dealing with what Linda Williams has called the “weedy field” of Porn Studies, and even trickier in the case of pornography written in the vernacular. As a medium that belongs simultaneously
to Porn and Pop Culture Studies (note the similar shorthand), eromanga is especially vulnerable to charges of pandering. Yet even with these extreme materials, I want to insist that we should beware the temptation to sanitize. It may seem like the safer choice, but we cannot deny the body. This is a genre in which readers’ bodies encounter problematic texts with problematic bodies. Our own bodies are implicated in the very process of engaging these texts, and that is what makes them matter. The crux of the problem with pornography is thinking through how textual bodies relate to real world ones.

We should also remember that certain bodies are going to have an easier time diving into these materials and this field than others. It is one thing to tackle eromanga or child porn as a research subject when one is a mother, and another when one is a single man. Identity politics matter. When several of us who are contributing to this volume traveled to present versions of these papers in the United States and in Australia, it was striking to notice how often a speaker or audience member felt the need to flag themselves in order to justify their position, whether it was a critique or a defense. Nationality, sexuality, gender, marital status, whether one had children, political persuasion, and occupation all came into play. It is only natural that how we each experience and evaluate these texts is tied to who we are, but what I want to point out here is the presumption that the more distant one’s identity from the presumed target audience of one’s object of study, the safer.

As a married, middle-aged mother of two, I am certain I had a much easier time researching mainstream heterosexual porn under the guise of scholarly neutrality than my heterosexual male colleagues would have, for instance. The experiences of some of my male colleagues seem to confirm this gender bias, or what we might call profiling. See Patrick Galbraith’s experiences in publishing his book described in his chapter in this volume, though with a couple of key differences from mine: the more explosive subject matter of lolicon and the use of a trade press, rather than an academic one. I might also mention a Canadian scholar who reported being detained by Canadian Customs when he identified himself as a Japanese Studies scholar when a Customs officer found the word “rape” on his computer.

In fact, when I was first asked to write for this volume, I worried that I was unqualified for I have not actually encountered any challenges in my own research or teaching on obscenity. On the other hand, my experience offers an important corrective to any assumption that these challenges are inevitable and universal. I published my monograph in the Columbia Weatherhead Institute Series and through University of Hawai’i Press without a problem. The use of explicit images – including ones that were deemed legally obscene and banned in Japan – presented no issues. In fact, the preferred cover design proposed by the press made me blanch a bit and request instead that we use the alternate. I have taught a graduate course on censorship that included pornography at University of Texas at Austin, which may be a liberal bastion, but is also the flagship public university in a conservative state. Hirings and promotions, thus far, have also seemingly not been affected by my research
subject matter. I would like to believe it is my approach that facilitated such smooth sailing, but I suspect my identity mattered too. Perhaps I was naive, but I carried a recently banned manga volume out of Japan back through US Customs without taking pains to conceal it, sure that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression in both Japan and the US would protect me. Even if discovered, I was confident that my identity as a female scholar would mitigate.1 The guise of scholarly neutrality can go a long way.

Rather than taking cover, when we look at these materials in our work, we should be ready to be aroused, disgusted, offended, outraged or excited, or simultaneously all of the above. Perhaps we need to include a proviso like the one on the syllabus of Linda Williams’s graduate seminar on pornography at UC Berkeley, which I audited back in spring 2001:

NB: Some of the images to be studied in this seminar may be offensive, arousing, or disturbing. Please realize that curiosity about this course does not mean that you are actually prepared to look closely at a wide variety of explicit sexual representations for an entire semester, nor that you are prepared to offer the same kind of close study you would give to any other cultural products. Consider carefully before you take this class.

(Williams 2001)

These bodily reactions to pornographic texts are central to their pleasures and problems. I suggest we exploit both these things so as to better understand the logic underpinning our own beliefs about where these materials do, and do not, belong.

Must we burn eromanga? When Simone de Beauvoir (1953) asked this question about the works of Marquis de Sade back in the early 1950s, her response was a very qualified no. In the case of eromanga, we may end up deciding to torch some of them, but before doing so, we should give them a fair trial, trying these texts in the classroom as if it were a courtroom. Rather than suspending judgment in the fashion of an ostensibly disinterested critic, we should take on the embodied position of the censor-reader to judge a text using an approach that is both somatic and analytic. Such an approach allows for arguments on both sides of the fence without foreclosing a defense or a critique. As such, it can become a pedagogical, not ideological, exercise. Or at least it can allow for conflicting, multiple ideologies. Rather than just limiting the debate to certain bodies and certain politics, it can invite a plurality of positions among people with divergent views, and even allow these divergent views to coexist in the mind of a single individual.

Such an exercise requires that we first know the laws and the texts, their premises and their implications. US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s infamous claim, “I know it when I see it,” reveals how subjective judgments about sexually explicit materials often are, even in a court of law. Although it wrongly suggests that no analysis of that reaction is necessary, it does helpfully point to the need to see the object in order to judge it. Knowing the laws
as well, and making sure our students do, is not merely academic; it is a pressing issue, especially in our globalized era in which bodies and texts cross international borders on a daily base, at least virtually. We must be willing to look at all the laws and texts, not just the repressive or liberating ones that might suit our own particular agendas.

The laws: the good, the bad, and the ugly

In terms of its modern-day censorship laws, Japan is neither Victorian England nor Babylon despite what some commentators might have us believe. Obscenity law was introduced at a time when Japan was consciously patterning itself on Western society. The 1880 Meiji Criminal Code (Keihō), which was modeled on French law, and the revised one of 1907 on German, includes an obscenity clause in Article 175. This clause remains today notwithstanding the 1947 postwar Constitution’s unambiguous bidding in Article 21 that “There shall be no censorship.” In terms of censoring obscenity, Japan diverged from its Western models in the immediate postwar. Whereas the not-guilty verdicts for Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1959 and 1960 in the United States and England heralded “the end of obscenity” (Rembar 1968), the Chatterley trials in Japan (1950–57) marked only the beginning. Since then, for over half a century, a string of high-profile judicial proceedings against literature, film, photographs, manga and computer-generated (CG) images have followed, including the most recent trial of the sculptor and manga artist Igarashi Megumi (who also goes by the name Rokudenashiko — or “Good-for-nothing kid”), who was arrested in July 2014 after sending the data from a digital scan of her vulva to 30 supporters who crowdfunded her project to design a “vagina kayak.”

For over a century, the same obscenity law has remained on the books, but it is a surprisingly fluid one. Despite the oft-repeated claim that Japanese authorities censor certain kinds of depictions (whether pubic hair, genitalia or penetration), what gets censored has changed over time considerably. There may be unofficial guidelines operating in practice, but only until they are no longer the guiding rule: for example, the unofficial ban on pubic hair until the so-called “liberation of hair” (hea no kaiki) in the early 1990s. This indeterminacy causes much speculation among publishers who continually try to gauge and push the legal limits, whether the minimum acceptable square footage of mosaics and masks, or the opacity of those masks. I want to stress here that obscenity law does not stipulate what those limits are. Article 175 does not define what constitutes “an obscene writing, picture, or other object,” merely specifying the punishments of 2.5 million yen (approx. US $21,000) and/or up to two years’ imprisonment for anyone “who distributes or sells or who publicly displays the same,” or “who possesses the same for the purpose of sale” (Beer 1984: 336).

To determine what constitutes obscenity, we need to look at case law. This offers influential judicial precedents although not binding ones as per Japan’s
civil, rather than common, law system. The 1957 Chatterley verdict enshrined the famous three-prong definition of obscenity as “that which wantonly stimulates or arouses sexual desire or offends the normal sense of sexual modesty of ordinary persons, and is contrary to proper ideas of sexual morality” (Maki 1964: 6–7). Many have criticized the old-fashioned language, including the archaic kanji used for obscenity, or waisetsu (猥褻), and its nebulous criteria that rival the famous non-definition of pornography offered by Judge Stewart. Its basis in some unspoken normative view of sexuality is clear, if unhelpful. What it does make apparent, however, is that legal determinations of obscenity are focused less on content than on reception, on the ability to incite sexual arousal and moral offense.

Although frustratingly silent about its criteria, in its refusal to enumerate what constitutes obscenity, the law is actually more complex than given credit. There is no simple list of X, Y or Z that constitutes obscenity because any content must, as the court recognized, be considered in context. This context includes both shifting socio-historical conditions surrounding the production/reception of the text, and a consideration of the text as text. The latter consideration was explicitly introduced in the “Yojohan” Supreme Court verdict of 1980, which called for a balanced analysis of a work’s content alongside such things as its style, narrative structure, proportions, packaging and marketing.

The law rightly presumes that texts possess a bodily affect. What we still need to think through further, however, is the effect of this affect. What is the effect of reading/viewing on our bodies, minds and lives? Before turning to examples from eromanga to consider this question, let us finish looking at how the laws themselves address this question. These show that Japanese censorship law is no simple matter, especially when it comes to non-representational hand-drawn art like manga.

Although Japan’s retention of obscenity laws in an era of the decriminalization or so-called “liberation of porn” abroad might seem to confirm suspicions of Victorian prudery living on, others suggest Babylon. Much to the dismay of its critics, Japan has never criminalized possession of obscenity. Although Customs has considerable latitude to prohibit any “work that would harm morals” (Article 21) from being imported for individual consumption, they only forward the case for prosecution under the Criminal Code if they judge the materials are meant for wider distribution. The standards used by Japanese Customs, however, are often stricter than the police and state prosecutors. For example, in 1999, officials at Narita airport confiscated a book of Mapplethorpe photos that had been on the market for sale in Japan without issue for five years (Kawabata 2003; Cather 2012: fn 1:298–299).

Japan’s stance on child pornography has been criticized for being lax until very recently. Whereas the US government website brags, “By the mid-1980’s, the trafficking of child pornography within the United States was almost completely eradicated through a series of successful campaigns waged by law enforcement” (US Department of Justice 2015), Japan did not introduce
legislation until 1999 with the passage of the Law for Punishing Acts Related to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, and for Protecting Children (or Jipohō, for short). This law was the result of international pressure after Japan was severely criticized at the 1996 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)-led first global “World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children,” held in Stockholm (Yamaguchi 2008: 25). Only after repeated pushes to criminalize possession of child porn by both domestic and international organizations, especially UNICEF (2008), the US embassy and ECPAT (End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography, and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes), was this amendment eventually enacted in June 2014.4

Ever since its introduction, there have been attempts also to expand the provisions of Jipohō to prosecute not just live-action films and photography that depict real underage children in sexual situations, but also fictional depictions with no live models, like manga and anime. This is what UNICEF calls “‘quasi-child porn’ (jun jido poruno, 準児童ポルノ) that realistically depicts the sexual poses or abuse of children whether or not the depicted subjects actually exist or not” (UNICEF 2008). Although the proposed amendment has been forestalled thus far, similar provisions have now been passed at the local level, most notably in Tokyo.

An amendment to Bill 156 under the leadership of conservative Tokyo Governor Ishihara called for the restriction of sexualized images of “non-existent youths” (hijitsuzai seishōnen). This unfortunate choice of wording led critics mockingly to dub it the “non-existent youth bill,” and to fierce opposition that squashed this part of the legislation, but not its core proposition – to target manga, anime and videogames in particular. At the time, Bill 156 already allowed for all kinds of media to be restricted from youths (under age 18) if they:

1. were excessively sexually stimulating,
2. depict excessively sadistic violence,
3. depict criminal acts likely to compel criminal behavior,
4. depict acts likely to compel youths to commit suicide.

(Kanemitsu 2012)

The two additional clauses that were eventually passed in December 2010 explicitly exempt live photography or film, while targeting manga, anime and videogames that:

1. include material that “unjustifiably glorifies or exaggerates” sex acts that are illegal under current Japanese law or Tokyo ordinances,
2. depict sex acts between family members who cannot marry under Japanese law.

(Kanemitsu 2012)
Alarmists worried that nothing was safe from censorship, crying that under these standards, even *The Tale of Genji* would qualify. However, to date, five years after the bill’s passage, only one manga title has been targeted using the expanded provisions: in May 2014, Mikage Sekizai’s *Imōto Paradise!* 2, which, as the title “Little Sisters’ Paradise” suggests, is about incest. Unlike obscenity and child porn laws that target realistic depictions, the new provisions of Bill 156 are aimed specifically at the hyperbolic, parodic expressions of manga, anime and videogames.

I should stress that youth regulations like Bill 156 are not outright bans and nor do they have national scope. Instead, they merely restrict sales from youths (under age 18) in the prefecture in question. Contravening these regulations could lead to fines or a prison term for the seller, but the material itself can still be legally sold to adults. Rather than crying censorship, it is perhaps best to think of this as a ratings system of sorts, albeit one that is imposed by the government rather than by the industry, which practices its own elaborate forms of self-regulation including age restrictions.

At the same time, we need to remember that in imposing this label at the local level, the practical effects extend beyond it. After *Imōto Paradise* was labeled “harmful,” Amazon pulled its Kindle edition even though they were under no legal obligation to do so. An Osaka “harmful” designation for BL books led the Kinokuniya bookstore to pull every BL title from their shelves (Kanemitsu 2010). The chilling effect of these decisions can be far-reaching. In July 2014, the publisher Comic Zenon cancelled Yamamoto Arisa’s new manga series two days before its scheduled debut solely out of fear that the Tokyo Youth Regulations committee would label it “harmful.” Because the *tankōbon* (print book) market in Tokyo is so huge, the publishers decided also to cancel the online version (Williams 2014b). This suggests how very intertwined moral and market censorship are, as well as how very tightly knit international censorship standards have become in our webbified world.

As we might expect of our global society, local censorship laws are aligning more and more with international norms. Even a well-known xenophobe like Governor Ishihara invokes this international community when necessary: defending his controversial Bill 156, he argued: “Pertaining to sexual products, such as magazine[s], books, and movies included, [Northern Europeans] are far ahead of Japan and surprisingly open … But! They have no perverse works with children as their subject matter … We should listen to parties entrusted with such affairs [in Europe] …” (Kanemitsu 2010). Importantly, these international norms are ones that presume harm extends beyond the fictional world of the text into the realm of reality. Often this harm is implicit, and perhaps all the more dangerous in its lack of specificity. When made explicit, representation is endowed with the power to encourage criminal behavior, for example in the citation of sex crime statistics in the obscenity trials or in the language of Bill 156.

The recent targeting of art forms that do not rely on live models represents a departure from the initial premise of pornography laws intent on
eliminating the real harm inflicted on real children (or women) in the act of filming them. Indeed, there has been a pronounced trend to include fictional characters (whether hand-drawn, animated or CG) in child porn legislation internationally although not without pushback. In 2002, the US Child Pornography Prevention Act was struck down by the Supreme Court as overly broad and as a violation of the First Amendment; as one justice wrote, “By eliminating the real-child requirement, a class of protected speech will disappear.” The Ashcroft decision ruled that “virtual child pornography” prevented the “visual depiction of an idea” (Greenhouse 2008), or promoted what Mark McLelland (2012) has nicely called “the juridification of the imagination.”

However, just one year later, in 2003, the US PROTECT Act was passed. The “Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today” prohibits computer-generated child pornography that is “virtually indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” (PROTECT Act 2003). The penalty is five years’ imprisonment for possession, ten for distribution. Under this act, non-representational media, like comics, must qualify using a higher bar than live-action photography or film – they must be deemed legally obscene, and also must not qualify as protected speech under the Miller test.6

In 2006, the second US citizen to be charged under this Act was arrested after US Customs authorities intercepted a package sent from Japan to a 38-year-old Iowan man, Christopher Handley. He was charged for importing what authorities summarized as “Japanese manga drawings of underage females being sexually abused by adult males and animals” (US Department of Justice 2009). Much to the disappointment of the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund (CBLDF), which eagerly agreed to serve as expert witness, this case ended with a plea bargain in May 2009 (a six-month sentence versus the possible 15-year jail term or $250,000 fine; and a mandatory sex offender treatment, but no requirement that he register as a sex offender).7

What this case showed was the degree to which manga is particularly susceptible to child porn charges because of its representational strategies. It also demonstrated the impotence of a defense that rests on such assertions. The defense lawyer argued that “because the males are drawn with androgynous features, they look much younger than they actually are … They also look younger because of the fact that there is no pubic hair drawn at all … But in actuality, they are not children.” The defendant too stressed: “All of the underage characters in question are actually all adults. It’s just because of Japanese manga representational methods that they look young” (CBLDF 2009, emphasis mine). This defense would gain little traction in a court of law. Of course they are not “actually” children, but nor are they “actually all adults.” They are not “actually” anything, other than representations.

Paradoxically, this is what makes manga and other hand-drawn art that does not rely on an actual live model particularly suspect. The age of so-called “non-existent youths” may be hard to prosecute, but it is equally hard to
defend. To forestall such accusations, many eromanga include an exculpatory postscript at the bottom of the table of contents that states: “The characters that appear in this manga are all over eighteen years of age.” Apparently, bra size is being used in Australia as a determinant of a character’s age (Ross 2011). We can see here how ridiculously the debate can devolve into a childish “is not, are too” variety, but it also helpfully raises a key question at the heart of censorship debates: what is the relationship between reality and representation?

From a legal standpoint, the Ashcroft decision could safely claim that the law should not infringe upon citizens’ First Amendment right to free expression unless actual harm is inflicted in the act of producing the work in question. In Japan, such a position has been advocated for decades by the eminent legal scholar Okudaira Yasuhiro, who identified a dangerous and what he would call fascistic tendency of Japanese authorities to equate thought and act, expression and action. As Okudaira charged in his defense testimony at the manga trial:

> Until now, expression has been treated just as if it has the same power as physical objects … For example, arguments to abolish the Emperor system and physical acts to eradicate the Emperor system were regulated by the same area of law: treason and lèse majesté. This stems from people thinking that physical actions and expression are the same.

(Nagaoka 2004: 215–216)

Although this is a viable (and I would argue desirable) distinction from a legal standpoint, it leaves us teachers in the lurch. It asserts that representation does not have the power to harm, or implicitly, to affect its audience in a meaningful real-world way. While it is dangerous to elide differences between depicting criminal acts and acting criminally, between real and fictional bodies, the claim that these are merely fictional characters with no relationship to reality is also dangerous. I want these depictions to matter, but not matter too much. There is a terrible Catch-22 here, but it is a productive dilemma to explore further by looking at these problematic texts and bodies more closely.

**The texts: the blacks, whites and grays**

The 2002 eromanga Misshitsu (*Honey Room*) was the object of the unprecedented and ultimately successful conviction of a manga under obscenity law, a decision that was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2007. The year-long district court trial with testimony from defense and prosecution witnesses offers a sustained glimpse into the arguments both for and against the text. This work has the added benefit of being available despite the ban. At the center of this eromanga are the bodies of young women in pain and/or pleasure. Elsewhere I have analyzed the trial arguments surrounding the two most offensive
stories in the collection to show how the successful conviction depended in large part on condemning it on the grounds of realism and feminism. Most problematic was the volume’s final story, “Crawling About,” which depicts the unremitting pain, torture and gang rape of a young female until she is finally rescued on the story’s final pages. The other one that was the catalyst for the indictment, “Mutual Philosophy, Mutual Love,” features a submissive prostitute, who endures brutally sadistic sex with a client only to admit to her own pleasure on the story’s final page, telling her sympathetic pimp, “Mutual sex with him is the best,” as she tweaks her pierced nipple (Beauty Hair 2002: 112).

The court donned the mantle of the feminist, banning the work in order to protect women from the kind of torture and abuse featured in the manga’s pages, a position that echoed the anti-pornography feminists’ oft-quoted slogan, “Pornography is the theory, and rape the practice” (Williams 1989: 16). It was the females victimized by male characters in the manga, as well as the ones that would be victimized by male readers in the real world, who needed the court’s protection.

Importantly, though, it was not only female victims in pain who needed protection. Most striking was the judges’ suggestion that these females needed protection from themselves, from their own aggressive sexual impulses and pleasure. The defense witness and manga critic Fujimoto Yukari had attempted to redeem the manga as a feminist one by pointing to these depictions of mutually pleasurable sex, and the judges reluctantly agreed with her that “in seven out of nine of the stories, the manga artist depicted consensual sex,” and “it is not as if there is not some room to consider that the works reflect a certain consciousness on the part of the artist toward sex and women.” However, these kinds of depictions were equally, if not more, problematic in the judges’ eyes. As they charged in their verdict, in “Mutual Love,” “the male violently rapes the female, and the woman even says that those kinds of actions are a form of love” (Tokyo Chihō Saibansho 2002, emphasis mine).

In other words, women suffering at the hands of sadistic men needed rescue, but so too did female characters suffering from false consciousness. Here the judges were pointing to stories like “Mutual Love” and also to ones like “New Heroine,” which has a failed stuntwoman turned adult video (AV) star playing a character who is raped while strung up to the ceiling by ropes. Nonetheless, after her first performance, she sanguinely comments: “It’s a little bit different from what I’d dreamed, but I was really happy I got to play the lead” (Beauty Hair 2002: 16).

Female pain and pleasure are at the center of arguments, but the manga’s ambivalent depiction of these things makes it tricky for both the pro- and anti-censorship feminist camps. As the kindly veteran male AV star coaches his new female costar, “It’ll be alright. If there’s opportunity, please enjoy yourself. That’s the trick” (Beauty Hair 2002: 7). Indeed, the trick for critics seems to be determining if her subsequent display of enjoyment was a mere performance for the diegetic film cameras in the text (and for the male readers...
of the manga), or a genuine experience (insofar as a fictional character’s experience can be claimed “genuine”).

If the manga’s depictions of pain and of pleasure potentially invite such widely divergent interpretations, then what of its more ambivalent depictions – its clichéd images of females who appear not to want it at first, but really do? For example, the two female high school characters in “Carnival, Carnival” and “Body Issues” initially object to “dirty” (kitanai) (Beauty Hair 2002: 60, 75) or “embarrassing” (hazukashii) (ibid.: 76) acts of oral and anal sex, only to find themselves ecstatic in the end; as one exclaims, “With you inside both my vagina and my ass, I feel incredibly good … I’m hotter than usual. Oh, I’m going to scream. AAAAAH! AAAAAH!” (Figure 4.1) (ibid.: 62–63).

Because the question of whether these displays of ecstatic pleasure or painful protest are genuine or just a performance is unresolved at the level of plot in the stories, either interpretation remains possible. Particularly with those that feature actresses, who are paid to perform, such as the AV star of “New Heroine,” the prostitute in “Mutual Philosophy, Mutual Love,” or even the French maid-costumed high-school girl in “Carnival, Carnival.” Further complicating the question of performance is the rapist’s use of aphrodisiac pills that are forcibly inserted into the female’s genitals, as in “Mutual Philosophy.” What does the attention drawn to the fact that it is a performance do

Figure 4.1 “Carnival, Carnival” in Misshitsu: Honey Room
(Beauty Hair 2002: 62–63; reproduced with permission. © 2002 Shōbunkan Publishing)
to our interpretation? Is it performative in the prosaic sense of being staged and therefore patently false, or is it a performance that is subjected to the gaze of the fetishistic, voyeuristic male spectator as per Laura Mulvey’s formulation? Some would argue that the mere existence of the question jars the status of the text as pure fantasy. See, for example, Fujimoto’s testimony on cross-examination when she notes the unreal and fantastical nature of the many female characters in the manga as prerequisites for otaku’s fantasies (Fujimoto 2002). Others would not credit it with the power to undo the pleasure male readers would take in images of battered and raped women.

What do we do with those stories and images of female characters who unabashedly enjoy violent sex that they themselves have aggressively initiated? The manga offers something of a gender-free take on sexual abuse where women are also the perpetrators. One story is about the randy female boss of a design company who turns her young male employees into sex slaves (“A Stroke of Fortune”); another features a female character in an insane asylum who sexually takes advantage of her seemingly comatose husband (whom she has actually murdered) and his doctors (“Innocent”). Or what about its sole depiction of a woman relishing her sexual desire on her own? A businesswoman masturbating in what appears to be her very own office appears on the book’s inside-flap (Figure 4.2).

On the one hand, a persuasive case could be made that Misshitsu is misogyny through and through. First, there are the raped and tortured women of “Crawling About,” “Mutual Philosophy, Mutual Love,” and “Love with a Beautician.” Second, even the unabashedly pleasure-seeking women could be construed to be part of larger misogynistic narratives since they are pathologized to a degree: the mental patient and murderess in “Innocent” is undeniably “sick,” and even in “Fortune at a Stroke,” the fact that a “successful career woman” is also depicted as sex-crazed is likely no small coincidence (although her young male sex slave certainly does not object). Even if the desiring female characters are not pathologized in the text, as textual representations, they could be argued to serve merely as objects of male readers’ pleasure, not as subjects of their own desire. For instance, the inside cover image of the masturbating businesswoman serves the prurient interests of male readers rather than as a potential model for the few to non-existent female readers of Misshitsu. In other words, at the level of plot, diegetically, she may spread her legs to please herself, but as a textual construction, she does so to please the male readers.

On the other hand, does a depiction of a woman owning and acting upon her own sexual desire recuperate it from a feminist perspective? Do such depictions lead us to celebrate the manga artist along the lines of the reinterpretation of Marquis de Sade offered by Angela Carter in the 1970s? To view him as a philosopher of freedom who “urges women to fuck as actively as they were able […] to fuck their way into history and in doing so change it” (Carter 2001: 27). If female readers are the audience rather than males, does this change our interpretation of these depictions of female sexual
pain/pleasure even if it occurs at the hands of sadistic men? Or, for that matter, if a female, not male, manga artist produced the text? What if the female character demanded it, or asked for it? What if she liked it? We can see how slippery a slope this becomes.

Rather than performing any further acrobatics of textual interpretation to argue that the manga is either feminist or misogynist, I would point out how one work, and often the very same material, can invite two completely opposite and irresolvable conclusions. My above descriptions of the stories are ordered in a way to start with the seemingly most indefensible representations (rape/torture of women by men) and gradually move toward the most defensible (women seeking sexual pleasure by dominating men or alone). The former may seem to invite censorship while the latter might invite celebration, but few are truly black or white.

**Manifestos and murky grays**

So where does this leave us? Impossibly twisted and lost, but perhaps this is all for the good, especially when dealing with a medium and genre as self-reflexive...
as eromanga that ruthlessly plays with conventions of good/bad sex, fantasies of power/powerlessness, pleasure/pain, and fantastic/realistic bodies.

It is all the more important to investigate this genre since it is representative of mainstream heterosexual pornography geared toward men, a surprisingly underrepresented topic in both Porn and Japanese Studies. As Linda Williams has self-critically noted of her own 2004 edited volume Porn Studies, although it “succeeded in introducing the variety of pornographies available, it perhaps was guilty of ignoring what still remained the mainstream of hard-core heterosexual video pornography … [T]his avoidance of the heterosexual mainstream … has left a large central plot of the garden untended” (Williams 2014a: 26). She laments that thus far what has proliferated in Porn Studies is research on safer, less mainstream genres that privilege queer alternative readings.

In Japanese Studies as well, there has been a marked tendency to redeem only certain genres of erotic comics, certain authorships, readerships or reading practices, and certain kinds of fantasies while either explicitly or implicitly demonizing others. For example, Sandra Buckley, one of the earliest scholars to address sexually explicit comics, praises bishōnen (beautiful young boy-boy love) comics because they challenge normative sexuality and gender, and offer both female and male readers a fantastic escape from their circumscribed gender roles. While she redeems narratives that squarely remain in the realm of fantasy, like the bishōnen magazine June, because its stories “are located in an idealized space outside of the ‘real,’” she demonizes as pornographic those comic genres (eromanga and ladies’ comics) that “present themselves self-consciously to the reader as pornographic … transform[ing] the subjects, objects, and experience of the everyday – commuting, eating, golf clubs … – into eroticized, fantasy objects.” Whereas the former are “disruptive of the fabric of society, opening up a fantasy space where there is a potential for the dis-organ-ization of the individuated body from the body politic,” the latter merely affirm misogynist norms (Buckley 1991: 191, 184).

Anne Allison, on the other hand, challenges Buckley’s “willingness to ‘see’ penises where they are not,” and instead of interpreting the repetitive brutality and rape of women (particularly sodomy) in eromanga as evidence of men’s “phallic power,” considers it proof of their “impotency” (Allison 2000: 69). To argue this, she considers both what is represented on the pages (the mind-numbing repetition of explicit phallic power) and the context in which these images are consumed (often in transit between spaces that fix and confine social identities, i.e. the salaryman at the office or the father/husband at home). For both Buckley and Allison, however, erotic comics offer a fantastical realm, a steam valve of sorts, where those lacking power in reality vicariously exercise power on the page either through the gender-bending non-normative sexuality of the bishōnen, or the raping phalluses of the eromanga.

Like Allison, who productively flips the terms of debate to ask “how a sexual practice or text may work for someone it gives pleasure to rather than
merely *against* someone it ideologically oppresses” (Allison 2000: 55), Susan Napier too considers how both female and male bodies are often hyperbolically represented in pornographic anime as omnipotent and impotent to argue that the genre is not a simple reflection of brutal male domination, but an “intricate series of contesting hierarchical relations in which men do not always come out on top” (Napier 2005: 65).

In other scholarship, works with otherwise offensive content are exculpated because of the context of their production or reception. In the case of BL comics or ladies’ comics, for example, the female gender of the character, artist or the audience mitigates. For example, Sharalyn Orbaugh (2003) argues for the subversive potential of amateur manga, or dōjinshi, in large part because it is both produced and consumed by typically disenfranchised populations – both women and lower-income, less-educated groups. Gretchen Jones (2002) redeems the mass-market genre of ladies’ comics by pointing to the fact that female comic writers and the readers are not just passive consumers, but active producers of these misogynist texts. Like Jones, Deborah Shamoon (2004) also recuperates ladies’ comics’ use of rape fantasy by considering female readers’ pleasure as predicated on a close identification with the pleasured and penetrated female characters rather than the penetrating male. This article fits the profile noted by Williams above; in fact, it was included in her edited volume that she self-critically noted skewed toward offering exculpatory readings of safer genres.

The path to redemption depends on finding expressions of female pleasure – be it in the faces and bodies of the characters in the pages of the text, the artists’ act of producing them or the audience’s reception. Texts are interpreted as feminist or misogynist depending on the gendered nature of their expression. While I am sympathetic to these subversive readings, I am also wary of their premise because they potentially imply only such queered readings, texts and audiences are legitimate. As if sexualities, bodies, sex, desires, and even sexes can be demarcated into permissible and impermissible categories. In so doing, what gets lost is the fluidity and indeterminacy of reception, the text and bodies.

Rather than entering only the minefield of the blacks or the Pollyannaimism of the whites, we need to be ready to enter into the murky terrain of grays, but perhaps we do need a manifesto at this juncture given the state of humanities and area studies today – if only for the sake of our own consciences. The premise of this volume suggests a real concern among academics that we might be violating laws somewhere, the ethics of our profession and, most importantly, harming our students. Our job as professors involves no Hippocratic oath, and yet we too surely want to avoid harm. It is the presumption of harm, however, that we need to investigate further.

We need to flip this presumption of harm on its head to consider also the benefits of such work. In an age of trigger warnings, this approach is sorely needed:
Rather than assuming the negative effects of exposure, perhaps it is time for a modified version of the syllabus proviso offered by Williams:

In this course, as in life, students will be exposed to images and texts that may be offensive, arousing, and/or disturbing. Students will be expected to look closely at such materials to analyze the various responses these works provoke both in themselves and in individuals from other nations, places and times.

In the academy today, there is a deep need to see, to feel and to know things both inside and outside our comfort zones.

Nor should we presume benefit. To what end would we ask our students to look at material that might offend, arouse, disturb and/or excite them? Though I may balk at the neoliberal push for such self-justification, I should be able to justify what I study by asking: what can such work add to existing knowledge? To our knowledge and experience of another culture? Of sexually explicit materials? Of our own feelings of arousal and disgust? Of our beliefs about what is acceptable and what is beyond the pale? To an understanding of how our own bodies and sexualities are shaped at least in part in response to such materials and to their regulation by the state?

In response to the increased regulation of manga and anime under Bill 156, one female manga artist who goes by the pen name Abyūkyō (2013) has proposed holding Cool Japan hostage: she proposes the creation of a national bishōjo society where these young, beautiful females, who are both the subjects of and readers who sustain manga, band together (Figure 4.3). The drawing cleverly suggests how dependent Japanese soft power and the manga market today are on these sexualized bodies of young girls. It nicely hints at the degree to which bodies are implicated in the process of creating and consuming manga.

Perhaps we teachers should take a page from her book and take back the representation of sexual representation in Japan. Otherwise we risk allowing Japanese sexually explicit materials to be the sole purview of sensationalized media that tend to characterize sexuality and sexual expression in Japan as either a sexually repressed uptight society of prudes, or an unabashedly pornographic society of perverts.¹⁰

Those of us who teach literature and film believe that representation matters, and that the humanities matter to forming who we are and how we navigate our place in society. I hope to have shown how staging a criminal trial of an obscene work in the classroom could help us and our students navigate our ever-expanding worlds that encompass the local and the global,
Figure 4.3 Abyũkyo’s manifesto
(Image courtesy of the artist. Reproduced with permission from Manga ronsō [Manga debates], vol. 9, pp. 64–65)
the fictional and the real. Looking at the grays in the laws and in the texts reveals the complexities involved in reading, researching and teaching eromanga, or just how murky the terrain.

Notes

1. In contrast, I was more cautious when traveling to Australia in the fall of 2014, having been apprised of the strict rules against depictions that include both sex and violence, as well as against any depictions of children (either real or fictional manga or anime ones) in sexual situations. The Australian Customs form requires that travelers declare any material that might be deemed Refused Classification (RC) by the Classification Board. For a list of potential RC content, see Australian Law Reform Commission n.d.

2. In July 2013, Japan had its first arrest for CG child porn of photoshopped young girl (shōjo) nudes that were also charged with violating copyright law (Nagayama 2013: 12). In July 2013, there was also an obscenity indictment of the publisher of two adult publications: Nyan 2, an adult photo pictorial magazine, and the adult eromanga Comic Megastore in July 2013, which resulted in a plea bargain with a suspended 14-month prison sentence and a 500,000 yen fine (Kanemitsu 2013; Manga ronsō 2013).

3. This overly optimistic self-assessment is contradicted by a quote that heads the page and is dated May 19, 2011: “Unfortunately, we’ve also seen a historic rise in the distribution of child pornography, in the number of images being shared online, and in the level of violence associated with child exploitation and sexual abuse crimes.”

4. Possession entails severe penalties of up to a one-year prison term and/or 1,000,000 yen fine if convicted, or even being held up to 23 days without charges. For arguments against such revisions, see Yamaguchi (2008) and Tokyo Shimbun (2008).

5. First passed in 1954, these youth protection ordinances, or Seishōnen hogo ikusei (or aigo) jōrei, allow for fines from 200–300,000 yen and, in a few cases, up to six-month prison terms. Only Nagano prefecture lacks one. For a list of prefectures with these ordinances that regulate “harmful” information, see MEXT (2006).

6. The 1973 US Supreme Court case Miller v. California deems a work unprotected under the First Amendment if the work as a whole would be judged by the average person based on contemporary community standards: 1) to appeal to prurient interest; 2) to be patently offensive; and 3) to lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

7. The defense memorandum admitted that his collection included “that subset of manga known as hentai, or sexually explicit manga … featuring drawings of characters that appear as young girls, known as ‘lolicon’ … [However,] lolicon was only a minute portion of his entire collection, which consisted of tens of thousands of manga and anime, representing all genres of the art form” (CBLDF n.d.).

8. I am indebted to Jaqueline Berndt for this observation.


10. To cite just one of these sites, see Gaijin Pot (2004).

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5 Manga, anime, and child pornography law in Canada

Sharalyn Orbaugh

[A] visual representation can constitute child pornography ... by showing a person who is, or is depicted as, being under the age of 18 and is engaged in, or is depicted as engaged in, explicit sexual activity [and in this case] person ... includes both actual and imaginary human beings ...

(R. v. Sharpe, 2001)

Finally, it is also worth noting that the makers and users of child pornography in North America are almost all men, usually adults, usually white, and often of middle-class means and employed.

(Benedet 2002: 335)

Background

This chapter represents an attempt to think through the implications of the current Canadian law addressing child pornography – how the law defines it, and under what circumstances it is prosecuted – for Canadian consumers of Japanese popular culture products such as manga and anime. However, it is also a very personal attempt by a 58-year-old woman who experienced sexual abuse as a child to think through the reasons why she opposes (that is, I oppose) the censorship of sexual materials, including those that depict people under the age of 18, so long as no actual child was harmed in the making of them. The process of preparing this topic for a paper presented at the Manga Futures conference at the University of Wollongong in 2014 was – to my surprise – excruciating. It forced me to scrutinize my most fundamental values for consistency and ethical rigor. It forced me to recognize and articulate processes of exploration and recovery that I have instinctively (that is, without conscious thought or planning) pursued throughout the course of my life. In this chapter I retain the personal quality of that 2014 presentation: it is about me and why I hold the opinions I do. In future work I hope to incorporate more academic and empirical evidence to support those opinions, but this essay is about my experiences and the ways they are not reflected in or supported by Canadian law.
Implications of Canada’s child pornography law for teaching and research

The possible ramifications of Canadian child pornography law on consumers of Japanese popular culture was first brought to my attention in 2010, when cultural historian (and then postdoctoral scholar) James Welker inaugurated what turned out to be an extremely popular class on manga and anime at the University of British Columbia (UBC). When James taught the course he was careful to ensure that any registered students under the age of 18 had the permission of the Dean to attend, and he told me that because of Canadian law he was also careful about what kinds of images he showed in class. I greatly admired the course (which I itched to teach myself), but I thought that James’s concerns about Canadian law were completely unfounded. Since moving to UBC from Berkeley in 1997, I had, on the contrary, experienced far fewer complaints from students about sexually explicit content in my classes. The complaints in the US had typically been from Christian students, but in Canada not one religion-based complaint had come my way.

After James left UBC in 2012, I began teaching the manga and anime class myself, and although from the first I have taken the precaution of ensuring that all registered students are over 18, I initially gave myself free rein in terms of the images that I showed and the topics we discussed. The course is divided into three thematic sections and one of those addresses the topic of gender, sex and sexuality in manga and anime. The relatively free (though age-appropriate) expression of sexuality in even materials for youngish children, and the frequent queering of sex, gender and sexuality in manga and anime for all demographics above adolescence, have been cited as some of the reasons for the extreme global enthusiasm for Japanese popular culture products, and that response has proven true in my classes as well. In this section of the course we look at the wide variety of ways – some of them normative, some unusual, some explicitly queer – that sex, gender and sexuality are expressed in every genre of manga: *shōjo* (for girls and young women), *shōnen* (for boys and young men), *seinen* (for older teenage males and young men), *josei* (for women), *otoko* (for men), *hentai* (pornography for, primarily, adult straight men), *ladies*’ comics (pornography for, primarily, adult straight women), *BL* (“boys’ love,” romantic male-male homoerotic stories for young women and men), *yaoi* (male-male homoerotic pornography for young women and men), *sabu/bara* (male-male homoerotic pornography for gay men), and *yuri* (female-female homoerotic pornography for, primarily, young women and women). I was more cautious in my choice of anime clips to show in class, but I judged that still pictures embedded in rich narratives (that is, manga) could not possibly be problematic. This was Canada, after all, the land of utter reasonableness.

As recently as the March 2014 Association for Asian Studies meeting, for which Mark McLelland had organized a panel on the topic of pornography legislation, I was astonished to be singled out in the audience as
coming from Canada and therefore no doubt all too aware of the strictures of anti-child-pornography legislation. Who me? Canada? You must be joking.

I knew that during my time in Canada there had been some important trials regarding obscenity and pornography, but one of the hallmarks of life in Canada, in my experience, had been a consistent disconnect between the strictness of existing rules and the laxness of their enforcement. What I had come to expect was a liberality of interpretation, a flexibility and generosity of spirit regarding subject matter that in the United States would have been far more contentious and taboo.

However, when it came time to do the research for the presentation at the Manga Futures conference, organized by Mark McLelland and Jaqueline Berndt, I realized that James and Mark had been correct. It turns out that the Canada I had been living in – although perfectly real – is not the only Canada, and possibly not the dominant one. It became clear that certain aspects of what I research and teach might contravene Canadian law, and that no matter how professional or educational my purpose, I might be liable to prosecution. I quickly became intensely personally interested in the actuality of Canadian child pornography legislation and its enforcement.

Here, in a nutshell, is what I discovered. The Supreme Court judgment in the case of R. v. Sharpe (2001) found that “a visual representation can constitute child pornography … by showing a person who is, or is depicted as, being under the age of 18 and is engaged in, or is depicted as engaged in, explicit sexual activity,” and in this case “person … includes both actual and imaginary human beings,” with cartoon characters explicitly mentioned as examples of “persons” under the law (Supreme Court of Canada R. v. Sharpe). Being “engaged in … explicit sexual activity” in this ruling included simply being nude, or even being clothed but in a seductive posture. A shirtless bishōnen (beautiful young man) looking lovely in a typical manga pin-up pose could be interpreted as contravening the law – and the person depicted did not have to be under 18, but only look as if s/he could be.

I was astounded. How many manga are left when we remove all those that contain such images? Moreover, all that is required to violate the law is possession of the image – which can mean something as simple as having a manga in a box in my basement that includes one sexy page, or clicking on something online; a person does not have to have exhibited, or distributed, or used the image in any way to be in violation of the law.

The consequences of this ruling have been severe, including the prosecution of a US man entering Canada whose laptop was searched and found to contain a single manga- or anime-esque image judged by the Customs officer to constitute child pornography (R. v. Matheson). In fact, Canada Customs has taken the word “manga” to be an equivalent to “child pornography,” as evidenced by the frequency with which they ask about and confiscate Japanese popular culture products at the border. Other countries, including Australia, have looked to Canada for inspiration in formulating their own child pornography laws, so the ramifications of the R. v. Sharpe ruling bear close examination.
Before I turn to the examination of R. v. Sharpe I should point out two things. The first is that if I am Canadian, it is by choice, not by birth. I have lived in Canada for 18 years, and hope to live here for the rest of my life, but I am from the United States and I lived there and in Japan for 40 years before I ever spent much time in Canada, so my perspective on Canadian law and political philosophy is that of an insider-outsider. However, the fact that I have come to Canada from elsewhere allows me to recognize aspects of Canadian practice and Canadian ethos that might seem natural and therefore unimportant to someone who has lived here from childhood.

Second, I am going to trace landmark legislation and court rulings that relate to obscenity and child pornography, but in the case of every single ruling discussed here, there were multiple arguments as the case went through the courts, and after every single ruling there have been multiple Canadian responses. There is nothing monolithic about Canadian opinion regarding obscenity or child pornography.

When I began my research for the Manga Futures presentation, of course I read up on the court cases that have shaped current law, and talked to local members of the fanfic and dōjinshi (manga fanfic) communities about their understanding of the legality of their web publications. I also consulted feminist colleagues to find someone with expertise in child pornography law and was directed to Janine Benedet, professor in the UBC law school and co-director of the Centre for Feminist Legal Studies at UBC.

I had never met Janine, and was gratified when she agreed to have tea with me and answer my questions about child pornography in manga and anime. I liked her immediately; we really hit it off. However, I came out of my meeting with her feeling very disturbed. This was, in the first place, because she assured me that all of the manga and anime images that I thought innocuous could in fact truly be in violation of Canadian law, and she endorsed the views of James Welker and Mark McLelland that in fact those laws could be vigorously prosecuted. My potential defense – that these constituted educational and research materials – was unlikely to get me off the hook, she warned, because the same arguments had been made, unsuccessfully, by actual pedophiles at their trials for child abuse and possession of child pornography. In other words, I was potentially in deep legal trouble since I already possessed examples of manga and anime that could potentially be counted in Canada as child porn. (As a result of my conversation with Janine I have removed all manga- and anime-related material off the laptop I travel with, and have moved many potentially contentious books and DVDs from my shelves to a storage facility in the United States.)

However, what came as an even more terrible shock to me was the fact that Janine absolutely supported the ruling in R. v. Sharpe, despite the fact that it was so incredibly sweeping. In fact, she felt that Sharpe did not go far enough in prohibiting potentially harmful materials. I described to her several of the manga that I like, manga that I teach, manga that my students love; I talked about the pioneering work of Takemiya Keiko and other women manga
artists who have provided alternative sexual narratives for female audiences, and explained the social benefits that I saw in the wonderful queerness that characterizes a lot of manga. I said that it would be a terrible pity to keep such works out of Canada.

Her response was: “Children are being abused and you are worrying about comic books?”

In other words, she hit me right in the face with what has been called “the intensity gap.” How could I possibly justify my concern with the fate of a few books in the face of real and persistent child abuse? If burning every manga would rid Canada of all child abuse, would I not be out there lighting fires?

Yes, I would! That is, I would if I believed that suppressing the one would lead to the disappearance of the other. At no time did I agree with her implication that there is a simple cause-and-effect relationship between sexual depictions of people under 18 in manga narratives and real-life child abuse, but my conversation with her nonetheless disturbed me very much because, as I say, I liked her. She is a warrior for children, and a feminist. She put a sympathetic face on a group of people, or an attitude toward the world, that I had always dismissed as ignorant, ultra-conservative, completely unrelated to me, and un-Canadian. However, here was this woman who clearly represented a very strong current in Canadian political philosophy—a current that I was now going to have to engage seriously instead of just dismissing it.

I am accustomed to talking to scholars and/or fans of manga and anime, who mostly share my positive attitude toward Japanese popular culture specifically, and toward narrative and works of the imagination more generally. I read Pat/Patrick Califia, Laura Kipnis and Linda Kaufmann about the value to society of extreme sexual expression, and I lecture audiences who already agree with that point of view. What was so painful to me now was the realization that it was not going to be so easy: the people I really needed to be able to convince regarding the value of Japanese popular culture were personified by Janine Benedet, who evidently cared nothing for literature/narrative—the subject to which I have given my life—and for whom the word “transgressive” did not equal “good,” as it so often does for me and many of my colleagues and audiences.

Much of my feeling of distress came from a sense that I had misunderstood Canada. I had thought that after a few early years of confusion and frustration I had eventually achieved a good understanding of Canadian political philosophy, and had realized that I mostly endorsed it. I liked the ways in which Canada was different from the United States. Let me be more specific about that.

At the risk of oversimplifying, we might argue that the United States can be described as libertarian in contrast to Canada’s socialism or protectionism. In Canada, if it appears that the playing field is not level, the government actively intervenes to make it so. This means that the rights of some people may be curtailed in order to create a better situation for all, or that the rights of all people may be curtailed in order to protect a particularly vulnerable
group. An example of the former would be the Canadian medical system. In order to keep medical care free for all Canadians (and residents), doctors’ salaries and the potential profits of pharmaceutical companies have to be controlled – doctors and businesses suffer a little so that the rest of us can enjoy excellent medical care for free. An example of the latter would be UBC’s grading policy, which artificially lowers the grades of all students in the first two years to try to create a more level playing field for vulnerable students who often find it hard to compete when they first begin university – new immigrants, first-generation university students, and so on. I loved Canada’s medical system from the moment I arrived – it is so satisfying to know that everyone has access to decent medical care – but it took my libertarian impulses some time to become reconciled to the grading policy, although eventually I got there.

What I found myself confronted with after talking to Janine was a vision of the Sharpe ruling as being part and parcel of this same Canadian socialism or protectionism that I have learned to endorse: it potentially inconveniences all in order to protect a particularly vulnerable group: children. I am fully in favor of laws that disallow the possession of harmful objects such as guns or explosives – my libertarian impulses are completely absent in that context – so I tried to think analogously about manga. If I knew that disallowing the possession of manga would eliminate child abuse, would I not support such a law?

In the process of thinking through ethical questions such as this one, I decided to look at the origins of the current Canadian views on pornography and obscenity, to discover the ethical and philosophical principles on which they were (implicitly or explicitly) based, as well as to discover whether empirical research about the effects of pornography formed any part of the legal arguments.

**Obscenity and pornography in Canadian law**

To understand fully R. v. Sharpe, it is necessary to look back at an earlier case, R. v. Butler, which went to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1992. Donald Butler owned a store in Winnipeg that sold materials that had been judged to be obscene by the police. He argued that the Criminal Code’s prohibition of sexual materials violated section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects the fundamental freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other communications media. Butler lost his Supreme Court case in a 9–0 ruling that declared section 163(8) of the Criminal Code was constitutional and did not infringe on free speech (Newman and White 2006: 254).

Despite the fact that he lost, the Butler case was important in that it did force the court to detail more limited and specific interpretations of what constituted obscenity and why. It instituted a set of “tests” to determine whether a particular image, artwork or film is obscene. The first test is the community standards of tolerance test, which:
emphasizes that what is obscene is not a matter of personal taste, nor is it
a standard of tolerance of a particular local community, but rather of the
community as a whole (that is, the nation). As Justice John Sopinka
wrote, “the community standards test is concerned not with what Cana-
dians would not tolerate being exposed to themselves, but what they
would not tolerate other Canadians being exposed to…”

(Newman and White 2006: 255)

This is, in part, meant to counter the problems that arise in the United States
because of the principle of states’ rights, where something that is deemed
obscene in one particular state (Oklahoma, for example) can be prosecuted
there even if, according to federal statutes, it is legal. In Canada, local com-


munities cannot assert “higher” moral standards, but this means that local
communities whose standards may legitimately be different – such as com-


munities of non-normative sexualities – cannot assert a right to material that
is specifically for themselves. To pass muster, material must be acceptable to
“all Canadians.” Of course, unless we somehow develop a way to poll “all
Canadians” on every instance of possible obscenity, this is a ludicrous notion
that is, in fact, embodied or enacted by just a few Canadians, specific agents,
who have specific agendas and belief systems.

One of those agents, collectively, is the Supreme Court of Canada. I will
not go into detail about who the current nine Justices are, but will point out
they are all white, six men and three women, and the website biographies for
seven of the nine explicitly mention their heterosexual marriages. The two,
both men, who do not mention marriage, also give no indication in their job
histories that they have ever advocated for non-normative sexualities. Since,
according to Statistics Canada, 19 percent of Canadians are non-white, even
just by that measure the current justices are a curious embodiment of “all
Canadians” (Statistics Canada 2011).

The 13,000 employees of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA, aka
Canada Customs), 7,200 of whom are the uniformed officials who actually
protect the border at over 1,200 entry points, collectively constitute another


crucial agent in carrying out this “community standards of tolerance test,” as
they choose what materials to confiscate, which people to bar from entering
the country, and which would-be visitors to turn over for immediate arrest
(Canada Border Services Agency n.d.).

The second test is the undue exploitation of sex, which asks whether the sex
in question is depicted as degrading and dehumanizing. “Justice Sopinka
stated that ‘degrading and dehumanizing materials place women (and some-
times men) in positions of subordination, servile submission or humiliation’”
(Newman and White 2006: 255). These were the depictions of sex that were
found problematic by the court, since the justices accepted the argument
(evidently without discussion or evidence) that we can recognize and agree on
which images are degrading and dehumanizing, and that such images cause
harm. In addition, they argued that such images are “antithetical to equality
values because they violate principles of equality between men and women as well as the inherent dignity of all human beings” (Newman and White 2006: 255).

However, in 1992 the Court did not intend to restrict all sexual images and narratives – they acknowledged that context could redeem some apparently problematic material. So they added a third test: artistic defense or internal necessities:

That is, even material that offends community standards may not be considered undue “if it is required for the serious treatment of a theme … To determine whether a dominant characteristic of the [visual material] is the undue exploitation of sex, the courts must have regard to various things – the author’s artistic purpose, the manner in which he or she has portrayed and developed the story, the depiction and interplay of character and the creation of visual effect through skillful camera techniques …”

(Newman and White 2006: 255)

Finally, Justice Sopinka devised another test that could clarify the relationship between the three tests already articulated. He divided sexual material into three categories:

1 explicit sex with violence (violence here meaning actual physical violence and threats of physical violence);
2 explicit sex without violence;
3 explicit sex without violence that neither degrades nor dehumanizes subjects.

(Newman and White 2006: 255)

He ruled that the first definitely falls under 163(8) of the Criminal Code and is liable to prosecution; the second may or may not be covered by section 163(8); and the third would definitely not be covered by section 163(8). Justice Sopinka added one final qualifier to this set of guidelines, explaining that “explicit sex that is not violent and neither degrading nor dehumanizing is generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as the undue exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its production” (Newman and White 2006: 255–256, emphasis added).

So this ruling leaves open the problem that what one person considers a dehumanizing and degrading image, another might consider playful, liberating or merely factual. (We might ask how the fact of sexual degradation can be understood and critiqued if it may not be visualized, for example.) However, the judgment does leave room for a fair amount of explicit sexual expression, especially that embedded in artistic narrative. The only caveat is that children should not be used in the process of creating such narratives. In other words, at this point, between 1992 and 2001, when the next judgment
came down, most manga and anime – certainly all the materials I routinely teach – were fine.

However, one of the important terms that came up in this judgment was “harm.” In this case it did not mean harm to the person or persons pictured in the obscene material, but the harm that such material causes to the viewer. The justices stated that while the accuracy of the perception that pornography inflicts harm:

is not susceptible to exact proof, there is a substantial body of opinion that holds that the portrayal of persons being subjected to degrading and or dehumanizing sexual treatment results in harm, particularly to women and therefore to society as a whole … While the direct link between obscenity and harm to society may be difficult, if not impossible to establish, it is reasonable to presume that exposure to images bears a causal relationship to changes in attitudes and beliefs.

(Newman and White 2006: 256, emphases added)

If true equality is to be achieved, therefore, “we cannot ignore the threat to equality resulting from exposure to audiences of certain types of violent and degrading materials” (Newman and White 2006: 256).  

Look at this ruling – it is so Canadian. Like the examples above, it endorses the inconveniencing of some (who like pornography) to ensure protection of the many: women generally, and the women and men who wish to live in a just and equitable society. Rather than letting the powerful run roughshod over the weak, Canada steps in and enforces protections. Of course, there are at least two very large problems here: first, the assumption of harm in the complete absence of evidence, which Justice Sopinka explicitly admits; and second, the assumption that women are passive, helpless victims of sex, rather than active agents themselves.

A final important point about the Butler ruling was that the justices agreed that although free speech is important and protected in the Charter, there are various levels of expression that deserve different levels of protection, and that pornography was assigned the lowest imaginable level (Newman and White 2006: 257).

This was, generally speaking, a fairly moderate position – a lot of sexual expression would be completely tolerated, some would be tolerated under certain conditions, and some would not ever be tolerated. Reasonable, moderate, Canadian. There was a lot of push-back from various directions over this ruling – libertarian Canadians thought it much too harsh while conservatives found it much too liberal – but it seemed to achieve a balance and allow for sufficient flexibility that many Canadians found it acceptable.

So now finally we return to R. v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court ruling from 2001 that currently regulates child pornography. It was the first major revision to pornography law after Butler. It is quite a complex ruling, written by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, the first female chief justice of Canada, and it
takes into consideration all sides of issues such as the importance of free speech, the question of harm and so on, but consistently comes down in its final decision to the most restrictive interpretations of the Criminal Code. Here, for example, is the explanation of the decision to prohibit simple possession of child pornography, rather than focusing on its distribution or its use in actually harming children:

the prohibition of the possession of child pornography *minimally impairs the right to free expression*. Although s. 163.1(4) [of the Criminal Code] is directed only to the *private possession of child pornography*, children are particularly vulnerable in the private sphere, since a large portion of child pornography is produced privately and used privately by those who possess it. The harmful effect on the attitudes of those who possess child pornography similarly occurs in private. Consequently, *prohibiting the simple possession of child pornography has an additional reductive effect on the harm it causes*. The prohibition of the possession of child pornography also captures visual and written works of the imagination which do not involve the participation of any actual children or youth in their production; in enacting s. 163.1(4), *Parliament sought to prevent not only the harm that flows from the use of children in pornography, but also the harm that flows from the very existence of images and words which degrade and dehumanize children and to send the message that children are not appropriate sexual partners*. The focus of the inquiry must be on the harm of the message of the representations and not on their manner of creation, or on the intent or identity of their creator. Given the *low value of the speech at issue in this case* and the fact that it undermines the *Charter* rights of children, Parliament was justified in concluding that visual works of the imagination would harm children.

(Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Sharpe, emphases added)

This is not the place to argue each of the significant points above, but one fundamental problem with this ruling must be pointed out: its failure to distinguish among “children” of different ages. While children under the age of puberty are unquestionably “not appropriate sexual partners” for anyone, as is recognized in Canada’s age of consent laws, middle and older teenagers can be perfectly appropriate sexual partners for each other, and an 18-year-old “child” is a not unreasonable sexual partner for a 19-year-old “adult.” Given that the age of consent in Canada is 16, young people who are still classified as children may legally engage in sexual activity, but if they create images of that activity they may find themselves in violation of this extremely broad ruling on the *representation* of sex. This has already resulted in a number of ridiculous cases, where teenagers’ selfies got them prosecuted for child porn. At some point a very high-profile prosecution under this law will result in a new Supreme Court trial that will, it is hoped, take us back to a less draconian position. I just hope I am not the defendant in that case.
Why “comic books” matter

At this point I return to the question of convincing Janine Benedet of why I think it is right to defend free speech even in “comic books,” and why I think Canada’s national health — including that of children — would be enhanced, rather than harmed, by allowing the kinds of sexual expression that we find in many manga that currently potentially contravene the criminal code.

Both of the court decisions that I have discussed here share some assumptions. First, both rulings assume that there is an empowered abuser group and a disempowered abused group in all pornography. Butler addressed almost exclusively images of women in porn aimed at straight men, and Sharpe addresses images of children of both sexes in porn for adult male pedophiles. The ruling is obviously based on the assumption implied in R. v. Butler and made explicit by Janine Benedet in the epigraph to this paper: that sexual predators are adult men and that their prey are hapless and vulnerable women (for Butler) and young children (for Sharpe).

The legislation and the court rulings are all about protecting those on the disempowered side of those equations. For many Canadians, who consume only domestically produced narrative and images (if there are any of those left in this wired world), these equations may sound valid.

However, any reader of manga knows that these equations are ludicrously oversimplified. In manga there are age-, gender-, sex- and sexuality-specific sexual narratives and images for all possible demographics, and the power relationships depicted in them are often complex and shifting. These are not materials meant to groom anyone for anything. On the contrary, for young people negotiating their sexual fears, desires and preferences as they work to build social identities, sampling and consuming a wide range of complex manga narratives allows them to make informed and independent choices about their own sexualities in a safe space, before they (or as they) engage in real-life sexual behavior. As Mark McLelland points out, sexual literacy is a human right, and a child’s right, as affirmed in Clause 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasizes the vital importance of children’s access to “information and ideas of all kinds” (McLelland, forthcoming).

Second, both rulings are based on the belief that images/narratives are extremely powerful and cause changes in the minds and attitudes of individuals, which then lead to changes across society. In this case, they are absolutely correct, but there are still huge gaps between their position and mine.

For one, Janine Benedet’s position and that of the Court in R. v. Sharpe is based on a complete lack of distinction between fantasy and action, but only in the realm of sex. We draw a clear distinction between people who commit murder and those people who think about murder and watch violent TV shows but do not actually kill anyone. Why is it acceptable to fantasize murder and bathe in the violent murder-fest that is television, as long as one does not act violently, but not okay to think about various forms of sexuality
and consume (perhaps even violent or transgressive) sexual fantasy, and not act on it? Similarly, we allow people to write or draw the most violent fantasies and publish them in almost any forum, but as long as they do not act them out in real life, it is fine. You can write stories until you are blue in the face about chopping a child up with a hatchet, and as long as you do not actually go after a child with a hatchet, you have contravened no laws. Why, in the case of sex and sex only, are the fantasy and the act seen as the same?

Also, and for me most importantly, when these rulings underscore the tremendous psychological or affective power of images and narratives, they see and mention only the negative aspects of that power. They see the harm that can be done, but not the healing. In fact, the only way to cure trauma is by reading stories and telling stories.¹⁴ I know about child abuse first-hand, and I also know that what I needed in dealing with the after-effects of it was not silence about sex, nor was it simple, pretty sanitized stories about sex. What saved me were reading and writing, using my imagination to try to understand the nature of and possible scenarios around unequal power and domination and betrayal. It may be that this is because of my type, a “literature person,” since I certainly loved reading and writing from even before the era of the abuse, but, as psychologists and trauma theorists have shown, narrative – telling and writing, listening, reading, retelling, rewriting – is the only thing that provides effective healing from trauma, and not just for literarily-inclined people like me. It is significant that in my informal interviews with writers of fanfic and manga dōjinshi, too, one of the most common comments was that writing stories helped the writer work through some traumatic issue that was troubling her or him.¹⁵

I do not contend that all narrative that is not harmful is healing and beneficial to society. Much sexual narrative is neutral, or slightly negative, or somewhat positive, or very negative, or very positive – but where it falls on that spectrum depends entirely on who is reading it and what their needs are. The point is that if someone has been sexually abused, then their recovery cannot be based on creating a pretend world that contains no sex. In order for victims of sexual abuse to heal, they have to talk about and think about sex, rehearsing the past, but also taking the narrative in new directions. The stories that will help people to work through trauma cannot always be entirely sunny and sex-positive – victims know better. One thing victims need is to have their experience affirmed – yes, rape exists; yes, it is violent and ugly – but then to have ways of thinking about that which do not merely leave it locked in the victim’s own traumatic experience. We need to see narratives that play out sexual scenarios in a variety of directions, some positive, some not so much. When you shut down all discourse on sexuality in order to try to keep exploiters from it, you ensure that sex appears in only two ways: absent/sanitized or horrible/criminal. You lose all the complex middle ground where healing and change can occur.

Of course, having a wide variety of sexual narratives available to and about young people is not just beneficial to victims of child abuse. Janine Benedet
and the justices seem to live in a heteronormative, cisgender world that shares simple assumptions about power relations and equality – it is in many ways a feminist world, but still incredibly blinkered. What about gay or gender-queer children and young people, looking for role models for their gender expressions and sexuality? Surely this is a vulnerable group that the Canadian government should give some attention to. Many scholars in Japan Studies, inside Japan and out, have written about how BL, or queer shōjo manga, helped them navigate their teenage years. Just as it is condescending paternalism to assume that women are not active agents in sex, and are in need of intensive governmental protection, it is also condescending paternalism to assume that young people need to be protected from all sexual expression, particularly that which depicts young people.

In sum, the harm (in the sense of lost benefit to society) in eradicating sexual images and narratives (that have not harmed any actual persons in their production) is in my view far greater than the potential harm caused to society by manga.

Notes

1 I refer here to narratives like Crayon Shinchan, which exists as both a manga and TV anime series, and is aimed at a very wide audience, from young children to adults. The eponymous Shinchan is a mischievous five-year-old boy who likes to run around naked (an image that is illegal in Canada, despite the extremely sketchy and cartoony nature of the depiction) and is curious about adult sexuality (though no explicit sexual activity is ever shown). Shinchan’s behavior and interests parallel those of many five-year-olds I have known, and the narrative’s inclusion of sexuality remains more or less at the level of what a five-year-old would understand. Including age-appropriate sexual themes and images is common in many (though by no means all) manga and anime.

2 So far I have taught this course to a wide variety of students – UBC undergraduates from all disciplines, an extremely multi-ethnic and multi-national group (though most are Canadians or permanent residents); Chinese undergraduates visiting UBC for an intensive summer program; and an international and ethnically mixed class of undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Tokyo. Course evaluations from and surveys done in all of those classes underscored frank (age-appropriate) sexuality and frequent queering of normative assumptions as reasons for their appreciation of Japanese popular culture.

3 This is not an exhaustive list of all the genres and sub-genres of manga, and the terms used for genre categories such as these change over time and from one reading community to another. The target audiences I have very briefly identified in each case are the demographic groups addressed by, for example, the advertisements in the commercial magazines in which these materials sometimes appear – that is, they are the demographic groups imagined by the producers as the primary consumers of each genre. It goes without saying that many people not among that target demographic read and enjoy works in any of these genres.

4 R v. Matheson was resolved, after two years of legal wrangling, with the Crown dropping all criminal charges in return for Matheson’s guilty plea on a minor charge with no further legal penalty. His reputation and career were severely harmed by the case, however, and his legal fees reportedly amounted to $75,000. Although there have been few other prosecutions, Canada Customs agents
confiscate manga books and anime DVDs on a regular basis, including things as innocuous as *Sailor Moon* (Alverson 2012).

5 For examples, see Hudson (2011) or Alverson (2012).

6 For one of many examples of Canadians who have publicly called for a reconsideration of the current child-pornography law, see Cossman (2013).

7 Janine's arguments about Sharpe can be read in full in Benedet (2002). The majority of her argument focuses on pornography that uses real children in its production.

8 This phrase has been popularized by North American media, used most often in the context of the abortion debate in the United States.

9 In fact it was Janine who suggested the characterization of “libertarian” for the United States and “protectionist” for Canada. Although I initially rejected “libertarian” as a descriptor of my opinions and values, I later came to accept those terms, at least provisionally, as describing a US–Canada contrast that I had long noticed but had no words for.

10 As the Little Sisters Bookstore and Art Emporium case in Vancouver showed, the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) explicitly targeted and routinely confiscated materials aimed at a gay male audience, deeming those materials a contravention of the R. v. Butler ruling because the sexual depictions included many that they deemed “dehumanizing and degrading.” The Supreme Court of Canada in 2000 ruled in a six–three split decision that the CBSA was wrong in explicitly targeting materials they knew to be intended for a particular audience (in violation of section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which covers freedom of expression), but that banning the materials from Canada *was acceptable* under section 1 of the Charter (the clause that allows the government to limit the otherwise guaranteed rights). See Little Sisters (n.d.), and Newman and White (2006): 260. It is a recurring irony that many of the materials targeted for confiscation by the CBSA (including many manga and anime) are sexual depictions of men, although the language of protection we read in Butler, and in the epigraph to this chapter, is all about protecting women/society from the harm caused by dehumanizing sexual images of women.

11 Mark McLelland makes a similar argument – that it is paternalistic and simplistic to assume that “young people” (children under the law, but past puberty) are vulnerable, hapless victims of sexuality (McLelland 2016).

12 Newman and White discuss in detail the various responses to the ruling by people of various political stripes (Newman and White 2006: 257).

13 For discussions of ways that Japanese popular culture contains sexual depictions that might appear to “degrade” women or young men, but in fact are saying something much more complex about power hierarchies and the ways they can be negotiated and overturned, and about social change, see Napier (2005), or Orbaugh (2009). For discussions of the ways women readers use male-male homoerotic sexual depictions, see Welker (2011), Nagaike (2012), or Wood (2013).

14 This has been argued by several generations of psychologists and researchers who work on trauma: early researchers include Josef Breuer, Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet, and contemporary ones include Bessel A. Van der Kolk, Cathy Caruth, James W. Pennebaker and Nathen Field. As an adult I have actively and consciously sought the healing power of writing and reading narrative, but what strikes me as particularly significant in this context is that when I was a child I instinctively turned to reading to help me cope with the after-effects of what had happened to me, to try to understand and work through it.

15 It goes without saying that the trauma they referenced was not always sexual in nature, though sexual trauma and childhood abuse did come up fairly frequently. This is a topic that deserves much more attention than I can give it here. In future research I plan to interview writers of fanfic more formally and systematically about their motives and pleasures.
In English, Akiko Mizoguchi (2003) is one person who has written eloquently about how reading BL manga helped her explore and understand her sexuality in her youth. It is significant that the manga she consumed for this purpose featured only male bodies, and romances between males, suggesting how complicated and unintuitive is the relationship between fantasy and real identities and behavior.

References


Some observations on researching unpopular topics in Japan

Patrick W. Galbraith

Introduction

Since the early 2000s, Japan has pursued a range of policy initiatives under the banner of “cool Japan.” These policy initiatives are based on the idea that certain forms of Japanese media and popular culture are perceived overseas to be cool, which represents not only the attractive possibility of expanding global markets, but also winning the hearts and minds of young people around the world and encouraging them to become “Japan fans” (Sugimoto 2013). From the beginning, cool Japan policy has made much of the supposed popularity of manga and anime in “the West,” which seems somehow to legitimize the nation and demonstrate that proclamations of its decline are premature (Leheny 2006: 214–216, 220–223; Choo 2011: 85, 87–88). Although cool Japan policy has drawn more vocal critics in recent years (see Mihara 2014 for an overview), public funds are still being allocated to promote manga and anime, among other things perceived to contribute to a positive image of Japan (Nikkei 2015). Public diplomacy and nation branding are in no way unique to Japan, but its government has drawn attention for being openly invested in national(izing) popular culture.

Given this, it is significant that the global spread of manga and anime has generated not only stories about “cool Japan,” but also simultaneously rekindled familiar stories about “weird Japan” as a sexually deviant “other.” This distinct but connected national(izing) discourse of popular culture came to the fore in the summer of 2014, when Japan banned the possession of child pornography, but did not include in its definition of child pornography manga, anime and games sexualizing characters that appear to be underage or depicting them engaged in sex acts. The decision sparked widespread criticism outside Japan of its perceived failure to crack down on child pornography – criticism that conflated actual and virtual forms, ignoring the presence or absence of victim and crime (McLelland 2005: 63–64; McLelland 2011: 351–354, 360–361, 363). For example, one article condemning Japan as “the Empire of Child Pornography” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014) is illustrated with a photograph of a Japanese man looking to purchase media emblazoned with manga/anime-style girl characters, who appear to be young. In articles
such as this one, Japanese manga and anime and men attracted to them are positioned as sexually suspect. In the photograph described above, we do not know the content of the offending media or the thoughts of the man looking to purchase them, but assume from the framing that the media are child pornography and the man is a pedophile and potential predator. Japan seems to be full of such media and men, which begs the question: “Why is there such a fascination with sexual interaction with young girls – known as rorikon (Lolita complex) in Japan” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014)?

The alleged sexual fascination with young girls revealed in manga and anime and attributed to Japan as a nation is referred to as rorikon, or lolicon, as it is more widely transcribed. Lolicon has long been a part of national (izing) discourses of Japanese media and popular culture, but manga and anime are particularly prone to be taken up as examples. It is not a problem to criticize manga and anime, which are not to everyone’s tastes and can repulse as powerfully as they attract, but it is a problem when critics move from personal repulsion to calls for regulation. It is a problem when critics equate attraction to manga and anime with perversion and pathology (Rogers 2010), and link the consumption of such media with horrific crimes against children – or, as one reporter ominously put it, “cartoons may be fueling the darkest desires of criminals” (Ripley et al. 2014). Although the jury is still out on the social impact of manga and anime – “It has not been scientifically validated that it even indirectly causes damage” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014) – many nevertheless feel justified to judge people guilty of imaginary crimes (McLelland 2012: 479). In this way, lolicon has become a keyword in global criticism of “Japan’s child porn problem” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014).³

Despite mounting concern about the sexualization of young girl characters in manga and anime, cool Japan policy continues to push for the creation of Japan fans, which is not unrelated to academic interest in Japanese media and popular culture. As Koichi Iwabuchi pointedly notes, uncritical research on and by fans of Japanese media and popular culture contributes to nationalistic discourse about Japan’s global influence (Iwabuchi 2010: 89). We can see this in remarks by Asō Tarō, a conservative politician and former prime minister of Japan who pontificated that, “Thanks to fans, Japanese culture, subculture, is undoubtedly being transmitted to the world […] Isn’t this something that we should take more pride in” (Galbraith, forthcoming a)?⁴ When Asō said those words at a rally in Akihabara in 2007, he could not have known that years later journalists would use images of manga and anime displays in that very same neighborhood as proof that Japan was “the Empire of Child Pornography” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014; Ripley et al. 2014). If he had known, would Asō still have wanted to be associated publicly with Akihabara? Would he still have been proud of the “Japanese culture, subculture” being transmitted to the world? Or, like other members of his political party in recent years, would Asō instead have called for increased regulation of lolicon media? There are clear connections between global interest in manga and anime, government investment in cool Japan policy, and increased
scrutiny of manga, anime and fans in Japan (Cather 2012: 243–247; Galbraith, forthcoming a). If lolicon is Japan’s “skeleton in the closet” (Alt 2014a), if the specter of weird Japan haunts cool Japan and threatens to possess it, then we can expect the government to bury the skeleton, exorcise the specter and attempt to shift the national(izing) discourse from critical to celebratory. In this way, the discussion of Japanese media and popular culture – by critics and fans, journalists and academics, bureaucrats and citizens – is always already political, and this is even more the case when the discussion is about lolicon.

This chapter provides some observations on researching unpopular topics in the politicized space of Japan. It is a polemic, which means a contentious argument against a position, in this case that certain forms of manga and anime are child pornography and that the presence of such media makes Japan the Empire of Child Pornography. The position against which I argue not only makes Japanese media and men sexually suspect, but also criminal. The position discourages debate, because no one wants to be seen as defending child pornography and abusers. Raising questions about categorizing manga and anime as child pornography is met with thinly veiled accusations of personal “interest” in the topic of lolicon.

In my ongoing ethnographic fieldwork in Akihabara, I have found the discussion of lolicon to be unavoidable. Although only a small part of my work, I have come to be labeled as “the lolicon guy,” which is not without consequences. Most people choose to remain silent on the topic of lolicon to avoid the kind of guilt by association entailed in the label of lolicon guy, but it does not end there. In this chapter, I provide the example of a publisher cutting an interview and drawings related to lolicon from one of my books for fear of sparking “a moral firestorm” in the United States. The publisher’s fear is understandable in context. Rather than risk the potential consequences, it is safer simply not to talk about lolicon. By remaining silent, however, we are complicit in the judgment of the unknown/other. The inability to look at images and listen to people involved has led to ignorance on the topic of lolicon and judgment of it based on ignorance. The chapter argues that it is politically necessary to include unpopular topics such as lolicon in the study of Japanese media and popular culture. If we are to intervene in national(izing) discourses that uncritically denounce or admire Japanese media and popular culture, we must engage with material that is unpopular and may make us so. Only in this way can we go beyond fixed and polarized positions to the more nuanced cultural politics of difficult topics such as lolicon.

The lolicon boom

Lolicon, now described as a “four-letter word” (Alt 2014a), has historically been a keyword for researchers of manga, anime and fan cultures in Japan. Beginning in the 1970s, when *shōjo* (for girls) manga was undergoing a renaissance, men were attracted to this content and crossed gender/genre
boundaries to produce and consume it (Galbraith, forthcoming b). The first appearance of the word lolicon in manga was Wada Shinji’s *Stumbling Upon a Cabbage Field* (Kyabetsu batake de tsuzazuite), published in *shōjo* manga magazine *Bessatsu Margaret* in June 1974. In a story that parodies *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, Wada calls Lewis Carroll a lolicon, with a footnote explaining his “strange character of liking only small children.” It is shocking that Wada, an adult male artist, would include such a footnote in a manga magazine ostensibly targeting young girls, but this was likely an inside joke for adult men reading his work, which points to the broader phenomenon of male readers of *shōjo* manga. The founders of the Comic Market, themselves adult male readers of *shōjo* manga, advertised their event in *Bessatsu Shōjo Comic* (Shimotsuki 2008: 11), a *shōjo* manga magazine that was likely read by men with shared interests. Although the existence of these men has gone largely without comment, they are an important part of the story of “otaku,” here referring to certain kinds of manga and anime fans, in Japan. For example, Fujita Hisashi argues that male fans of *shōjo* manga “sought friends who shared their interests and became the early ‘otaku’” (Fujita 1989: 130).

Also in the 1970s, men who had grown up with manga and anime began to be attracted to “cute” and “cartoony” characters, or manga/anime-style characters, as opposed to those drawn in the more “realistic” and “adult” style of *gekiga*. Among these men was Azuma Hideo, who is considered a pioneer of *bishōjo* (cute girl) manga. Azuma explored and explored the sexuality of cute and cartoony characters, which had long existed in the foundational manga and anime of Tezuka Osamu and his followers, but had been a “taboo” and “unspeakable thing.” Azuma was not alone in his interests. Male fans of manga and anime began to gather at places such as Manga Garō, a café that had anime cels and fanzines on display (Morikawa 2011: 182–183), where they spoke about attraction to cute and cartoony girl characters such as Pipi from Tomino Yoshiyuki’s *Triton of the Sea* (Umi no Toriton, 1972) and Clara from Takahata Isao’s *Heidi, Girl of the Alps* (Arupusu no shōjo Haiji, 1974). Manga Garō regulars drew manga/anime-style girl characters in a communal notebook, which raised awareness of shared interests. It was here that Hirukogami Ken wrote, “I am a lolicon” (Morikawa 2011: 184). Hirukogami’s *Alice* (Arisu, 1978) is remembered as the first lolicon fanzine, but it would not be the last. Oki Yukao, an assistant to Azuma Hideo, recruited Azuma, Hirukogami and Nishina Sō’ichi, and the four together produced the legendary fanzine *Cybele* (Shiberu, 1979). As Azuma recalls, “I wanted friends. I thought that there absolutely must be others who like this sort of thing somewhere” (Azuma and Yamamoto 2011: 141). Sharing interests at Manga Garō led to sharing interests through the fanzine *Cybele* at the Comic Market, which was itself established by male fans of *shōjo* manga looking to share interests and make friends.

Although the content of *Cybele* shocked many (Takekuma 2003: 107), subsequent issues swelled in popularity with the rising tide of attraction to manga/anime-style characters. In 1979, the same year that the first issue of
Cybele was released, Miyazaki Hayao’s *Lupin III: The Castle of Cagliostro* (Rupan sansei: Kariosutoro no shiro) sparked a subgenre of fanzines about its young heroine: “Clarisse magazines” (Takatsuki 2010: 97–102). This led to the belated discovery of the character Lana from Miyazaki’s TV anime *Future Boy Conan* (Mirai shonen Konan, 1978). Finally, Oshii Mamoru’s TV anime adaptation of *Invader Lum* (Urusei yatsura, 1981–86), a bawdy romantic comedy featuring a buxom alien babe in a tigerskin bikini based on the beloved manga (1978–87) by Takahashi Rumiko, spurred manga/anime-style character attraction to new heights. The moment was christened by the foundation of *Lemon People* (Remon pipuru, 1982–98), a commercial manga magazine that boldly claimed on its cover to feature “lolicon comics.” Inspired by Yonezawa Yoshihiro, one of the founders of the Comic Market, anime magazines that had originally focused on sci-fi fare such as *Space Battleship Yamato* (Uchû senkan Yamato, 1974–75) and *Mobile Suit Gundam* (Kidô senshi Gandamu, 1979–80) began to talk about the “the lolicon boom.”

The lolicon boom is an important chapter in the history of manga, anime and fan cultures in Japan. In fact, it is hard to speak with any specificity without addressing the moment and its influence. The first pornographic animation produced in Japan was the *Lolita Anime* series (1984–85) by Wonder Kids, which was based on work published in *Lemon People*. *Lolita Anime* was quickly followed by another *Lolita Anime* series (1984–85), this time by Nikkatsu and based on the work of Uchiyama Aki, the so-called “king of lolicon.” At this point, erotic or pornographic works in the manga/anime style, which is to say those featuring cute and cartoony girl characters, were all associated with the term lolicon. To put it another way, lolicon was not necessarily about attraction to young girl characters, let alone real children, but rather attraction to cute, cartoony, manga/anime-style characters. This is clear in the original debate about “otaku,” which appeared in the pages of *bishôjo* comic magazine *Manga Burikko* in 1983 and focused on a critique of manga and anime fans attracted to fictional girl characters instead of real women (see Galbraith 2015 for an overview). In this debate, lolicon was a keyword.

**Brief review of research on lolicon**

Given its importance, it is not surprising that lolicon has been well researched in Japan over the course of decades, which has led to numerous insights. In the literature, we find that lolicon refers to “desire for two-dimensional images (manga, anime) rather than realistic things” (Akagi 1993: 230). Such an orientation comes from growing up with manga and anime and becoming attracted to manga/anime-style, cute, cartoony characters (Nagayama 2014: 83–87; Saïtô 2011: 30–31, 87–89). Characters are not compensating for something more “real,” but rather are in their fiction the object of affection (Akagi 1993: 230–231; Schodt 1996: 48; Shigematsu 1999: 131–132). This has
been described as “finding sexual objects in fiction in itself” (Saitō 2011: 16), which in discussions of lolicon is made explicitly distinct from desire for and abuse of children (Saitō 2011: 6–7, 30–31). In the 1990s, when the Japanese media linked a child molester and murderer to lolicon, the image of otaku as a “reserve army of criminals” confused about the difference between fiction and reality took hold in Japan. Note that the conflation of lolicon with desire for actual children obscures the possibility of an orientation of desire toward fiction as such. It is not a coincidence that even as lolicon became a “four-letter word” (Alt 2014a) it was replaced by moe, which refers to the same attraction to and affection for fictional characters consciously separate from reality. From early writings to the present, researchers suggest that lolicon artists are playing with symbols and working with tropes, which does not reflect or contribute to sexual pathology or crime (Tsuchimoto 1989: 110; Nagayama 2014: 129–130).

The debate about “harmful manga” in Japan in the 1990s concluded that manga, whatever the content of the drawings may be, does not harm anyone in its production and does not cause demonstrable harm to others in its distribution and consumption (Schodt 1996: 49–53). On the contrary, the literature on lolicon suggests that it might be good for some people. Such manga and anime speak to a deep discomfort with hegemonic social and sexual roles (Editors 1989: 2–3; Akagi 1993: 233–234; Kinsella 2000: 124). Fiction can open up imaginative dimensions of sex and allow people to work through them (Shigematsu 1999: 146–148; Saitō 2011: 24–26, 30–31, 117, 126, 156–158, 162; Nagayama 2014: 148–150, 197–198). It was on these grounds that feminists, lawyers and artists with no personal interest in lolicon nevertheless defended the freedom to produce and consume it in debates about “obscene” and “unhealthy” manga and anime in the 2000s (Cather 2012: 233; McLeland 2011: 355–356, 358–359, 361). It was precisely because of this long history of debating the connection and distinction between fiction and reality that Japan decided in 2014 that manga and anime, whatever the content of the drawings may be, should not be categorized as child pornography, which took international journalists by surprise. While it appears that Japan has come to the conclusion that actual and virtual forms should not be collapsed together in regulation, many Anglophone countries have not done the same when it comes to child pornography. While the stereotype in Japan in the 1990s was that otaku could not distinguish between fiction and reality, it is now countries other than Japan that are conflating the two in law and criticizing Japan for not doing the same. Otaku bashing has become Japan bashing in the media, but the issue is still lolicon.

Case study: “a moral firestorm”

In the context of its use among manga and anime fans in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, lolicon was not associated with child pornography or desire for actual children, but rather desire for manga/anime-style, cute, cartoony girl
characters. At present, such characters are more popular than realistic variants in erotic and pornographic manga, anime and games in Japan. Not only is the lolicon boom an important chapter in the history of manga, anime and fan cultures in Japan that contributed to the development of present-day forms, but a discussion of lolicon also opens a window on to sexual politics in media consumer society. With this in mind, in 2009, as part of a book project, I began to interview artists, critics and people involved with the lolicon boom. Among them was Uchiyama Aki, remembered as the “number one bestseller of lolicon manga” in Japan in the early 1980s. Uchiyama is in many ways a symbol of the lolicon boom: he published in not only Lemon People, but also the mainstream manga magazine Shonen Champion; he produced 160 pages of manga a month to meet demand; his work is the basis of the Lolita Anime series by Nikkatsu. However, when the lolicon boom ended around 1984, Uchiyama disappeared from the public eye.

Given his prominence in the lolicon boom, I planned to include the interview with Uchiyama alongside some of his drawings in my book, which had evolved into an exploration of attraction to and affection for fictional characters in Japan. Although it was for a commercial press and targeting a general audience of English speakers, I did not see an issue in including Uchiyama. The book passed all the usual rounds of internal review without any complications. In the final stages, my editor sent a PDF of the book to manga and anime translators, critics and scholars, in hopes of getting endorsements for the back cover. As my editor went through this process, she received some comments from a reviewer that disturbed her greatly. She explained to me in a panicked email:

We would like to make some last minute changes to the book.

The impetus for this was a comment by ****. I sent him a PDF of the book asking him for an endorsement and he gave us a nice one (which I will place on the cover and run by you before printing), but he also had this to say:

“I read through the book, and I’m sure that it will do well, although I do hope that it doesn’t also ignite a moral firestorm in the United States. Hopefully, you are fully aware of how controversial some of this material may be in more conservative circles.”

This comment led to a lot of discussion here about the content of the book and its market in the States. We want the main market to be teenage/young adult and not academic. We also don’t want to cause what **** calls “a moral firestorm.”

With these two concerns in mind, my superiors read the manuscript. I wanted a second opinion from them. I was sure they would come back and demand that the Uchiyama Aki chapter, for example, be cut, but they thought the interviews were OK. They thought the most potentially controversial part of the book was your intro, with far too much mention of SEX and EROTICISM! They have asked us to tone it down […].
The point was also made that something missing from the intro is an authorial stance. What do you, the author, think? What have you got to say, as a fan, to other fans about whether this is good or bad or sick or normal? [...] **** made a funny comment about otaku in the States being forced to live under a bridge wearing an ankle bracelet. We don’t want that to happen to you. Or us.

While I did agree to many of the edits, I did not agree to make a statement about whether or not I found attraction to and affection for fictional characters to be “good or bad or sick or normal.” I also asked my editor to reconsider the decision to cut all discussion of eroticism and sex from the introduction, which would paint a very sanitized and ultimately untrue picture of manga, anime and fan cultures in Japan. She eventually agreed, but nevertheless did not want any mention of lolicon, which she thought would raise flags about child pornography and pedophilia. In the end, at her insistence, the interview with Uchiyama Aki was cut. The content of the interview is rather innocuous (see Appendix I in this volume), and although a few of his drawings included in the layout are somewhat risqué, they are not out of line with what many other artists produce today. I can only conclude that it was the strong association with “lolicon” – that particular “four-letter word” (Alt 2014a) – that made Uchiyama unsuitable for the book. Lolicon generally and Uchiyama specifically could have no place in a book introducing Japanese media and popular culture. Ultimately, the refusal to look at and discuss the content of lolicon media not only makes it feel objectionable and obscene, but also forecloses more nuanced understandings and positions such as those emerging in Japan.

My publisher’s decision was made to avoid igniting “a moral firestorm,” which came packaged with the imagined threat of everyone getting burned. If they were associated with presumed perverts, pedophiles and predators, the publisher’s image might be damaged, it might lose customers and sales or face legal action. They warned me that we all might be arrested, put on a registry somewhere and ostracized – “forced to live under a bridge wearing an ankle bracelet.” Recall that we faced this imagined threat for doing three things: one, writing about lolicon without adopting the position that it is bad and sick; two, listening to people involved and providing a forum for their words; and three, including images of manga/anime-style, cute, cartoony girl characters to illustrate what was being discussed. My publisher was responding to the imagined threat of a moral firestorm, of being perceived as defending and standing with perverts, pedophiles and predators, if not also being one of them, which might ruin our lives. Rather than take the risk, my publisher decided that words and images that had not previously been objectionable – and my editor and her superiors did not agree on this – would now trigger a response from “conservative circles” and could not be included in the book.
Context for the publisher’s response

While my publisher’s concerns may seem exaggerated, I do think that the threat of a moral firestorm that they imagined (albeit belatedly) was real in the context of the reception of manga and anime in the United States at the time. They had every reason to believe that the association of lolicon might be child pornography, which might trigger a backlash against the book. If there was a moral firestorm, book sales would suffer, and even if they did not, the publisher’s image certainly would. Indeed, at the time of my publisher’s decision, there were already high-profile incidents of publishers backing down when faced with a moral firestorm.

In 2007, for example, Seven Seas Entertainment abandoned its planned English-language release of the manga The Time of Children (Kodomo no jikan, 2005–13). The project was severely criticized online by people who could not believe that the company was releasing this story of a precocious grade-school girl who tries to seduce her teacher. Jason DeAngelis, president of Seven Seas Entertainment, at first stood firm and promised to “have an open dialogue with the large book chains and other vendors. My intention is to make them fully aware of this debate [… and] familiarize them more fully with the content” (DeAngelis 2007a). Open dialogue and familiarizing people with the content before they judge it seem reasonable enough, but before DeAngelis could act, vendors canceled their orders for the now toxic title. In a later statement, DeAngelis agreed that The Time of Children “cannot be considered appropriate for the US market by any reasonable standard” (DeAngelis 2007b). Further:

I love the manga industry and I delight in my job, and I would rather not take the risk of causing problems that could undermine this industry, especially in light of the escalating media scrutiny we have been getting on this title […]. If the controversy continues to escalate further, it could reflect very poorly on Seven Seas in the eyes of not only those who oppose [… The Time of Children] within the manga community, but in the eyes of practically anyone who does not understand manga.

(DeAngelis 2007b)

The rationale for abandoning The Time of Children is not so different from my own publisher’s decision to cut the interview with Uchiyama Aki: Both publishers would rather not take the risk of causing problems that could undermine the industry surrounding Japanese media and popular culture. The same fear is there that manga and anime and fans of such media might be perceived in the wrong way: manga and anime as perverted, if not child pornography; fans of such media as perverts, if not pedophiles and predators. While DeAngelis was at first interested in explaining the manga’s content to those who did not understand, he backed away when faced with media scrutiny and people who do not understand manga but object to it anyway. He backed away from the imagined threat of a moral firestorm. In the end, he
agrees that a relationship — whatever that means — involving a grade-school girl and her teacher is objectionable and “cannot be considered appropriate for the US market by any reasonable standard.” As it was in the specific case of The Time of Children, so it is in general with lolicon.

In contrast, the original author of The Time of Children, Watashiya Kaworu, a female artist who debuted in Bessatsu Shōjo Comic (targeted at girls), responded to the controversy by writing on her blog, “[t]he boundaries on depictions of lolicon and so on vary with each locale, era, and culture” (Anime News Network 2007), which raises questions about what is meant by lolicon, why it is or is not acceptable and by what standard. In truth, Seven Seas Entertainment played a part in setting up the moral firestorm when they decided to give Watashiya’s manga the English-language title of Nymphet (rather than The Time of Children, which is the literal translation of Kodomo no jikan). The manga is not nearly as racy as the proposed title suggests, but even if it were, would it be objectionable simply because it deals with the taboo subject of cross-generational sex? What about Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955)? Would this literary classic be inappropriate if it were manga? Regardless of depth or complexity, if Lolita were manga, it would, like The Time of Children, no doubt be categorized as lolicon, which is perceived as objectionable in the Anglophone world.

Even if we grant that market pressures and bad publicity are reason enough to justify the decision not to publish manga and artists associated with lolicon, what of the talk of being forced to wear an ankle bracelet? That is, what do we make of the potential legal and criminal consequences of publishing lolicon media in the United States? To understand the imagined threat of the ankle bracelet, we must consider the broader context of escalating concerns about sexuality, children and risk. In her pioneering work on the politics of sexuality, anthropologist Gayle Rubin explains how institutional and social forces separate sex into “good” and “bad” forms (Rubin 2011: 180) (as my editor put it, “good or bad or sick or normal”). Good sex is safe, non-commercial, non-violent, coupled, heterosexual, focused on male genital penetration of the female genitals, monogamous and aimed toward childbirth, while bad sex is the opposite (Rubin 2011: 151). Among particularly despised forms of sexuality, Rubin includes “transsexuals, transvestites, fetishists, sadomasochists, sex workers such as prostitutes and porn models, and the lowliest of all, those whose eroticism transgresses generational boundaries” (Rubin 2011: 149). To understand the position of “the lowliest of all” on this list, it helps to know that Rubin formulated her ideas after experiencing a “child-porn panic” in the United States in the late 1970s, which led to harsher laws to punish offenders across the country (Rubin 2011: 142). It is against this backdrop of elevated concern for children in relation to adult sexuality that cross-generational sex becomes “the lowliest of all” bad sex. Cross-generational sex raises concerns about abuse of power, violation of innocence and damaging a child for life. Here we see how sexuality comes to be perceived as a threat to others, and indeed to social order itself (Rubin 2011: 151).10
Rubin’s work was partly inspired by the philosopher Michel Foucault, who expands on the connections between sexuality, children and risk. In a public dialogue in 1978, Foucault noted a shift from punishing illegal acts to protecting vulnerable populations, which he explains as follows:

[T]here are people for whom others’ sexuality may become a permanent danger. In this category, of course, are children, who may find themselves at the mercy of an adult sexuality that is alien to them and may well be harmful to them. Hence there is legislation that appeals to this notion of a vulnerable population, a “high-risk population.”

(Foucault 1988: 276)

For Foucault, the issue is that sexuality becomes a risk that must be managed – a “roaming danger” or “omnipresent phantom” (Foucault 1988: 281). Foucault’s identification of the child at risk has proven almost prophetic in recent years, which have seen an explosion of concern for children in relation to adult sexuality (McLelland 2005: 61; see also boyd 2014: Chapter 4). Catherine Lumby points out that child abuse, which is paradoxically seen as totally aberrant and yet widespread in contemporary society, has achieved “a phantasmic status” (Lumby 1998: 47–48). As Rubin reminds us, “[g]reat and mighty edifices have been built on the basis of such phantasms” (Rubin 2011: 169). Institutional and social edifices meant to protect children from potential predators invent virtual victims: children who might be harmed, at risk of harm, virtually harmed. Nowhere is this invention of virtual victims more apparent than in the treatment of manga and anime as child pornography: In the absence of an actual child, the fictional character is treated as a child, who is abused virtually; manga and anime featuring fictional characters in sexual scenarios are treated as child pornography, which collapses together actual and virtual forms; manga and anime are said to put actual children at risk of sex crimes inspired by such media.11

If we follow Foucault’s arguments on biopower, or regulation of subjects through control of bodies and populations (Foucault 1976: 140), then biopower in the contemporary moment extends beyond actual bodies and populations to virtual ones. The state acts on the virtual to control “processes of emergence that may become determinate threats” (Anderson 2012: 34) to actual bodies and populations. Practically, this means surveillance of the virtual, of interactions with fictional characters, which might reveal a person’s dangerous sexuality and might lead to criminal sex acts. In short, a person can be guilty of virtual sex crimes, of crimes with no actual victim, because a determinate threat may emerge from the processes of interaction with fictional characters. Here we see the invention of virtual criminals, which is characteristic of new regimes of law and order (Hall et al. 1978: 8, 35, 43, 45–46). Sexuality, even when it involves only imaginary others, can be dangerous, criminal and just plain bad. The line between good and bad sex, as Rubin reminds us, is “imaginary” (Rubin 2011: 151), so it is fitting that the line is drawn in the imaginary.
While this may all seem purely theoretical, it is in fact already in practice in many parts of the world, including the United States, typically considered a bastion of freedom of expression, but one that is also struggling to surveil and respond to emergent threats. In May 2006, US postal inspectors raised flags about a man named Christopher Handley, who they suspected of importing “cartoon images of objectionable content” from Japan (Anime News Network 2008). Authorities seized more than 1,200 items from Handley’s home and accused him of possessing “drawings of children being sexually abused” and “depictions of minors engaging in sexual conduct” (Anime News Network 2008, 2010). Of the 1,200 items, approximately 80 were deemed objectionable, many from Comic LO, which is a lolicon manga magazine. Faced with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years if convicted, and afraid that the material would immediately repulse a jury without any knowledge of manga and anime, Handley accepted a reduced sentence for a guilty plea in May 2009 (Chase 2010). He was sentenced to six months in jail and, although not forced to register as a sex offender, ordered to “participate in a treatment program, to include psychological testing and a polygraph examination, as directed by the U. S. Probation Officer” during three years of supervised release and five years of probation (Anime News Network 2010). Although there is no evidence that he ever purchased or possessed child pornography featuring actual children, Handley is treated by the American judicial system, and one assumes those who know him from this case, as a pedophile and potential predator who needs to be monitored and reformed. Because the case was never taken to trial in an open courtroom, we do not know for certain what offensive material Handley purchased and possessed, but he was and is judged all the same. Under the heading “kiddie porn” in an introductory criminology textbook in wide use in the United States, we find that Handley, “regardless of your personal thoughts,” is guilty (Siegel 2011: 15).

The example of a moral firestorm ignited by the planned English-language release of *The Time of Children* and concomitant imagined threat of legal and criminal consequences embodied by Christopher Handley were not distant memories when my book was in production in 2014, and they certainly informed the external reviewer’s comments and my publisher’s response. One can understand why an editor, who receives an email containing ominous warnings about “a moral firestorm,” “conservative circles” and an “ankle bracelet” would take it to her superiors and insist on cuts to the book to excise the discussion of lolicon. It does not matter that the content was not objectionable on initial review, my editor and her superiors did not agree that it was objectionable on subsequent review or that the threat of a moral firestorm was an imagined one. One can understand backing off lolicon to avoid getting burned – just to be safe. While I find fault with no one involved, I would like to point out that my publisher’s decision reflected and contributed to a larger problem of ignorance. Refusal to look at and discuss lolicon manga and anime leads to ignorance about it and judgments based on ignorance. The insidious power of self-censorship to avoid potential
consequences is a serious limitation to free thought and open dialogue. It not only closes down the space for dissenting opinions, but also prevents understanding of the issues at hand. To borrow a turn of phrase from Kirsten Cather (in this volume), we do not give lolicon “a fair trial.” We do not see it, but assume that we somehow still know what it is. The decision to cut the Uchiyama Aki interview seems so problematic to me because it makes his work invisible and silences him, which not only eliminates a chance to understand lolicon, but also makes it taboo and unspeakable. By not actually looking at images and listening to people involved, we all too often do not know what we are talking about and rush to judgment based on fear of the unknown/other.

Global feedback and self-regulation in Japan

In Japan, self-censorship has expanded into a system of private companies and public facilities self-regulating in response to moral firestorms or the threat of them. The results can be stunning. In October 1999, a new child pornography law in Japan – passed amid intense global criticism (see Cather, this volume) – raised the possibility that certain forms of manga might now be illegal. Rather than wait for action by police and prosecutors, Kinokuniya Books, a major retailer, sent a fax to all of its stores telling employees to “remove anything suspicious” from the shelves (Fujimoto 2011: 30). Among the manga removed were Miura Kentarō’s Berserk (1989–) and Inoue Takehiko’s Vagabond (1998–), both series for young adults that have won the Tezuka Osamu Cultural Prize. Significantly, neither of these works could by any stretch of the imagination be categorized as pornography, let alone child pornography, but they were still deemed suspicious because the dark fantasy series Berserk shows a child being sexually abused and the historical drama Vagabond shows an “underage” samurai warrior having sex (Fujimoto 2011: 30). This extreme example demonstrates that the strategy of self-regulation can be an ultimately conservative one; preemptively self-regulating can have a serious chilling effect on adult forms of expression.

The rush to remove suspicious material from shelves continued in the next decade. In 2008, complaints from a handful of citizens led the Sakai Municipal Library in Osaka to remove around 5,000 books from its shelves, which were young adult novels focused on romance between male characters. When feminists and free-speech advocates protested that not a single one of the books had been deemed an “unhealthy publication” – that is, while they may not have been to the taste of critics, there were no legal grounds for the removal of the books – all 5,000 titles were returned to the shelves. While many perceived the Sakai case to be a victory, manga editor, critic and educator Fujimoto Yukari points out that the decision to remove the titles based on pressure from conservative circles should raise serious questions about the decision-making processes involved in such self-regulation (Fujimoto 2011: 30–31). The books were returned when pressure was applied from the
opposite direction, but decision makers at the library remained ignorant of (or chose to remain silent on) the content of the books, which they did not discuss publicly. If there had been no opposition, the books would have stayed off shelves. Such opposition is in fact rare, because few want to be openly associated with objectionable material. Fujimoto points out that when the Tokyo Metropolitan government attempted to pass revisions to an ordinance and expand its power to name unhealthy publications, liberal politicians who were in principle opposed were nonetheless cowed into not voicing dissent by smear campaigns that referred to them as “porn politicians” and “the enemy of children” (Fujimoto 2011: 37). Revisions to the ordinance were passed in December 2010 (see McLelland 2011).

When journalists in the Anglophone world uncritically associate manga and anime with child pornography (Ripley et al. 2014) and treat lolicon like a four-letter word (Alt 2014a), this feeds back into conservative politics in Japan. Consider the example of debate show TV Takkuru, which in an episode aired on September 1, 2014 posed to panelists, including Tsuchiya Masataka, a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the following question: “Do we need to regulate violent lolicon anime?” Framing the debate with explicit reference to an English-language article calling Japan the Empire of Child Pornography (Adelstein and Kubo 2014), the examples of lolicon marshaled by the show’s producers included The Time of Children – an anime adaptation of a previously unobjectionable manga for young adults, which global feedback had made objectionable. From there, the range of objectionable material continued to expand until it included “bathing scenes” and eventually anything with “cute girl characters as protagonists.” By this last definition, much of anime, which has been celebrated for its strong female characters (Napier 2005: 11–12), is suddenly suspect. We see at work in TV Takkuru what Amy Adler calls the “pedophilic gaze” (Adler 2001: 256–264), or the tendency to scrutinize all images of children for potentially pedophilic elements, which makes seemingly innocuous images into child pornography and viewers into suspected sex criminals. Given the pedophilic gaze, any manga/anime-style, cute, cartoony girl character can be linked to a discussion of lolicon as child pornography, which is precisely what happened in an article in The New Yorker accusing American music star Pharrell Williams of producing a “lolicon video” (Alt 2014a). While we might find such claims absurd, they collectively paint a picture of Japan as the Empire of Child Pornography and legitimate regulatory impulses. Back on the set of TV Takkuru, conservative politician Tsuchiya answers the question, “Do we need to regulate violent lolicon anime?” – which ignores regulations already in place and the ambiguity of what is meant by lolicon – with a confident and righteous, “Yes.”

As we have seen, judgments of manga and anime in terms of lolicon and child pornography are often based on ignorance, and these judgments tend to discourage free thought and open dialogue on difficult issues. Although the anti-regulation panelists on TV Takkuru appeared to have won the debate,
one wonders how much longer such people can continue when opponents label manga and anime – lolicon or otherwise – with toxic terms such as child pornography, and juxtapose the content with stories of molested and murdered children. If allowed, spurious arguments that collapse together actual and virtual forms of child pornography, manga and anime and pornography, and real and imagined harm to vulnerable bodies and populations win based solely on their powerful emotional appeal to “think of the children” (Rubin 2011: 141). Ironically, the more we “think of the children” in the abstract, the less we actually look at the offending media and material objects and evaluate demonstrable harm to children. Rather than grounded discussion, we end up with ungrounded judgment.

The limits of cool Japan

Some readers might be thinking that even if a commercial publisher shied away from lolicon for fear of a moral firestorm, an academic publisher certainly would not. Perhaps, but academia is not without its limits. For example, when I proposed to include drawings by Uchiyama Aki in this chapter, Mark McLelland, the editor of this volume, expressed concern that he might be criminally liable for “making available” child abuse images that would be prohibited in the United Kingdom and Australia (see McLelland 2005; Eiland 2009). The drawings, therefore, have not been included in this volume, which is released by Routledge, self-advertised as “the world’s leading academic publisher in the Humanities and Social Sciences.” The decision is no different from my commercial publisher, and the result is also the same: The reader cannot see and does not know what Uchiyama drew, cannot judge it for themselves and is left with the impression that it must have been terribly objectionable. It does not matter how much I tell the reader otherwise. The images are associated with lolicon, which is thought to be a form of child pornography and so becomes refused content.

Neither the line dividing the commercial from the academic nor the one dividing the academic from the political is bright and bold, as is evident in the study of Japanese media and popular culture. From a somewhat cynical standpoint, the establishment and growth of a field of study dedicated to contemporary Japanese media and popular culture seems deeply tied to shifting economic and political fortunes in Japan and the United States, or a “crisis of Japan Studies” (Harootunian and Sakai 1999: 593–598). The 1990s saw the decline of the Japanese economy and a shift of geopolitical interest toward East Asian neighbors. On the one hand, within Asian Studies, fewer people were signing up for classes on Japan and more were taking classes on China and South Korea; on the other hand, within Japan Studies, the interest was not in economics and political science, but rather media and popular culture, most especially anime, which was rapidly building toward a full-blown boom (Landsberg 2011). The crisis of Japan Studies, of legitimizing academic interest in that nation, could be resolved by aligning oneself with
the phenomenon of “cool Japan,” which assured us that Japan, through the powerful appeal of its media and popular culture, was still economically and politically relevant in the world. This renewed interest in Japan in the United States was in turn a boon to the struggling government of Japan (Leheny 2006: 214–216, 220–223; Choo 2011: 85, 87–88). In many ways, the interests of Japan Studies programs in the United States and the Japanese government aligned in encouraging the growth of “Japan fans.” The aim of such encouragement is no secret: In 2015, the Japanese government announced that it would invest US$15 million for funding Japan Studies at nine US universities as part of a “push to counter the growing influence of China and South Korea” (Umekawa 2015). It would be nice to think that only governments are so nationalistic and territorial, but Japan Studies programs also worry about the growing influence of China and South Korea, and losing students and institutional funding to China Studies and Korean Studies.

In an environment of inter-nationalism that encourages studies of and by Japan fans (Iwabuchi 2010: 92, 95), there is a demand for research on manga and anime, but what about research on lolicon? My sense is that one can criticize lolicon, but anything beyond that is unwelcome. Actually looking at the material and talking to producers and consumers of it is taking things too far. To the extent that lolicon manga and anime have been condemned as child pornography, any discussion of them, academic or otherwise, is severely limited. James Kincaid notes that the narrative of child pornography and abuse is a “gothic” one, where there is only good and bad, right and wrong, for the children or against them (Kincaid 1998: 10–11). A person who does not immediately denounce such material is seen as standing against children – “the enemy of children” (Fujimoto 2011: 37). Such a person is seen as standing with the pedophiles and predators – one of them, not one of us – and is guilty by association. One can recognize the pressures of a gothic narrative in my publisher’s demand for an “authorial stance” on whether certain forms of manga and anime are “good or bad or sick or normal,” but one is forced into the same compromised position in academia. Here, too, one is judged for not taking the only acceptable position on an issue that is not open for debate.

For example, in 2010, I was writing an academic article on lolicon, which I saw as an intervention into the discussion of certain forms of manga as harmful or hindering the healthy development of young people in Japan. It seemed to me that critics in Japan were emboldened by the negative reception of adult manga, anime and games overseas. Globally, lolicon had emerged as a keyword to refer to the problem of (virtual) child pornography in Japan, but there was much confusion about its meaning. When I told a university professor (American, male), who I consider a friend, that I was writing an article on lolicon, he advised that I not go through with the publication, which would amount to “career suicide.” If I were perceived as someone “interested” in this topic, he explained, it could ruin my job prospects. I should wait to publish such “provocative” material until I have tenure.
Ignoring his good council, I did publish the article in a peer-reviewed journal (Galbraith 2011), which has led to me being known as “the lolicon guy.” That I have been labeled this way means that I effectively did commit career suicide. The lolicon guy: Does that mean a guy who studies lolicon or a guy who has a Lolita complex? The lolicon guy seems to suggest both. So career suicide: Who wants to hire or work with the lolicon guy, whose work reveals his perverse “interests?” If, as Karen Kelsky suggests, the academic job market is in many ways comparable to a popularity contest, then researching lolicon is a mistake in two ways: “picking the wrong things to highlight” and “underestimating the importance of likeability” (Kelsky 2012). Lolicon highlights the wrong things: on one scale, it risks causing problems that could undermine the industry (commercial, academic) surrounding Japanese media and popular culture; on another, picking this topic supposedly highlights my own perverse “interests.” The lolicon guy is not very likeable; he might not find research funding or stable employment. As my university professor friend dutifully warned me, it is better not to take the risk of writing about provocative topics like lolicon.

Just as there are social, institutional and national politics that allow and limit the study of Japan, so too are there politics to the study of popular culture. Cultural theorist Stuart Hall draws our attention to the “structuring principle of ‘the popular’,” or “the tensions and oppositions between what belongs to the central domain of elite or dominant culture, and the culture of the ‘periphery.’ It is this opposition which constantly structures the domain of culture into the ‘popular’ and the ‘non-popular’” (Hall 1998: 448). To understand “popular culture,” then, we must look past particular forms to the dynamic processes of power that shape them. For example, Hall argues that, “[t]he magistrate and the evangelical police have, or ought to have, a more ‘honoured’ place in the history of popular culture than they have usually been accorded” (Hall 1998: 443). Indeed, “the magistrate” and “evangelical police” in Japan and beyond have certainly impacted the kinds of manga and anime that are produced, circulated and consumed, including lolicon, but they are not the only ones involved in structuring the popular. Hall explains:

What is more, a whole set of institutions and institutional processes are required to sustain each [dominant and peripheral culture] – and to continually mark the difference between them. The school and the education system is one such institution – distinguishing the valued part of the culture, the cultural heritage, the history to be transmitted, from the “valueless” part.

(Hall 1998: 448–449)

Peripheral cultural forms can become dominant cultural forms and “cultural heritage,” just as popular culture can become unpopular culture. This is a dynamic and ongoing process, one in which researchers and educators are involved through producing and reproducing knowledge on cultural forms;
our evaluations are not politically neutral. For Hall, popular culture is a terrain of struggle or even a “battlefield” (Hall 1998: 451).

Particularly helpful in a discussion of national(izing) discourses such as “cool Japan” is what Hall calls “the terrain of national-popular culture” (Hall 1998: 451). Note the hyphen that connects the nation and certain cultural forms: the hyphen holding together a constellation of “national-popular,” for example “Japanese-popular” culture. Here we must consider not only the obvious example of cool Japan policy and its selection of media and popular culture to promote, but also our own educational institutions and practices of knowledge (re)production. When publishing and teaching courses on manga and anime as Japanese media and popular culture or connecting them to Japanes traditions, we are part of the processes shaping national-popular culture. Such publishing and teaching might find funding from the Japanese government or related promotional institutions – if, of course, the image and history of Japan transmitted is acceptable to the funders (Umekawa 2015; see also Miller, this volume). When selecting works by Tezuka Osamu and Miyazaki Hayao as manga and anime traditions, we are involved in deciding “the history to be transmitted” (Hall 1998: 449). We create a descriptive inventory that freezes popular culture into particular forms, which ignores the dynamics of selection and struggle over meaning. Our work is not politically neutral. One might, for example, exclude Uchiyama Aki and the lolicon boom from discussions of manga, anime and fan cultures to sanitize Japanese popular culture, or highlight them to reveal “Japanese pop culture’s dirty little secret” (Alt 2014b).

This is not a question of being right or wrong about Japan, but rather a reminder of the politics of writing and talking about Japanese popular culture. We are already on the terrain of struggle, already part of the institutional processes shaping Japanese popular culture, and to ignore our position is to abdicate the responsibility that comes with it. The academy is ideally a supportive environment for researching unpopular topics, which contributes to free thought, open dialogue and more nuanced positions, but, as we have seen in the case of lolicon, the threat of social and institutional repercussions has limited the range of acceptable topics of research on Japanese media and popular culture. One writes about certain topics because they are popular and tries to win a popularity contest for funding, publications and jobs (Kelsky 2012). This situation has led to an alarming silence on issues such as lolicon, which are of real importance and require long-term, in-depth research to understand. We can no longer remain silent on unpopular topics. Writing and talking about lolicon may risk igniting a moral firestorm and come with the imagined threat of one’s life being ruined, but the alternative is to be complicit with judgments based on ignorance, which lead to actual people losing their jobs and going to prison. This has to stop. It is time to take a position that challenges simple criticism or celebration of Japanese media and popular culture. It is time to stop the uncritical discussion of “weird Japan” and “cool Japan.” Only then will we be able to move on to more nuanced understandings and critiques of cultural politics.
Conclusion

This chapter has considered the social, institutional and national politics that allow and limit the study of Japanese media and popular culture. I have argued that it is imperative to open up and maintain a space for researchers to take on unpopular topics, which challenge us to be critical without rushing to judgment. Through an unpopular topic such as lolicon, we can begin to question national(izing) discourses of “cool Japan” and “weird Japan,” and go beyond them to more nuanced discussions of cultural politics. As Koichi Iwabuchi rightly points out, much is missing from simple criticisms and celebrations of Japanese media and popular culture:

We need a serious consideration of the sociohistorical contexts in which people passionately consume/appropriate media texts, and of the cultural politics and cultural economy involved in their active consuming practices. We must consider issues such as self-empowerment in terms of marginalized identity politics (gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, nation, and so on), coping with the tyranny of everyday life in the neoliberal world [and more].

(Iwabuchi 2010: 88)

Here we see pathways for research on popular culture as a terrain of struggle in Japan, and Japan itself as a terrain of struggle, which is already global and in which we are involved. However, I have shown that researchers all too often choose to remain silent on the unpopular topic of lolicon rather than face potential consequences of being associated with it, which both reflects and contributes to broader problems. Manga and anime generally, and lolicon specifically, are condemned as child pornography; a commercial publisher cuts an interview on lolicon when faced with the imagined threat of a moral firestorm; another abandons the English-language release of a manga featuring cross-generational eroticism; an editor refrains from including line drawings labeled as lolicon in an academic volume for fear of being criminally liable for making them available; rather than introduce offending images in court, a man pleads guilty to possession of lolicon manga and is imprisoned; questioning the situation makes one a “lolicon guy” with suspect interests. The environment is not one conducive to critical thinking and open dialogue on difficult and important issues. Refusing to look at lolicon material and listen to people involved not only closes down the space for discussion and debate, but also actually prevents understanding of the issues at hand. The result is bias, fear and judgment of the unknown/other based on ignorance, which can ruin lives. To remain silent is to be complicit. It is time to face potential consequences and imagined threats and to speak openly about unpopular topics, even if doing so makes us unpopular as well.
Notes

1 For example, a 2008 report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is titled, “Measure and Framework for Strengthening Japan’s Public Diplomacy: To Increase the Number of People Understanding Japan and the Number of ‘Japan Fans’.”

2 For example on Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lolicon. While Wikipedia is well known for making information and images freely available, the fact that the online encyclopedia was hosting images in its “lolicon” and “pedophilia” entries led to major backlash from conservative circles and eventually the mass removal of offending images in 2010. See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reporting_of_child_pornography_images_on_Wikimedia_Commons. In this chapter, I will discuss the impact of moral firestorms such as this one on free thought and open dialogue about lolicon.

3 Saitō Tamaki, a practicing psychiatrist, argues powerfully that, “bringing up the ‘Japanese Lolita complex’ is the wrong answer. Ethical considerations aside, attributing a given perverse tendency to an entire nation based on a mere impression is simply an unscientific fallacy” (Saitō 2011: 6–7; see also Shigematsu 1999: 135, 156). Nevertheless, this is exactly what happened in the summer of 2014.

4 For a discussion of the meaning of “otaku,” see Galbraith 2015.

5 First held in 1975, the Comic Market is an event for buying and selling self-published media, primarily short-run print publications. The majority of these publications are manga by fans of commercial manga, anime and games, which imagine relationships between existing characters. Although a violation of copyright law, and often containing graphic depictions of sex, the fan artists behind these works are generally not prosecuted in Japan. In fact, the Comic Market has grown into a massive event that attracts an average of half a million people, as well as massive amounts of media attention. See for example: www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Hk_bj2ZqdE.

6 These quotes come from a dialogue between Azuma Hideo and Yonezawa Yoshihiro, one of the founders of the Comic Market, published in Gekkan Out in March 1982.

7 Although these shows were originally intended for young audiences, they attracted adolescent and even adult viewers (Ōtsuka and Sasakibara 2001: 195; Sasakibara 2004: 21).

8 Azuma Hideo also disappeared for many years, but made a comeback with diary manga about his personal struggles with alcoholism and depression (Azuma and Yamada 2011: 20). Meanwhile, Hirukogami Ken joined the Buddhist clergy to rid himself of worldly desires (Tsuchimoto 1989: 104–105).

9 I received this email on January 16, 2014. For issues of privacy, the name of the publisher, editor and external reviewer have been removed. The content of the email is abridged, but otherwise unaltered.

10 Gayle Rubin dubs this inflation of the threat of sexuality the “fallacy of misplaced scale” and “domino theory of sexual peril” (Rubin 2011: 149, 151).

11 Proposed revisions to the Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance Regarding the Healthy Development of Youths in 2010 captured the essence of the virtual victim perfectly by introducing the awkward phrase “non-existent youth” (hijitsuzai seishonen). See McLelland (2011).

12 Note how objectionable content is coming under increased scrutiny at a time of elevated concern about sexuality, which is not entirely without precedent. Indeed, Rubin highlights the role of “watchdog postal inspectors” in the child porn panic of the 1970s (Rubin 2011: 143).


15 Some speculate that job candidates in these programs will be subject to screening, which sounds like a process to ensure that positions go to Japan fans. For examples
of how cultural gatekeepers can censure Japan scholars for promoting a somehow “incorrect” image of the nation, see Miller’s chapter in this volume. When reading her chapter, note the alignment of academic and funding/promotional institutions and the evaluation of research subjects.

This was not an isolated incident. On October 27, 2014, I organized a mini symposium on the legal limits of, and media outrage over, sexuality in Japanese popular culture. The symposium was held at Temple University, Japan Campus, where I teach part time; free and open to the public, it drew well over 100 people. The following day, a co-worker (American, male) stopped by my desk on campus to congratulate me on the success of the symposium, but wondered aloud if that same success might spell my doom. I would now always be associated with issues of “perversity” (hentai), he explained, which might make me “unhireable.” A video of my talk at the event was made available online, which my co-worker jokingly said would come back to haunt me. See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7HZ9-E8UrA&feature=em-subs_digest.

In a grant-writing seminar, an instructor explained to me that, “[s]ome topics are more charismatic than others.”

The risk is not, however, the same for all people. As Kirsten Cather points out (in this volume), “It is one thing to tackle […] child porn as a research subject when one is a mother, and another when one is a single man.” In other words, when one might be labeled a “lolicon guy.” If one is not distant enough from the topic, then it is no longer safe to research.

This also resonates with Jonathan E. Abel’s call to step back from the overheated discourse of cool Japan and contribute to the “uncooling” of research topics to better “comprehend meanings in history and culture” (Abel 2011: 66).

References


7 All seizures great and small
Reading contentious images of minors in Japan and Australia

Adam Stapleton

Introduction

Japan, in the imagination of some Anglophone writers, is an “Empire of Child Pornography” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014). This label reflects the way that Anglophone pictorial traditions motivate particular readings of visual content, but more so, it demonstrates the primacy of the assumed relationship between representation and culture. Representations of children inform Anglophone debates about the sexualization of children (Lumby and Albury 2010; Egan and Hawkes 2008) and also affect Anglophone conceptualizations of Japan. Nuanced readings of the image of the “Lolita” in Japan (Bergstrom 2011; Galbraith 2011, 2012, this volume; Lunning 2011; Mackie 2010) sit in contrast to an image of Japan as an exotic haven of child pornography and sexual perversion (Adelstein and Kubo 2014; Fukada 2008). In this chapter, I discuss my own experience in seeking permission to import supposedly “objectionable” Japanese publications into Australia for the purposes of academic research. As Galbraith also discusses in his chapter in this volume, this experience suggests that undertaking research into contentious areas of visual culture has the potential to provoke institutional resistance that interrogates both professional and personal intentions. Following this, I argue that the language used to discuss contentious images of minors motivates us to think about this issue in ways that foreclose nuanced readings of the material, or its audiences. In the next section, I argue that the legislative inconsistencies and different cultural frameworks surrounding Japanese and Anglophone definitions of child pornography make it difficult for both researchers and audiences to understand contentious forms of Japanese media both within its native context and its dispersion throughout the global mediascape. Instead of maintaining an Orientalist fantasy prevalent in the media that sees Japan as sexually exotic (McLelland 2003: 106–107), my research suggests that there are common transnational fantasies of childhood that recur in our representations of minors.

Research undertaken in the course of my PhD involved assessing commercially available images of minors from a variety of sources. As part of my research, I viewed a range of easily accessible Japanese media that potentially encroach upon Anglophone child pornography legislation. Given my lack of
expertise in Japan Studies, I make no claim that my assessment of this material reflects how it is understood in its native context. Rather than assuming to know what the material discussed might mean to its audiences within a Japanese context, my own divergent interpretation intends both to divorce it from its native context and from the Anglophone juridical concepts that foreclose the opportunity to appreciate how the specific phenomena under investigation relate to broader visual culture. This is not cultural or moral relativism but simply an acknowledgement that our ideas about obscenity rest upon notions of good taste and that this good taste is in itself an unreliable epistemology.\(^1\) The intention of undertaking such an approach is that “the proper use of reason” can provide an “antidote to xenophobia” (Coe 2009: 922) and shift discussions of Japanese visual culture beyond a binary paradigm of “cool” or “weird” (see Galbraith, this volume).

Harumi Befu (2009) offers an important point that serves as a caveat for the research undertaken in this chapter. He proposes that there is a tendency, within sociological and anthropological research, to make an essentialist fallacy, in respect to the subject of inquiry. He warns that:

> at best, all these discussions and pronouncements of what “Japan” is, what “Japanese culture” constitutes, and who “the Japanese” are, vary in accordance with innumerable and variegated experiences in changing historical circumstances.

(Befu 2009: 21)

In this respect, my research in this chapter intentionally avoids attempting to give an analysis of “Japanese culture,” as though the specific materials with which I deal can be used to make broader claims about Japan. Such essentialist pronouncements run counter to the themes of cultural deterritorialization and media audience fragmentation that recur throughout discussions of new media, generally (Jenkins 2006), and are specifically applied by some theorists attempting to come to terms with the contemporary Japanese media fan cultures (Azuma 2009). These approaches emphasize the way that fans construct their experience of media through a variety of activities such as collecting, remixing and sharing content. Although I think that examining these practices can offer useful insights, my own research presented here defers consideration of these practices or any attempt to rationalize the “meaning” of the texts to which I refer. Rather, my research seeks to understand how the Anglophone West attempts to disavow its own interest in representations of minors through characterizing Japan as the “Empire of Child Pornography” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014).

**Contentious images of minors**

Japan, according to the narrative championed by Adelstein and Kubo (2014), has an inexplicable “fascination with sexual interaction with young girls” that
escapes the application of the law. They describe this fascination as *rorikon*, also sometimes written as *lolicon*. This concept has been subject to discussion and theorization by a number of Japan Studies scholars (Galbraith 2011, 2009, this volume; Kinsella 1995, 2002, 2006; Tamaki 2011), but examining the term’s own Anglophone origins is one strategy to deconstruct this narrative of Japan. *Lolicon* is a portmanteau of “Lolita complex” and this phrase is used by the American author Russell Trainer (1966: 300–309) in his text, *The Lolita Complex*, to describe adult male attraction to pubescent and pre-pubescent females. This text is a work of pop psychology that both normalizes sexual relations between grown men and young girls and conceptualizes it as a symptom of cultural decay. “Lolitaism” is described as a pathological side effect of sexual liberation, as “the trend of all sex climbs steadily upward toward greater freedom, more looseness, more frequency, and more wicked abandon” (Trainer 1966: 300). In particular, the mass media are implicated in the spread of Lolitaism. The author suggests that it is a problem that further legislation cannot resolve and it can only be effectively addressed through communication. The etymology of lolicon and its origins in Anglophone culture contradict the populist arguments that suggest that fascination with teenage girls and their sex lives is the province of Japan in particular. Rather, the image of Lolita is a “transnational bricolage” (Mackie 2009) that manifests across a number of subcultures that sometimes connect to broader popular culture (Kehily and de Lappe 2015; Lunning 2011). Similarly, the “junior idol” phenomenon (defined below), often viewed as an aspect of lolicon culture, is increasingly a transnational phenomenon, suggesting that the study of idols is increasingly relevant to media researchers outside the field of Japan Studies, and that this material can be assessed as part of the field of representations of children. This involves moving beyond a bipolar investigation of whether particular images are indecent according to particular juridical frameworks and attempting to contextualize the flow of representations as they serve to reinforce and challenge particular ideas about childhood.

An investigation into Japanese popular media that mobilizes terms such as “child pornography” is inappropriate because the term is a misleading descriptor of the material under investigation and the use of the term forecloses the way that the materials are interpreted and circulated in everyday life. Using a term such as “lolicon” is also less than ideal because it also ties the content to particular fan communities rather than recognizing the way that the transnational flow of media makes material accessible to audiences outside any specific geographical region or subculture. Instead, I opt for a more general term, “contentious images of minors.” This term is not a euphemism for “child exploitation material” (discussed below), but is a way of approaching images that are more subtle or ambiguous than the record of child sexual exploitation. Instead, this term is like Mitchell Dean’s (2012) concept of the “unacceptable,” suggestive of a “grey zone” inadequately covered by the “juridical-theological model” that permits and prohibits access to content. While this terminology may not resolve all the difficulties of
discussing such material, it aims to highlight particular qualities of this material. It suggests that juridical and social judgments of obscenity exist in a state of tension. It acknowledges that there are often gaps and overlaps between the juridical concept of child pornography and the way the concept is used in broader public discourse.

Including “images” in the terminology describing child-exploitation material highlights that the material of most concern to legislators is visual material. Although the Australian legislation covers both that which “describes or depicts,” prosecutions and public controversies tend to focus upon images more often than writing. Whether it’s an image that is a recording of an event or an image with an imaginary basis, images seem to provoke and disturb in ways that are distinct from the ways that words offend (Mitchell 2005: 125). As a media and cultural studies researcher, my primary interest is in images that are designed for, and consumed by, a mass audience because of the theoretical assumption that understanding the production and consumption of this material elucidates how particular representations and practices relate to broader cultural values.

The use of “minors” instead of the term “children” emphasizes that the material does not simply refer to representations of prepubescent individuals but also to teenagers who may have reached the age of consent but are yet to reach the age of legal majority (Ost 2009: 19–20, 89). The use of the term “minors” also highlights the gap between biological and legal definitions of childhood. A “minor” seems to have a clear legal definition, linking the concept to social agency and legal responsibility, whereas the “child” is an empty signifier that “changes to fit different situations and different needs” (Kincaid 1992: 5). Furthermore, “child” tends to be a more emotive term than “minor” but it’s not clear that heightening the affective dimension actually promotes the development of better legislation. When attempting to mobilize public sentiment against child pornography, proponents sometimes select the most offensive material in order to maximize the affective response (Lowenkron 2015: 6). Typically, the most offensive material involves sexual objectification or exploitation of young children, yet focusing upon such patently offensive material that records adult abuse of actual children should not come at the expense of understanding that other materials such as consensually exchanged “sext” messages between adolescents themselves (Moran-Ellis 2012), and a range of Japanese lolicon and idol images, are also subject to Anglophone child pornography legislation (Galbraith 2011, 2009; see also Orbaugh, this volume).

When my investigation into “contentious images of minors” focuses upon material from Japan, the scant Anglophone scholarship into lolicon and junior idols makes it difficult to ground my assessment of the material or its fan communities. As someone with no formal training in Japan Studies, who has only spent a short amount of time in Tokyo, and is unable to read or speak Japanese, I am not in a position to offer an authoritative assessment of these materials within the context of their native mediascape. However, my
research is able to highlight how the reluctance of Anglophone researchers to investigate this area produces a kind of ignorance about both the scope of Anglophone child pornography legislation, and the materials that are available within Japan (Galbraith 2011, also this volume). Rather than attempting to reveal the meaning of Japanese visual culture, as Kirsten Cather (this volume) also explains, my research seeks to understand how these materials are framed by public and juridical discourses of pornography in different local settings.

My research focuses on two sets of contentious texts that are published in Japan. The first of these are junior idol publications. These publications are part of the Japanese idol industry that includes magazines, music, audio-visual media, trading cards, dolls and live performances (Galbraith 2012). “Junior idols” refer to performers 15 years of age and below. This is substantiated on the cover of publications that declare U-15 (Galbraith 2009). In contrast, publications that feature models older than 15 are marked R-15. The publications relevant to my research are the “gravure idol” works that feature U-15 models posing in bikinis, leotards, school uniforms and other attire. Images of gravure idols are similar to the “pin-up” or “cheesecake” models. They feature no sexual activity nor is sexual activity implied in the images. Although many of these images are “innocuous” enough to sit below the legal threshold of indecency, particular poses, camera angles and articles of clothing make this material contentious from the perspective of Anglophone child pornography legislation. The second kind of content is exemplified by the “lowbrow” art of Trevor Brown. Brown is an English artist based in Japan who draws and paints a range of images that combine the tropes of fetish pornography with illustrations from children’s picture books. The effect of this juxtaposition places Brown somewhere between the Western “Pop Surrealist” movement that grew out of the underground comix of the 1960s (Williams 2004), and the Japanese “Erotic-Grotesque-Nonsense” movement dating to the 1920s (Silverberg 2006). Although some of his content is based upon medical fetishism, and Japanese rope bondage, my focus is upon his “baby art” because this corpus encroaches upon Anglophone conceptualizations of child pornography.

All seizures great and small

Although the Commonwealth of Australia is a liberal democracy, its approach to media classification is rather illiberal. Australian media classification is performed by a government body, the Australian Classification Board (ACB). This means that their classification decisions are legally binding. Furthermore, classification is a prerequisite for the screening of films (unless a formal exemption has been granted). This stands in contrast to the United Kingdom and the United States where motion pictures are voluntarily classified by an industry body, the British Board of Film Classification and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), respectively. This is a
similar situation to Japan where EIRIN (Eiga Rinri Kanri Iinkai), is an industry body set up by the Americans during the Occupation of Japan (1945–52). Instead, the decisions made by the ACB not only suggest the suitability of content for various age groups but have the capacity to prohibit the importation or exhibition of content that is “Refused Classification.” These decisions can be appealed through the use of another government body, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, but this is costly and so it is really only a feasible option for businesses with an interest in making content available for purchase. Although the first principle of the National Classification Code states that “[a]dults should be able to read, hear, and see what they want,” this is merely an aspiration rather than a principle that informs the operations of Australian Customs or the ACB.

Representations of children have been a source of particular controversy. The ACB has been involved in the seizure of contentious images of minors in a number of high-profile scandals about the representation of children in contemporary art. This scrutiny of depictions of children in art has intensified within Australia in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This period began with media commentary critical of “corporate pedophilia” (Rush and La Nauze 2006). Proponents of this thesis argue that contemporary popular culture is causing children to undergo premature “sexualization” and that this causes a number of psychological and behavioral problems (Egan and Hawkes 2008). Although criticism tended to focus upon advertising, magazines, music videos and other areas of popular culture, the gaze shifted toward fine art on the eve of acclaimed photographer Bill Henson’s 2008 exhibition at the Roslyn Oxley 9 gallery in the Inner Sydney suburb of Paddington. The invitation to the exhibition featured an image of a nude pubescent female standing listlessly in the shadows. As the New South Wales Police confiscated several contentious Henson pieces from the gallery, the image on the invitation became a fulcrum for a debate about “child pornography” in the arts. This was resolved when the ACB gave the images a formal assessment and deemed the images to be “PG” meaning that Parental Guidance may be necessary when minors below the age of 15 years view the material. This judgment permitted the artworks to be returned to the gallery and for the exhibition to commence. Although the police threatened legal charges against Henson and the proprietors of the gallery, no charges were laid because the classification of his artworks as “PG” foreclosed any subsequent assertions that the images were objectionable.

This process of seizure and classification is not always so tidy. This is demonstrated in the case against the Australian artist Paul Yore (ABC Arts Online 2014). In 2013, Yore’s installation, *Everything is Fucked*, was subject to partial seizure by the Victorian Police. His installation was part of an exhibition, in tribute to Australian artist Mike Brown who had himself been prosecuted for obscenity in 1965, at the Linden Centre for Contemporary Arts. The exhibition had been open a few days when detectives entered the gallery and excised portions of Yore’s installation. Subsequently, Yore was
charged with producing and possessing child pornography. Unlike Henson, who is primarily known as a photographer, Yore’s installation included a collage of images from various sources that police affirm amounted to content objectionable enough to warrant child pornography charges. However, in the wake of the Henson scandal, Yore had already made the effort to have his installation classified by the ACB and they had found the material to be Category 1. This means the material is restricted to adults 18 years and over. Despite this classification decision, the police decided to press charges. Yore’s defense was that the material had “artistic merit.” When the case went through court in 2014, Magistrate Amanda Chalmers found that the prosecution did not sufficiently argue why the rating given by the classification board should be overturned. Consequently, she was able to reserve any judgment in respect to the artistic merit of Yore’s work and dismissed the case based upon the grounds that Yore’s work had not been “Refused Classification” and therefore was not legally objectionable. These public scandals suggest that the ACB has a crucial role in establishing the legitimacy of making, possessing and distributing contentious images, and that their decisions are sometimes at odds with other government bodies involved in law enforcement.

In addition to their role in resolving scandals about the lawfulness of particular representations of minors, I have had my own experience of being interpellated by the discourse of media classification. On December 15, 2004, four books featuring work by the artist Trevor Brown that were to be delivered to my home were intercepted and seized by Australian Customs. An Italian publication, Rope, Rapture & Bloodshed (2001), and three Japanese publications, Forbidden Fruit (2001a), Medical Fun (2001b), and Li’l Miss Sticky Kiss (2004), were purchased on eBay from an American vendor. These publications were uniformly judged by the Office of Film and Literature Classification (OFLC) to be objectionable goods under regulation 4A (1A) of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956. The publications contained drawings and paintings, many depicting figures resembling pubescent and young adult females, although other features suggest that they are dolls. The items were seized under the judgment that “they depict bondage and describe or depict in a way that is likely to cause offense to a reasonable adult, a person who is, or who looks like, a child under 16 (whether the person is engaged in sexual activity or not).” This initiated an 11-month process that required evidence of my record of scholarship and my enrollment in a PhD program. The exemptions officer in charge of my case described the process, via the telephone, in the following way: “The people who seized the publications believe that you are a sick puppy. You need to prove your work has educational merit so that they don’t think you’re a sick puppy.” After three court appearances, and binding arbitration through the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, an agreement was made between myself and the OFLC. It stipulates the narrow conditions within which this material might be shown to my colleagues and maintained in my possession. These conditions stipulate that I must keep the materials in my possession, in a locked cabinet, and that
I may only show the material to another person within the context of my postgraduate research. Furthermore, I have agreed to return these publications to the OFLC, upon submission of my doctoral dissertation, so that they may be destroyed.

In November 2005, I went to the facility to collect the seized goods. I delivered the relevant paperwork and awaited the retrieval of the publications. An officer returned with a box, but before surrendering the items she asked me to confirm the purpose of the acquisition. Although permission had already been granted by the director of the OFLC and a magistrate had verified the validity of the proceedings, I offered a response, not wanting to miss the opportunity to try to encapsulate my postgraduate research as a sound bite. However, my response faded into silence as I noticed the expression of contempt on her face. “Well,” she retorted, “as a parent, I think it’s disgusting!” I left the building on the verge of tears, startled to be subject to this impromptu judgment in a moment when I anticipated a degree of vindication.

Although I have formerly published commentary on these events (Stapleton 2013), this narrative is augmented through the inclusion of other facts. In March 2005, while I was contesting the seizure of the Brown publications, I received another seizure notice. The seized publication, Irina Ionesco’s R (2004), reprints semi-nude images of her then under-age daughter, Eva Ionesco, originally published in the 1970s.8 Like the three Japanese publications of Brown’s work, this book was published by Pan-Exotica. This book was purchased from a Japanese site (www.nippon-export.com), along with two other items that were inspected but not seized. Unlike the first seizure, this seizure was made under Regulation 4(A) but did not mention causing offense or sexual activity. Rather, the problem was stated more plainly as “nudity.” Furthermore, there was a statement at the bottom of the notice acknowledging that I had attempted to import other goods that were subject to seizure (referring to Brown’s publications) and that, although I was not facing criminal prosecution at this time, if I continued to import prohibited goods then the earlier seizures might be included in a future criminal prosecution.

I decided not to contest this subsequent seizure. Although I believed that if my credentials were going to be sufficient to permit the possession of one group of seized publications then they might support a further request for an exemption, I forewent the opportunity to seek an exemption for the following reasons. I was concerned that two pending requests could damage my reputation and make me appear obstinate, not only to the OFLC but also to the university that was supporting my candidature. Furthermore, the compound cost of pursuing two separate matters through the courts would have added to my expenses. Whilst the university wrote appropriate letters of support, it was my responsibility to bear legal costs. Finally, it would be disingenuous and unnecessarily guarded not to highlight that I did have some reservations about arguing for my right to possess the Ionesco book because her work
depicts an actual minor in contrast to Brown’s fictitious persons. While I do not believe that the possession of this material is harmful to the model, Eva Ionesco, or to my personal character, I concede that it is more difficult to defend the material because the indexicality of the images makes them appear a step closer to reality than drawings. Since I had not seen the material in question, it was easy to imagine that it could be something invariably indecent. Having subsequently viewed the material elsewhere, it is not what I would describe as indecent, but the ethics of viewing (and more acutely, collecting) the material are challenged by the protracted efforts of Eva Ionesco to stop the republication of photographs her mother staged throughout this period (Willscher 2015).

Although Brown and Ionesco can be distinguished by examining their use of media, their foci, and their level of associated cultural capital, their common publication through Pan-Exotica, a subsidiary of Éditions Treville, suggests that these works possess a degree of similarity. While it may be tempting to suggest that the common denominator is the depiction of female minors, this connection should not come at the expense of noticing broader thematic links between these works and other titles published by Pan-Exotica. At its broadest, the thematic focus of Pan-Exotica seems to be surrealism, or as described on their website, the “exotic contents of unknown & imaginative world of aesthetics.” Some Japanese artists, like Junko Mizuno and Suehiro Maruo, are associated with manga. Some artists, like Amano Katan and Etsuko Miura, craft and stage ball-jointed dolls in scenes that are then photographed by Ryo Yoshida. Others, like Zdzisław Beksiński and Fuyuko Matsui, seem to focus on painting surrealist landscapes. The unification of these disparate works under a common publisher suggests that intertextuality is not necessarily confined to textual links between different units of content. Rather, the act of releasing these works under a common publisher with a stated thematic focus creates intertextual links between these works that would otherwise not necessarily exist. Furthermore, the seizure of these materials by Australian Customs suggests that the default stance towards representations of children is one of prohibition, and that the exoneration of Australian artists like Bill Henson (Marr 2008; McDonald 2012; Simpson 2011) and Paul Yore is established through arguments that refer specifically to the merits of their work rather than arguments that counter the sensibilities that generate the public outrage about these representations.

The ability to confirm clearly the legal status of these materials was further complicated in October 2014, when I interviewed two officials from the ACB of the Attorney General’s Department (the organization that superseded the OFLC). As permitted under the agreement I made with the OFLC, I showed them Brown’s publications and subsequently asked them to explain their assessment of the material. Upon viewing the materials, they found the publications to be “weird” but thought they were not offensive enough to be prohibited under the regulations that permitted their seizure. There was one particular image in Rope, Rapture & Bloodshed that the assessors agreed was
in breach of ACB regulations. However, this was a drawing of a figure that appeared to be an adult female, and its offensiveness is the depiction of buttocks flushed red from a spanking and nothing to do with Brown’s depictions of figures that appear to be minors. Conversely, I showed them another publication, *Moecco: Vicky* (2009), a mook (somewhere in size between a magazine and a book) featuring junior idols from the *Candy Doll* studios. *Candy Doll* is a child modeling website, hosted in Japan, which features images and videos of young girls from Ukraine. This material is also published in Japan in the form of magazines and DVDs (which are the formats used for my assessments of the material since website access is restricted to Internet Protocol addresses located within Japan). They agreed that this publication was likely to be found objectionable on account of its depictions of what appears to be minors under the age of 16 depicted in a sexual context. This sexual context was suggested by the poses of the models and their clothes.

The threat of criminal prosecution illustrates two interesting aspects of how power operates in this event, with its potential for diffuse temporal effects. First, the materials that were seized were not on the OFLC list of Refused Classification publications. Accordingly, it was not possible to have prior knowledge of whether the materials were unknown to the OFLC or simply not subject to classification. The implicit recommendation, to think and behave like a Customs officer when purchasing goods from the Internet, assumes I possess such a competence but elect to purchase objectionable goods, despite the fact that they only become objectionable goods at the point when they are inspected and seized by a government officer trained in a specific scopic regime that is not necessarily one shared by the general public. Even if it were possible to assume the gaze of the Customs officer, I would still not be able to cheat causality and view materials that I have not yet received. Chief Justice Stewart, after all, only knew pornography after he saw it. This experience is reflected in the prosecution of Christopher Handley (Galbraith 2011; Stanley 2009) in the United States, where he was compelled to develop a legal defense for the importation and possession of manga materials that he had not yet viewed. The obscene character of these materials was only established through the juridical processes that categorized the materials as obscene, and it is therefore impossible to provide an *a priori* justification for materials that have not been viewed and are not yet known to be obscene.

Second, the threat of retroactive prosecution suggests that my future behavior affects the meaning of my past behavior. If I am prosecuted for importing further materials and I do face prosecution for the importation of Brown’s books in 2004 and Ionesco’s book in 2005 then these actions would retrospectively become criminal actions rather than simply the attempted importation of unclassified publications. Slavoj Žižek (2014: 144) describes acts that have the power to “(re)constitute the past” as “authentic” as they “not only create new actual reality” but they also retroactively constitute the conditions for our acts. The authenticity of criminal prosecution and conviction
contrasts with the virtual character of media consumption. Any media inter-
action that can be mapped onto the basic parameters of obscenity has the poten-
tial to be retroactively rendered as criminal activity. However, this only becomes
the new actual reality through the discursive practices of juridification that
make formal and binding classifications of media content.

“Juridification” is the term used by Jürgen Habermas (1987: 356) to
describe how in contemporary Western societies, the everyday lifeworld is
increasingly colonized by the application of formal regulations.11 This is part
of the process that separates the internal domain of morality from the exter-
nal domain of legislation. This stands in contrast to earlier societies that held
no distinction between morality and law (Habermas, 1987: 174–175). McLel-
land (2011) argues that the broadening of child pornography legislation to
include depictions of fictitious persons is an example of the “juridification
of the imagination” as the law articulates specific criminal offenses that arise
from the creation, possession or distribution of objectionable images of non-
eexisting persons. In the wake of the 2008 controversies about children in art in
Australia, the Australia Council for the Arts voluntarily developed the Protocols
for Working with Children in Art (2010). This document articulates
specific measures that need to be taken to acquire government funding. These
recommendations traverse both the internal and external domains, respec-
tively requiring actions as varied as giving “thoughtful consideration regard-
ing the rights of the child” (Australia Council for the Arts 2010: 5) and
submitting the artworks to the ACB so that they can then be subject to
formal government classification (ibid.: 9–10). The development of these
protocols suggests that the image of the child within the field of representa-
tion is increasingly subject not only to a gaze that seeks to determine whether
the image is pornographic but also to sets of legislation and procedures that
explicitly regulate the production and dissemination of the image. However,
Paul Yore’s experience of being charged for child pornography offenses
despite seeking and obtaining classification for his artworks suggests that the
comprehension of these protocols is not uniform.

The law, according to Habermas, contains a “critical normative dimension”
where the law “retains a need for moral justification” (Deflem 2013: 81). As
Gadamer suggests, the exercise of “good taste” is related to morality and this
is reflected in the construction of legislation. Furthermore, it is also reflected
in the auxiliary discourse about contentious or legally objectionable materials.
The remarks to which I was subject and the process that secured the release
of the material confirms that it is not just the material itself that is subject to
scrutiny but also my relationship to the material. This suggests there is a level
of contagion between media and its perceived audience. Phrases such as “sick
puppy” and expressions of disgust demonstrate the connection between emo-
tion, cultural value and the field of judgment (Stapleton 2013: 116, 124). As
Cather points out in this volume, it is possible to speculate whether the per-
sonal remarks to which I was subject would have been similarly proffered if
my gender, age, ethnicity or status as a parent had been otherwise. It is
difficult to imagine that I would have been treated with similar contempt at the Customs facility if my physical appearance and affect mirrored that of the aggrieved officer. Perceived as the “other” to the guardians of objectionable media, I was fair game to be judged alongside the materials that I attempted to import. Rather than seeing my research as contributing to the field in which they work, my interest in contentious areas of popular culture was read as a symptom of personal pathology.

As personally confronting as these characterizations were, they seemed to have no bearing upon the decision to recognize my academic credentials. This seemed to focus purely on whether the university supported my application for retrospective permission to import objectionable goods. This suggests that there is a gap between the formal functions of juridification and the lived experience of enduring the process to gain permission. The formal process made an assessment of the material and then assessed my worthiness to gain the materials without interrogating my morality. However, the casual verbal statements made by individuals working for Australian Customs suggest that my personal morality appeared suspicious, or perhaps even pathological, for my willingness to investigate visual materials on the periphery of indecency. Although the extent to which Brown’s publications exemplify “good taste” or my personal morality was not an official concern of the ACB, these concerns seemed quite relevant to individuals working in an official capacity at Australian Customs.

The rhetoric of child pornography

Academic and lay perceptions are constructed through the language used to discuss phenomena. Suzanne Ost (2009: 171) argues that, “language, the choice of words and the framing of the risks of child pornography … determine the way in which these risks are constructed.” From the Anglophone world, the concept of “child pornography” has been exported into other states such as Brazil (Lowenkron 2015) and Japan (Leheny 2006). The concept of “child pornography” has been broadened through different legislative amendments that have criminalized an increasingly vast range of materials. Key to this process has been the deployment of particular rhetorical strategies to marshal public support (Jenkins 1998; Lowenkron 2015) as can be seen in recent condemnatory statements issued about Japan’s supposed tolerance of this material by international agencies such as ECPAT and UNICEF. However, the unanimity of public support has generated a perverse effect whereby current legislation has become preoccupied with an increasing range of materials and, conversely, less clearly focused on addressing the problem of the sexual exploitation of actual children (Adler 2001; Lowenkron 2015; Ost 2009; Stapleton 2010).

Anglophone child pornography legislation is derivative of obscenity legislation, and juridical concepts such as “indecency” and “lasciviousness” are derived from the concept of obscenity (Gillespie 2011: 25). Conceptualizing
child pornography through this framework has led to incoherent legislation. Initially, child pornography legislation tended to address depictions of actual minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. There was a clear distinction between “child pornography” – “photographs or films of children being sexually molested,” and “child erotica” – “any material, relating to children, that is sexually arousing to a given individual” (Lanning 1984: 83). The former was prohibited on the grounds of its indecency whilst the latter could not be comprehensively prohibited by legislation because its boundaries are amorphous (for example, an underwear catalogue featuring child models may appeal to those with a pedophilic orientation). These two kinds of content are not mutually exclusive because they refer to different epistemologies. The former delineates a particular kind of content (images of actual children being subject to sexual exploitation) that can be objectively determined, whilst the latter proposes that content can be classified by the gaze that an individual applies to the content. Despite the impossibility of comprehensively defining child erotica, these subjective questions about the response of an imagined viewer have become increasingly crucial to the Anglophone conceptualization of child pornography. This has promoted what Amy Adler (2001) describes as the “pedophilic gaze,” where “child pornography law makes us share the gaze if not the desire of the pedophile” (ibid.: 76). This approach to regulating representations of minors has a perverse effect because it reproduces the image of the sexual child and seems to pull an increasingly broad range of materials into the domain of pornography.

Child pornography, in the wake of the pedophilic gaze, is not a thing but a way of thinking about representations of minors. This can be seen by observing the trajectory of Anglophone child pornography legislation (Gillespie 2011: 42–97; Ost 2009: 54–56, 67–70, 200–208; Persky and Dixon 2001; Wortley and Smallbone 2012: 7). Generally, legislation has shifted from an interest in the photographic record of molestation of an actual child to broader representations including drawings and other depictions of purely fictional persons. This process is not completely uniform. In the United Kingdom, “photographs” are covered by different legislation to “images,” whilst Australian Commonwealth legislation makes no distinction between photographs and drawings. In the United States, legislation that conflated the subjects depicted in different kinds of images, via the phrase “appears to be a minor,” was overturned by the Supreme Court but images are still able to be prosecuted if they are alleged to be obscene, as happened in the Handley case.

Although the process of separating images of fictitious persons from actual persons may become increasingly difficult due to the development of software able to generate realistic depictions, the more profound ambiguity is the determination of whether content is “lascivious,” and whether a minor is depicted in a “sexual context.” US v. Knox confirmed that the lascivious depiction of a child can occur even when the child is fully clothed (Ost 2009: 204). This is problematic because it accentuates the requirement of the pedophilic
gaze but the power of this gaze is not easily challenged or falsified. This causes both misrecognition and legal ambiguity. Suzanne Ost has summarized the trajectory of Anglophone child pornography legislation in the following way:

Contemporary child pornography law is not limiting itself towards the main harm of visual depictions that exploit real children, but is now directed towards exploitation of the non-existent child, possible future harm that could be caused to other children, and non-exploitative relationships involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. It would seem that the original legislative purpose of preventing the exploitation of real children has gradually metamorphosed into a more all-encompassing construction of harm. Any behaviour related to child pornography, whether real, potential, remote or virtual, is thought to give rise to a risk of “harm.”

(Ost 2009: 89)

This suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the broadness of a concept and its clarity as a point of reference. As “child pornography” increases in semantic density, materials produced and read in myriad contexts are reduced to a single concept and so rather than producing knowledge, the concept produces ignorance.

The problem with defining child pornography broadly, through the rubric of the pedophilic gaze, is that there is always a surplus of potential juridification and a gap between what could be found to be objectionable and what is found to be objectionable. This is evident when examining how “child pornography” is used in tabloid media. The term is sometimes deployed in public discourse to refer to material that does not actually meet the legal criteria of child pornography. This is similar to the way that the tabloid media use “pedophilia” to describe a variety of activities that have little to do with its clinical definition (Kitzinger 2004; Meyer 2007). Rather, the term is employed to signal and reinforce moral condemnation. Examples of this include the 2008 controversy about the public showing of Bill Henson’s photographs of nude adolescents where Sydney tabloid The Daily Telegraph ran the headline “CHILD PORN ART RAID” (McDonald 2012: 102). This headline was published at the time of the seizure, before any formal classification from the ACB. The term is used by the tabloid as an expression of moral judgment. Similarly, the release of Louis Malle’s (1978) movie Pretty Baby was met with this headline on the cover of the May 1978 edition of People magazine: “Pretty Baby. Brooke Shields, 12, stirs a furor over child porn in films.” This headline proposes that there is child pornography in cinema, of which Pretty Baby is one example. However, this film was shown and is still available for purchase in countries like the United States and Australia where it has an M rating (recommended for mature audiences). These examples demonstrate how the “discourse in which the image of the child as sexual is preserved and multiplied” through attempts to contain it
(Adler 2001: 6), and that pornography is not a thing but a “thought structure” (Kendrick 1996: xiii). Furthermore, the disparity between the language of tabloid journalism and the classification decisions of various governmental bodies that regulate media content emphasizes that “child pornography” does not always refer to material that actually conforms to the parameters of the relevant legislation. Rather, describing contentious material as “child porn” takes advantage of the epistemological deficiency of Anglophone legislation and becomes a way of reinforcing prejudices, stoking public outrage and propagating the image of the sexual child.

Given that “child pornography” has such apparent conceptual problems, it is unsurprising that the term is falling into disuse. Within the scholarly literature and journalism, the term “child pornography” is increasingly obsolescent. Instead, terms like “abuse images,” “child abuse material” and “child exploitation material” are used (Wortley and Smallbone 2012: 7–9). This signifies a shift in emphasis from the titillation of the offender and a discourse of obscenity, to a focus upon the crime visited upon the victim and a discourse of child protection. This shift is important because it emphasizes that child protection takes priority over the field of representation. Ost (2009: 135) argues that this is useful because it moves legislation from a framework of “indecency” and into a framework of “exploitation.” The adoption of “exploitation” as the relevant framework could potentially bring Anglophone legislation towards alignment with Japanese legislation as questions about the representation of fictional persons would move beyond the scope of child pornography legislation.14 Without separating contentious and obscene representations from materials that are a record of sexual exploitation of an actual child, the shift in nomenclature becomes a form of obscurantism because it disguises the broad range of material that is covered by legislation and it employs terminology that sounds even more shocking and unpalatable. This subsequently makes it increasingly difficult to question the value of conflating different kinds of material because challenging this discourse is tantamount to disregarding child protection (McKee 2010).

The effect of this conflation can be observed in the discourse that conceptualizes lolicon materials as child pornography. The legal status of lolicon materials in the West is ambiguous, yet there is a clear trend towards the prohibition of the production, dissemination and possession of these materials through the broadening of child pornography legislation and the development of specific legislation to address representations of fictitious minors. The prohibition of these materials is related to the movement from legislation that aimed to protect actual children from the harm of sexual exploitation to a more obtuse desire to forbid sexualized depictions of non-existent children (Adler 2001; McLelland 2011, 2012; Ost 2009: 82–90; Thompson and Williams 2004). This polarity has erased the distinction between the actual and the virtual, both in the sense that non-existent children are granted the same protection as real children and in the sense that there is a lack of distinction between a record of sexual exploitation that has occurred and the contention
that images have the capacity to facilitate or normalize sexual abuse. There is a collapse of the virtual into the actual, and a compression of the past and possible future into the present. This flattening of experience has led to a tendency for legislators to insist that the creation or consumption of an image that potentially perverts the viewer, regardless of intent, is a criminal action. Even if a specific child is not harmed through this chain of events, it is a pollutant that endangers all children through the representation of an unsavory or dangerous idea. The ascendancy of this notion is demonstrated in the 2008 ECPAT report that states their position on this material:

We argue that the crime of possession, and making or distribution of child pornography, whether virtual or not, are crimes not only against a particular child, but against all children.

(Quayle et al. 2008: 20)

Despite describing lolicon as a range of materials, part of the Japanese manga industry, as worth more than 500 billion yen, Quayle and her co-authors seem quite comfortable subsuming these materials under the concept of “child pornography.” To argue their position, the authors cite David Oswell (2006), who argues that “virtual images” offend against a universal childhood because they are only rendered intelligible through a connection to “objective reality.” He proposes:

The primary concern is not one of the effects of the image on others or one of the relations of power encoded in the image, but one of the virtual evidentiality of the image (i.e. on the image’s capacity to refer to an objective reality that is both internal and external to the image). The ethical intensity of the virtual image lies precisely in its capacity to refer to a scene beyond itself.

(Oswell 2006: 258)

Taken broadly, it is difficult to think of any images that do not have the capacities described by Oswell. All representations must necessarily refer to an objective reality that is both internal and external to itself. Accordingly, the ethics of viewing representations of other kinds of criminal or immoral behavior remain unclear. Despite this deficiency, this perspective seems dominant throughout the Anglophone world. However, Japanese legislators have not so far taken such a broadly prohibitionist stance towards contentious images of minors. Rather, they have maintained a clear distinction between images of real persons in contrast to images of fictitious persons, and they have maintained strict regulations about what can and cannot be depicted, rather than making the pedophilic gaze an essential part of the epistemology of child pornography.

Although legislation was enacted in Japan in 1999 that banned the production and trade in child pornography images, in June 2014 the Japanese
Diet (parliament) voted to extend this prohibition to the simple possession of child pornography. However, this prohibition is restricted to images that depict the sexual exploitation of actual children (ABC News 2014). These amendments confirm that Japanese legislators continue to recognize distinctions between both actual and fictitious children, and between “cute idol performances” and “child pornography.” Recognition of these distinctions is based upon the limitations of the concepts used within the legislation. The continuing acknowledgement of a distinction between images of actual persons and images of fictitious persons is based upon the specific meaning of a child within the context of the legislation. In the Punishment for Acts Regarding Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Protection of Child Act 1999, a “child” means “a person under 18 years of age,” and “child pornography” refers to photographs or other recorded media (Kao 2012: 81). Consequently, depictions of fictitious persons cannot be regulated under this juridical discourse because representations do not have characteristics such as age because chronology is a product of biology.

The second point of diversion is the consideration of the content of an image over its capacity to arouse the viewer. Although the legislation stipulates that that “which arouses or stimulates the viewer’s sexual desire” is prohibited, this is restricted to recordings of the touching of genitals or the display of (partial or full) nudity (Kao 2012: 82), rather than the amorphous “sexual context” used in Australian legislation. Given the continued legality of junior gravure idols in Japan, it would seem that “partial nudity” refers specifically to displays of genitals rather than a judgment about the propriety of particular kinds of clothing or posturing.

The junior idol phenomenon suggests that there is a juridical fissure between Anglophone countries that consider the material to be indecent and other countries that deem the material to be a part of the entertainment industry. Undertaking a critical analysis of this material helps contextualize this material as part of a transnational phenomenon with close ties to phenomena that exist concurrently in Anglophone countries. This has the potential for researchers outside the field of Japan Studies to gain a better understanding of the idol phenomenon whilst undermining discourses that attempt to reduce it to an “incredible tolerance for the sexual exploitation of young girls” on the part of Japanese culture.15

**Idols as a transnational phenomenon**

The idol industry is a significant part of the broader entertainment industries within Japan, including music, television and print publications. It involves the mediation of performances given by young male and female idols. Performances typically involve singing, dancing and modeling. Popular male idols are marketed by companies like Johnny & Associates (Nagaike 2012; Glasspool 2012). Aoyagi Hiroshi (2005: 9), the foremost scholar of “idology,” proposes that “Japanese idols are becoming global icons in the sense that the
popularity of these adolescent personalities has recently extended far beyond the Japanese archipelago.” Aoyagi argues that fan communities are emerging in other parts of Asia, in sufficient numbers to warrant tours from Japanese idols, and that fan communities are emerging in North America and Europe (Aoyagi 2005: 9). Gravure idol materials, such as DVDs and photobooks, are also available, domestically, or internationally via online sites. Given that the Japanese idol phenomenon appears to be spreading beyond Japan, it seems increasingly necessary for researchers outside Japan to address both the texts and their related fan communities.

*Candy Doll* is a commercial child modeling studio that provides still images and videos of female models, aged 15 and under. The models are likely to originate from Ukraine, but the context of distribution seems primarily isolated to a Japanese audience, where this material is part of the gravure idol (*gurabia idoru*) industry (West 2006: 176). The website (www.candydoll.tv) is the primary site where still images and videos are made available on a subscription basis. Additionally, some of the website content has been licensed for distribution by publishing agencies, Cosmic Publishing, GOD, and My Way Ltd. These corporations publish Japanese print and audio-visual media. Cosmic Publishing appears to publish a wide range of magazines, whilst My Way appears to focus upon gravure idols.

Although the website forbids subscriptions from users outside Japan, The *Candy Doll* content that is published online via the subscription website is frequently shared on the Internet. This form of distribution is illegal, in violation of copyright and, depending on national legislation, accessing, possessing or distributing this material may be criminal, if the material meets local definitions of child pornography. This content is shared freely and publicly on newsgroups or, until the end of 2010, on public Bit Torrent trackers such as The Pirate Bay. This suggests that there is demand for this material beyond its domestic context and the decision to launch *Tokyodoll.tv* with the capacity for international subscribers indicates that there is a global audience for this kind of material.

Gravure idols conventionally model an array of clothing, but the swimsuit is the most popular garment. Although *Candy Doll* models do often wear standard idol garments like swimsuits and school uniforms, they also wear “maid” and “fighting girl” costumes. This seems to support Galbraith’s (2012: 186) argument that “fictional characters and idols occupy the same conceptual space” and this is made explicit in some instances. In March 2008, two *Candy Doll* models, Aleksandra D and Yuliya S, made a public appearance on the streets of Akihabara. Their appearance elicited attention from the public, gathering a crowd of amateur photographers around the models. Aleksandra and Yuliya were dressed as characters from the manga/anime serial *Bishōjo Senshi Sērā Mīn*, literally translated as “Pretty Girl Soldiers, Sailor Moon,” but known in the West simply as *Sailor Moon* (Allison 2006: 129). Idols appearing as manga characters is not uncommon and demonstrates that the “idol is a fiction that has very real effects/affects” (Galbraith
2012: 186). The idol is a fiction that is easily able to be connected to other fictions (such as manga, other forms of popular culture, or mythology). However, this fictionality is enlivened by the performance of the model as she uses postural and facial affect to substantiate the fiction and provoke an affective response in the audience.

The images in the magazine Moecco: Vicky (2009) give some indication of junior idol content and its capacity to transgress Anglophone legislation. The models in the magazine are aged between 11 and 14 years. Of the 14 models featured, seven are aged 12. Consequently, they quite readily appear to be minors. Furthermore, particular poses and camera angles seem to establish a context that is arguably related to sexual arousal. The most obvious of these is the “crotch shot.” There are a total of 12 crotch shots featured in the publication. There are other images that include photos of breast cleavage, or buttocks that are partially visible because of revealing attire such as swimsuits. However, most of the images in the magazine are much more innocuous. By far the most popular image focuses upon the reciprocated gaze of the models. There are 166 images in this magazine that feature a reciprocated gaze, compared to 12 images that depict a model with an averted gaze. This evidence suggests that idol publications are not about the lascivious display of clothed genitalia but that they address the viewer in ways similar to other areas of visual culture that represent children. Representations of children with a reciprocated gaze proliferate in diverse forms such as advertising materials, children’s fashion publications such as the Italian Vogue Bambini and the Australian Studio Bambini, fine art, television and cinema (Higonnet 1998; Holland 2004). Gravure idol publications are unlike these other materials, though, because of the way that the publications arrange collections of models and become a collectable piece of idol ephemera. However, the representations depicted in the publications belong to broader traditions of depicting childhood. This content is produced by adults to project fantasies of childhood through the representation of the gaze and the body of the child.

The distinction between Japan and Anglophone countries is not that the former promotes erotic investment in childhood through media representations whereas the latter does not, as is apparent in the media furor over “corporate pedophilia” discussed earlier. Rather, it is the amount of countervailing disavowal that the latter builds into its representations. The American reality TV program Toddlers and Tiaras, for example, exemplifies the coterminous investments in the erotic child. This program ran from 2008 until 2013 and depicted the contestants of local children’s beauty pageants, their parents and pageant organizers, as they prepare for and perform in child beauty pageants. Similar to how the gravure idol industry is a part of the broader idol industry in Japan, parents often describe competing in pageants as part of a broader strategy to work in the entertainment industry as a model or performer. In this series, the performers compete in “natural” and “glitz” pageants, where the former has performers wearing standard children’s fashion and only stage make-up, whilst the latter includes clothing that is ornate.
and make-up including spray tans, fake eyelashes, lipstick and hairpieces. Some of the pageants, such as the one detailed in the final episode of the first season, have a “Living Doll” competition where performers dress as famous fictional children such as Pippi Longstocking, Raggedy Ann and Little Orphan Annie. This activity parallels the public performance of Candy Doll models as Sailor Moon characters. It suggests that there is a common cultural acknowledgement that femininity has a performative element that enables anyone of any age or gender to become an idol or beauty queen through the adoption of particular clothes and affect. While there are notable distinctions between Toddlers and Tiaras and idol materials like Candy Doll, they both trade on the spectacle of confected girlhood.

It seems unhelpful to begin with the assumption that gravure idol material is used for sexual arousal because this ignores the broader context in which fantasies of childhood operate in visual culture. It seems prudent to acknowledge our own relationship to images of children, to understand how Candy Doll appeals to a form of melancholic nostalgia, where the “affective tableau” is “one in which the child always is … but always is beyond reach” (Kincaid 1992: 67). These images present girls, frozen at the dusk of childhood, frolicking outdoors and in comfortable bourgeois surroundings. They are corralled into a fantasy space where they are safe and the viewer is safe to gaze upon them. However, such a reading is obscured by deploying a singular focus on whether the material is sexually arousing to an imagined third party.

Attempting to contextualize Candy Doll purely through the Japanese junior idol phenomenon fails to connect the material to other thematically similar works that originate in an Anglophone context. While Amazon Japan is lambasted in the American press for the sale of junior idol materials (Adelstein 2015), critics fail to indicate that the American branch of Amazon both manufactured and sold junior idol DVDs reportedly shot in Europe. Maxwell’s Junior Idols – Antonia 13 is an example of such material. This DVD lacks the production values of Candy Doll but it is similar in the sense that a female minor models a range of outfits and poses for the viewer. This suggests that junior idols are not only attracting a transnational audience but that the production and sale of these materials is not isolated to Japan.

However, thematic links between Candy Doll and Anglophone visual culture are deeper than Amazon’s apparent willingness to distribute similar materials, or its parallels with American phenomena such as child beauty pageants or TV programs devoted to that industry. It is not simply connected to popular culture but also to Anglophone traditions in fine art. The objective stated on the Candy Doll site, to create a place where viewers can “enjoy the beauty of little girls” through viewing “true masterpieces,” situates this content within fine art traditions that are not alien to Anglophone culture. The content produced by Candy Doll bears a degree of resemblance to fine art like that produced by Irina Ionesco, David Hamilton and Charles Dodgson. Dodgson’s nineteenth-century photography, including his famous images of the girls from the Liddell family, suggests that dressing girls in a range of
costumes (or even having them pose nude) is not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon. Rather, what appears to have shifted in Anglophone culture is our capacity to speak about the images. Sir Alfred Tennyson is said to have declared Dodgson’s 1859 image *The Beggar Maid* to be the most beautiful image he had ever seen. This remark stands in contrast to the Australian prime minister’s declaration that Henson’s images of nude adolescents were “absolutely revolting” (Marr 2008: 46–47).

In the Anglophone world, discourse about images of children is focused upon exploitation, perversion and risk. These manifest in controversies about artists like Bill Henson, Paul Yore, Sally Mann, Robert Mapplethorpe, David Hamilton and Jock Sturges (Faulkner 2011: 119–148; Julius 2002: 141–142; Kammen 2006: 78–82; McDonald 2012). However, it perhaps even more routinely manifests as anxiety and scandal about representations of minors in popular culture where images of both childhood innocence and the “knowing” child are used to seduce and titillate their audience (Higonnet 1998: 133–192; Kincaid 1998: 74–109; Mohr 2004). These are all legitimate concerns to have in respect to both child protection and a critical engagement with visual culture. However, as Kincaid (1998: 284, 287) advocates, we also need to reimagine “our Romantic roots and the Romantic investment in the child” in order to come to terms with the “way that children are devised by our culture as erotic.” The investigation of images that promote such an image of the child is therefore not a way of trivializing child exploitation or normalizing pedophilia. Rather, it potentially helps to uncover the broader erotic investments that we maintain in the image of the child. Instead of endlessly attempting to reinvest childhood with an antiquated notion of innocence, we need to conduct a cultural critique of how the notion of “innocence” is used to legitimize political power and maintain social cohesion (Faulkner 2011: 144–148). This involves moving beyond a “gothic narrative” (Kincaid 1998) that valorizes and eroticizes childhood innocence. Instead, our fantasies of childhood should be separated from our capacity and willingness to permit agency and afford protection to different individuals and groups.

**Conclusion**

Ian Hacking (1999: 146) proposes that child abuse, “as a diagnostic and political concept, has chiefly been a phenomenon of the English-speaking world, with the United States as almost the only source of conceptual innovation.” For Hacking, it is a concept with a “missionary element,” where advocates attempt to export social alarm, insisting on its international pertinence. Like child abuse, the United States is the chief exporter of the concept of child pornography. However, in addition to the promotion of particular attitudes toward the welfare of children, it has also facilitated the promotion of particular beliefs about the relationship between sexuality and media. These beliefs tend to eschew sophisticated models that attempt to account for textual polysemy, or the literacies used by audiences to make sense of media
content, in favor of models that tend to be more deterministic and consequently more risk averse. Although such models of media effects have received criticism from media researchers within the field of cultural studies (Gauntlett 2005), research that emphasizes media literacies often fails to influence public understanding or policy debates about contentious media (Buckingham and Bragg 2004; Lumby and Albury 2008). This is particularly true when considering media content considered “harmful matter.” The broad acceptance of arguments that substantiate the harm of recorded child sexual exploitation need not occur at the expense of questioning the extent to which these arguments are applicable to drawings and non-nude photographs of minors (Ost 2009: 130–135). Although interrogating these areas of visual culture features very real risks that researchers may be accused of “actively promoting child abuse” (Lumby 2013: 69), failing to investigate these areas has repercussions beyond personal or professional reputation. Rather than protecting children, the reluctance to think more broadly about how contentious images of minors operate within visual culture risks producing a surplus of ignorance that undermines our capacity to think critically or intervene effectively in this area.

In his opinion, Chief Justice Stewart expressed the difficulty of intelligibly defining “hard-core pornography” but insisted that, “I know it when I see it.” However, it is another matter as to whether this interpretation is supported by consensus. As Anne Higonnet (1998: 122) puts it bluntly, “everyone interprets.” Public discourse about child pornography often has law enforcement officials and moral entrepreneurs acting as the voice of authority whilst the public occupies a reactive position of ignorance. Knowledge and ignorance often exist in an interdependence that extends beyond semantic antagonism (Tuana 2008: 111). The lack of an evidence-based epistemology risks condemning society to an increasingly entrenched and increasingly ineffective approach to child protection. James Kincaid (1992: 3) suggests that in the absence of knowledge about the construction of the adult love for the child, we are left with “‘knowingness,’ a pact that authorizes us to treat our ignorance as wisdom and to make that ignorance the basis for action.” This ignorance inhibits the formulation of coherent or appropriate legislation because it relies on the reiteration of our preconceptions, as the pedophilic gaze “imagines so that it might recoil in disgust” (ibid.).

Instead of relying upon the pedophilic gaze to judge contentious images of minors, new capacities for critical intervention need to be established. W.J.T. Mitchell proposes that “the application of ‘good taste’ to images, the critical separation of true from false, baneful from beneficent, ugly from beautiful images, seems like one of the fundamental tasks of criticism” (Mitchell 2005: 81). One problem with prohibition is that it circumvents this process, consigning particular texts to a status where they are not only “Refused Classification” through the process of juridification but their muted presence in the mediascape means they are also refused criticism. Whilst there may be little public support to alter the range of prohibited content, researchers within and
beyond the field of Japan Studies would benefit from close textual engagement with materials that may otherwise be considered legally objectionable. Rather than chastising Japan as an “Empire of Child Pornography” (Adelstein and Kubo 2014), the Anglophone West would be better off examining its own relationship to the image of the sexual child, and challenging its own assumptions about the relationship between media content, fantasy and social behavior.

Notes
1 Hans Georg Gadamer (2004: 32) proposes that the origins of taste clarify that the expression of a taste is a moral judgment and not simply an aesthetic judgment. The concept of taste, according to Gadamer, “implies a mode of knowing,” and in essence, it is “not private but a social phenomenon.” Matters of taste are therefore not a purely subjective phenomenon based upon personal preferences but are closely related to social hierarchies and modes of judgment used within and outside the courtroom.
2 In this sense, Trainer’s text appears to be an antecedent to the “sexualization” arguments that were dominant towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, including texts like M.G. Durham’s (2008) The Lolita Effect.
3 An example of its movement from subculture to popular culture was Gwen Stefani’s 2004 use of “Harajuku Girls” as dancers for her live performances.
4 Broadening the analytical gaze beyond the spectrum of the legally indecent is common practice in addressing images of children. Max Taylor and Ethel Quayle (2003: 32) suggest that the COPINE scale, their taxonomy of different kinds of child pornography, “quite deliberately includes pictures that do not fall within any legal definition of child pornography.”
5 In Canada, Section 163.1(1) of the federal Criminal Code identifies four main kinds of child pornography: visual representations; writing, images or audio recordings that advocate sexual activity with a person under the age of 18 years; written material that describes sexual activity with a minor for the purpose of sexual arousal; and any audio recordings that describes sexual activity with a minor for a sexual purpose (Gillespie 2011: 77). There have been concerns that the inclusion of writing infringes upon the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but the outcome of R. v. Sharpe confirmed that this child pornography legislation does not violate the charter (Persky and Dixon 2001: 25; see also Orbaugh, this volume).
6 The ACB superseded the Office of Film and Literature Classification but they both performed the same function and operate under the power of the same legislation.
7 Notably, the OFLC used two different modes of assessment for Henson and Yore, respectively. Henson’s image was assessed under the guidelines for films and videogames whilst Yore’s installation was assessed as though it were a publication.
8 Throughout the 1970s, artists such as Irina Ionesco, Jacques Burboulon and Hajime Sawatari all enjoyed a degree of popularity in Japan, for their artistic photographs of female minors both in the nude and in ornate costumes and surroundings. Sawatari’s (1973, 1979) books featuring a model known as “Alice” connect this fan culture to the writings and photography of Lewis Carroll (Gershheim 1969). Galbraith reports that Sawatari’s work was part of the “Alice boom” that sparked popular interest in similar material but, by the end of the 1970s, it lost its currency as fine art and became increasingly conceptualized as adult content (Galbraith 2011: 94–95).
9 See the case, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964.
The importation of unclassified publications is not in itself a criminal offense. In fact, the process of having any foreign publication assessed by the Classification Board requires the material to be imported so that a copy of the publication can be sent to the Classification Board for assessment.

The “lifeworld” is the term Habermas uses to refer to “the whole of cultural values, social norms, and socialization patterns that often remain unquestioned among actors and that, in fact, enable interactions to take place” (Deflem 2013: 80).

Photographs and pseudo-photographs are covered under The Protection of Children Act 1978, whilst other kinds of images, such as drawings, are covered under The Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

The Child Pornography Prevention Act 1996 was successfully challenged in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) for its overly broad definition of a minor, but this was addressed in PROTECT 2003 by legislating as a specific offense, “obscene visual representations” such as drawings, paintings and sculptures (Akdeniz 2008: 128). The case against Christopher Handley demonstrates how this legislation is applied (Galbraith 2011; Stanley 2009).

Such a measure would not necessarily mean that representations of fictional persons would not be subject to regulation. Rather, this argument would take place within the discourse of obscenity rather than the discourse of child exploitation.

This quote, from Jake Adelstein, was used to punctuate a *Vice News* report, “Schoolgirls for Sale in Japan.”

The transnational nature of the idol phenomenon, and its lack of clarity from an Anglophone perspective, was demonstrated recently when the K-pop group *Oh My Girl* were detained at Los Angeles airport and refused entry into the United States on the suspicion that the eight group members were sex workers (Staufenberg, 2015).

Tokyodoll.tv is a website made by the owners of Candydoll.tv that features models over the age of 18.

Crotch shots of females are a pervasive visual trope of Japanese pornography but they also commonly feature in other areas of popular culture (Allison, 1998: 30, 152).

There are six shots of cleavage and six shots of buttocks.

See Adler (2001) for a related discussion on how Japanese males perform as schoolgirls.

References


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8 “The love that dare not speak its name”
The fate of Chinese danmei communities in the 2014 anti-porn campaign

Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu

Introduction

In June 2014 when the Japanese government finally passed legislation outlawing the “simple possession” of child pornography, there was widespread criticism in the Western press that so-called “virtual child pornography” – that is, fictitious images and stories such as those found in manga or animation – had not been included (see McLelland, and Galbraith, this volume). Although this incident was not widely reported on in China, it sparked some lively discussion among Chinese ACG (anime, comics and game) fans who associated the Japanese legislation with the then ongoing campaign against online pornography in China. Most Chinese fans perceived the exclusion of fictitious images in anime, manga and computer graphics from the legislation as a victory for the ACG fandom and hoped that one day the Chinese government too would also tolerate erotic fantasy involving two-dimensional characters. This chapter looks at the media panic about danmei, a genre of erotic writing imported from Japan and popular with young Chinese women, and the various responses of online danmei fan communities to government surveillance and censorship.

On April 13, 2014 the National Office against Pornographic and Illegal Publications, along with other government agencies, jointly announced that a nationwide crackdown on pornographic content on the Internet would be carried out from mid-April to November. The goal of the 2014 campaign was to remove all pornographic texts, images, videos and advertisements contained in websites, search engines, mobile application stores, Internet TV USB sticks, and set-top boxes, to rectify any websites, channels and programs that were heavily involved in the production or dissemination of pornographic information, and to shut down all illegal websites (National Office against Pornographic and Illegal Publications et al. 2014).

The campaign opened with a heavy hit on China’s leading web portal, Sina.com. One day before the official announcement of the campaign, Sina Book, an online literature channel of Sina.com, was abruptly shut down due to its publication of 20 pornographic novels. Some 17 Sina Book employees were taken away by the police and six editors were detained for over one month.
Sina.com was further threatened with being stripped of its Internet publishing license and audio-video broadcasting license, prompting a 6.76 percent drop in its stock price on the NASDAQ (Ji and Long 2014). The listed company was also punished for allowing pornographic content on its blog accounts and e-book sharing service in 2013, but the penalty at that time was merely a fine of 30,000 renminbi – approximately US$4,800 (Beijing News 2013). After the government made an astounding example of Sina Book, most literature websites scrambled to remove or hide any content that could be deemed inappropriate by the government. Online writing communities dedicated to boys’ love (BL) or danmei in the Chinese language, were particularly under pressure to scale back their activities.

BL is a genre of male-male same-sex romance created mostly by and for women. First emerging from Japanese manga in the early 1970s, BL has gained followers worldwide and become “one of Japan’s most influential, if overlooked, cultural exports” (McLelland 2009: para. 17). The genre was introduced to China through pirated Taiwanese translation of Japanese BL manga in the early 1990s under the elegant name “danmei” – literally, “addicted to beauty” (Wang 2005: 34). Unlike the predominance of manga in Japanese BL, the novel is the most popular form of Chinese danmei production, probably because it takes less skill and training to produce a novel than manga. Mainly through online publication and distribution by fans, danmei has been transformed from the discreet hobby of a small group of loyal fans into a famous genre of web literature and a massive cyberculture. In tandem with its growing popularity among Chinese youth, the genre has also fallen prey to government censorship and prosecution, as danmei, like Japanese BL, is replete with sexual depictions (Suzuki 1998: 252; Nagaike 2003: 77–78).

Based on in-depth interviews with danmei fans and participant observation of key danmei communities, this chapter examines the complex and ambivalent relationship between danmei fandom and government censorship, and the ethical tensions within the fandom concerning transgressive sexual expressions. The chapter begins with a concise outline of the spread of Japanese pop culture in China since the late 1970s, paying special attention to the legal and political challenges faced by transnational Japanese cultural flows. The second section analyzes the vulnerable presence of the Japan-originated danmei fandom in China in terms of government censorship and the annual anti-porn campaign. The third section discusses policies for dealing with explicit content developed by three major danmei communities: the self-censorship measures at Jinjiang, the classification system at Changpei, and the rating system at Suiyuanju. It also recounts the divergent and contingent tactics taken by those three communities to dodge the ruthless anti-porn campaign in 2014 and highlights the tensions within the fandom concerning depictions of pedophilia and sexual violence.

While danmei is clearly censored and repressed by the state, individual and community responses to this censorship are quite diverse and cannot be sweepingly characterized as “resistance.” In their production and
consumption of sexual content, danmei communities may have challenged censorship laws in some respects, but through self-regulation, they are also one step ahead of those laws in other respects. Moreover, due to substantial differences between danmei communities, there is no unified response or resistance to state censorship. Each community has its own stakes, concerns and survival strategies. Hence, in studying the relationship between danmei and censorship, we need to think beyond the over-simplified repression-resistance paradigm deployed or implied in some BL/danmei research (see for example, Liu 2009; Wood 2013), and explore in more detail how specific danmei communities interact and negotiate with the broader socio-legal context constituted by the government regulations, the mainstream media, traditional local values, Western legal discourses and transnational fan practices, in order to form their own stances towards the thorny issue of sexual depiction.

The vicissitudes of Japanese pop culture in China

Although China and Japan are close neighbors “with long-standing, rich historical and cultural connections” (He 2013: 7), contemporary Japanese pop culture was not introduced to China until the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). In 1978, Deng Xiaoping first facilitated the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan, and then paid an official visit to Japan to win the support of Japanese business and political leaders for his reform policy. In the same year, China imported three foreign movies as a gesture of opening up to the world, and two of them were Japanese (Xie 2008: 18). The 1980s, or more accurately, 1983–92, witnessed not only the “golden age” of Sino-Japanese relations in modern history but a general boom of Japanese culture in China (Li 2004: 2–3), as an enormous amount of Japanese cultural products, including TV dramas, movies, anime, music and literature, were imported, some of which, such as the hit TV drama Red Suspicion (1975), even became symbols of the era.

In the 1990s, Japanese trendy dramas like Tokyo Love Story (1991), Long Vacation (1996) and Love Generation (1997) that foreground “beautiful people, beautiful clothes, good food, and good entertainment” (Chua 2004: 206) created a second round of Japanese cultural fever among China’s younger generation yearning for cosmopolitan fashions and lifestyles. It was also in the 1990s that Chinese youth started to have first-hand knowledge of Japanese pop music (also known as J-pop), even though J-pop bands or singers were usually preoccupied with the domestic market and seldom toured outside Japan. Since the turn of the century, however, with the maturation of the domestic entertainment industry, diversified consumer tastes, the flooding of the Chinese market by Korean TV dramas and K-pop idols, and, last but not least, the steady decline of the Sino-Japanese relationship, Japanese pop culture, with the exception of ACG, has gradually been overshadowed by cultural content deriving from South Korea and the United States.
Japanese manga and anime have captured the hearts and minds of generations of Chinese youth ever since the state TV network, China Central Television (CCTV), aired the black-and-white version of *Astro Boy* (1963) with great success in 1980 (CNTV 2011). This is the first time that a foreign animation was ever broadcast in China, six years ahead of the Warner Bros. cartoon series *Tom and Jerry*. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese television screens were crowded with Japanese anime titles, as they were imported either for free or at a very low cost (Wang 2005: 15–18) and usually dubbed in Taiwan or Hong Kong, two regions that received Japanese pop culture much earlier than China (Wong 2006: 34). The broadcast of the anime series *Saint Seiya* in 1992 and *Slam Dunk* in 1998, in particular, converted a great number of Chinese teenagers into dedicated fans of Japanese anime and manga. Since the early 1990s, cheap pirated copies of Japanese manga, anime DVDs, anime music CDs and various spin-offs had also been flourishing in the Chinese market until consumers began to access manga and anime content on the Internet at the start of the new century.

It was also in the first half of the 1990s that Japanese BL manga like *RG Veda*, *Tokyo Babylon*, and *X* were introduced to China. The authorized Chinese translation of *RG Veda* was published in Taiwan by Taiwan Tohan Co. Ltd. in 1993. A year later, multiple pirated versions of the manga series cropped up in the Chinese market, which soon caught the eye of some Chinese readers with their glamorous drawing style and the unconventional theme of same-sex passion. By the end of the decade there were already a couple of online danmei forums in China, such as Sangsang Academy (1998–) and Lucifer Club (1999–), where young Chinese women started to create danmei fanfics of *Slam Dunk* or even tried their hand at writing original danmei stories. With the founding of the first print danmei magazine, *Danmei Season*, in 1999, Japanese BL manga and novels have been systematically translated and published in China to satisfy the growing interest in this genre.

In 2004–05, researchers conducted a national survey of 3,355 Chinese youth concerning their favorite animation and comic works. The results show that nine out of ten of the most favored titles were Japanese, the remainder being *Tom and Jerry*. In a 2008 follow-up survey of around 5,000 college students, all top ten works were from Japan (Chen and Song 2009: 2–12). The tremendous influence of Japanese manga and anime in China has caused educators and government officials to worry about the threat of Japanese “cultural invasion.” As conservative Japanese politicians have been reluctant to face up to Japan’s imperialistic past and work towards a genuine historical settlement, memory of Japanese aggression not only persists among ordinary Chinese people but has been increasingly intensified by the Chinese government as a means to maintain public support (He 2013: 10–12). Coinciding with the deterioration of Sino-Japanese ties since the mid-1990s (He 2013: 8), the Chinese government issued a ban on the publication of any foreign (read Japanese) manga title in domestic comics in 1995 (Zhang 2005). A quota system has been implemented in the comic book market as well, allowing
Only ten Japanese manga titles to be imported into China every year (Yang 2007: 22). In the name of protecting and promoting the domestic animation industry, the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) has issued a series of regulations to control the airing time of foreign cartoons, including the requirement of a broadcast permit for foreign cartoons in 2000, the establishment of a seasonal broadcast ratio of domestic to foreign cartoons in 2004, and a ban on the broadcast of foreign cartoons during primetime hours between 5:00pm and 8:00pm in 2006. A SARFT regulation issued in May 2008 further extended the ban to 9:00pm (Chung 2008).

Since Japanese manga and anime are known for their graphic violence and unconventional treatment of sex, gender and sexuality, from time to time there are also bans on specific Japanese manga and anime titles. For instance, in 2007 and 2008, there was a crackdown on pirated copies of the horror-themed Japanese manga, anime and film series *Death Note* due to its allegedly negative impact on young minds, even though the series was never officially released in China and had gained its popularity purely through piracy (Goderie and Yecies 2010; see also Freedman, this volume). In March 2015, the Ministry of Culture announced the rectification of 19 video portals for hosting anime titles that contained scenes of violence, pornography, terrorism and content that endangered public morality. The Ministry specifically listed three Japanese anime shows, *Terror in Resonance*, *Blood-C*, and *High School of the Dead*, as negative examples (Sina News 2015).

The heavy-handed government interference is justified by the belief that comics and animation are products for young children, and hence need to be infused carefully with correct morals and values. In Confucian societies like Hong Kong and South Korea, comics and animation are also negatively associated with the well-being of children (Yoon 2009: 106; Ng 2010: 472–473), and have probably encountered more hostility from the general public than in China. To be fair, China is not the first Asian country to take restrictive measures against Japanese popular culture due to concerns about Japanese cultural imperialism. As Santos and Sihombing point out in their chapter in this volume, anxieties about and suspicion of Japanese cultural influence are still very much alive in the Philippines and Indonesia, both societies that were negatively impacted by Japanese colonialism. In an account of the global spread of Japanese manga, Wendy Siuyi Wong observes that there had been decades of banning Japanese cultural products in Taiwan and South Korea, two former colonies of Japan. Yet rather than preventing Japanese manga and anime from entering those two countries, such official policies merely stimulated the wide circulation of pirated copies (Wong 2006: 33–34). If cultural embargos could not succeed during the pre-Internet era, they would be even less likely to be effective in the age of the Internet. By the time the Chinese government shut down the official outlets for Japanese manga and anime, the platforms for Internet dissemination were already well constructed. Armed with new media technology, Chinese fans have long been engaged in the practice of “0day” fansubbing, meaning that Chinese-language fansubs (that
is, anime subtitled by fans themselves) will appear on the Internet within a few hours of the latest anime episodes being aired in Japan (Chen and Teng 2006: 80). Due to the productivity of Chinese fansub groups, China has even become “the center for fansubbing and Internet sharing of Japanese ACG in Asia” (Ng 2010: 468). In addition to fan websites, general online video websites such as Tudou, PPTV and Youku have also set up anime channels and provided free, easy and timely access to Japanese anime series. To enhance its competitive advantage over other video websites, from 2011 to 2012, Tudou purchased the copyright of classic Japanese anime series such as Bleach (2004–), Gin Tama (2006–), and Naruto: Shippuden (2007–) (China International Comic Net 2012). Those few licensed titles partly deflect attention from the piracy of numerous other minor titles. Through both legal and illegal online distribution, new titles of Japanese anime are able to spread much more widely and quickly than before.

Apart from the official regulation of Japanese pop content in China, cultural flows from Japan also occasionally suffer from heightened political tensions between the two countries. During the protests against the Japanese government’s purchase of the disputed Diaoyu Islands in 2012, many Japanese cultural products, along with Japanese cars and electrical appliances, were boycotted in China. Bookstores across the country removed translated Japanese novels from the shelves, video websites hid away Japanese TV dramas and films, and a televised Asian singing contest hosted by the Oriental Satellite TV in Shanghai deleted all shots of Japanese singers. Only Japanese manga and anime were still able to be accessed online, apparently because of their irreplaceability in the Chinese market. Although China became the world’s largest animation producer in 2011 with all-round government support, Chinese youth still overwhelmingly prefer the more sophisticated Japanese anime to their superficial and didactic Chinese counterparts.

However, since anti-Japan sentiments have been systematically embedded in China’s “patriotic education campaign” (Wang 2008) and spectacularly promoted in the mainstream media, Chinese fans of Japanese pop culture often face questioning and censure from parents, peers and non-fans for choosing to “like Japan.” They either have to keep their fandoms to themselves or make a distinction between the cool “cultural Japan” and the bad “political Japan,” claiming that they are only interested in Japanese culture but oppose the political stance of the Japanese government (Jenkins 2013). Yet in general, Japanese pop culture still offers Chinese fans an invaluable venue to explore Japanese history, geography and culture more deeply, and consequently gain a much more balanced view about Japan than they could ever obtain from school textbooks or domestic mass media.

The precarious existence of Chinese danmei fandom

While the expansion of mainstream Japanese pop culture in China over the last four decades is partly regulated by the Chinese government and partly
pushed by the market, the exponential growth of *danmei* in China is purely driven by fan demands. Despite its boom on the Internet, however, Chinese *danmei* fandom is constantly at risk of prosecution as it breaks two social taboos in one shot: pornography and homosexuality. Pornography is strictly prohibited in China. Article 363 of the Criminal Law stipulates that anyone who produces, duplicates, publishes, sells or disseminates obscene articles for the purpose of profit-making can be sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment, plus a fine and confiscation of property (National People’s Congress 1997). The law is often enforced through the annual anti-porn campaign organized and supervised by the National Office against Pornographic and Illegal Publications (hereinafter, the Office). Established in July 1989, one month after the Tiananmen Democracy Movement was suppressed by the government, the Office is now headed by the minister of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and supported by 27 government agencies, whose mission is to “maintain socio-political stability and ideological security” in an era when “the battles in the ideological field remain intense and complicated” (Guo 2011). Since legal definitions of “obscenity” and “pornography” are quite “vague and circular” (Yan 2015: 388), the anti-porn campaigns generally follow the guidelines issued by the then State Administration of Press and Publication (SAPP) in 1988 and 1989, respectively, to determine pornographic expressions. Starting from 2009, the campaigns have targeted both obscene or pornographic content and “vulgar” content related to sex, violence and privacy (Yan 2015: 394–395).

One category of obscene content in the 1988 SAPP decision is defined as “graphic depictions of homosexual (*tongxinglian*) or any other abnormal sexual behavior (*xing biantai*) in an obscene manner” (Yan 2015: 389). Homosexual behavior is not only singled out by the state as “obscene,” but conflated with “abnormal sexual behavior.” Such bias against homosexuality was typical of the legal practices of the 1980s when male anal sex was penalized as a crime of hooliganism. Although legal and public attitudes towards homossexuality have changed considerably with the deletion of the crime of hooliganism from the 1997 Criminal Law (Davis and Friedman 2014: 17–18), the anti-porn campaigns continue to follow outdated, homophobic regulations. Hence, theoretically speaking, any *danmei* work, regardless of sexual content, could be viewed as pornographic, following the censorship logic of “homosexuality = abnormality = pornography” (Huang 2010: 79). Moreover, since web literature is looked down on by cultural elites and the general public as a form of low-quality “fast food culture,” it is almost impossible for *danmei* writers to claim artistic value for their works and be exempted from the anti-pornography law.

During the past decade, the Chinese government has steadily expanded the duration and scope of the anti-porn campaigns in an attempt to rein in sexual content on the Internet. Although crackdowns usually focus on straightforward porn websites, web literature with pornographic content has been
increasingly censored and the results can be quite disastrous. In 2004, the Office launched a four-month campaign against Internet pornography and shut down 1,400 pornographic websites. Among those involved in the operation of the websites, 197 were prosecuted (Zhu 2004). In the six-month 2007 campaign, 8,808 websites involved in pornography and fraud were shut down, as were another 9,593 unauthorized websites. As collateral damage, hundreds of BL forums and e-libraries based in Xilu Shequ, once the second most popular BBS (bulletin board system) community in China, were wiped out during the campaign (Liu 2009). In the 2010 campaign, thousands of danmei forums, websites and personal blogs were forced to close, followed by the arrest of dozens of danmei writers and a danmei website owner in the next year, all on the charge of disseminating obscene articles (Yi 2013).

Other than instilling fear and anxiety among danmei fans, perhaps one of the most damaging consequences of the incessant anti-porn campaigns is that they have reinforced the public image of the outlaw nature of danmei, as the genre is not only denied legitimacy by the law but is outside its protection. For years, original danmei writers have complained that their works have been plagiarized by heterosexual romance writers, but none dares to take legal action against the perpetrators for fear of being prosecuted first. In February 2015, a notable playwright, Li Yaling, was revealed to have won a slander lawsuit against a website administrator who accused her of plagiarizing the storylines and characters of a heart-wrenching novella by leading danmei writer Feng Nong in a television drama series. While admitting that she had taken a cursory glance at Feng Nong’s work, Li nonetheless described it scornfully as “very pornographic and very violent,” and claimed that as a straight woman she could not bear any gay pornography (Chenyu 2015). Although Li’s self-righteous stigmatization of danmei and the unfair legal proceedings angered a great many danmei fans, Feng Nong remained silent throughout the incident, let alone resorting to legal means to defend her rights.

At a time when the CCP has already been disgraced by numerous sex scandals of party officials, it might seem puzzling that the Party is still so obsessed with the policing of the sexual morality of the population to the point that the crackdown on pornography and illegal publications was even mentioned in former president Hu Jintao’s keynote report delivered during the opening ceremony of the eighteenth CCP National Congress in 2012. It was the first time that a congress work report, the most important policy guidelines of the CCP, touched on the anti-porn issue (Long 2013). Gary Sigley (2006: 44–48) explains the sexual conservatism of Party state authorities by tracing the intersection of sex and politics in the history of the CCP. He highlights the CCP’s elitist ambition to transform the popular culture that is deemed “crude, vulgar, and bawdy,” its paternalistic desire to protect young people from corrupting influence and, above all, its justifiable anxiety that sexual liberalization will lead to political liberalization and the discourse of sexual rights will undermine social stability. This convergence of sex and
politics is also indicated in the name of the Office, which is not only against pornography but against illegal publications. The latter refers to pirated copies of legal publications, and publications that contain politically subversive content and therefore can never be published legally in the first place. As many critics have observed, the crackdown on pornography is merely a convenient excuse for the government to tighten its grip on public opinion and stamp out anti-government voices (Yan 2015: 395). Anyway, as a strategy of governance, a principle related to the moral legitimacy of the Party state, and a matter of social and political stability, the anti-porn campaigns are bound to continue till the end of one-party rule.

While the anti-porn campaigns have posed a serious threat to the viability of Chinese danmei fandom, it must be pointed out that not all danmei works contain adult content and neither do all danmei fans feel bothered by the campaigns. In our interviews with 27 veteran danmei fans from January 2014 to September 2014, we found out that they have varied comfort levels with sexual content. Some claimed that as long as the story itself is attractive they could accept whatever kind of sex it contained. Others accepted various sexual acts only within their preferred subgenres. Still others could not stand depictions of extreme sexual violence but nevertheless maintained that such writings should be allowed to exist in the fandom. Although all our interviewees viewed sex as an integral component of danmei fiction, when it came to the necessity of anti-porn campaigns, the opinions were surprisingly divided. While some viewed the campaigns as a total nuisance, others hoped that they could help curb the deluge of thoughtless and distasteful works, an unintended consequence of the explosive growth of danmei in China, and minimize the potential harm of the genre to younger fans. In recent years, a large number of teenage girls have entered danmei fandom due to the spread of the Internet, prompting some senior fans to worry about danmei’s negative influence on younger fans’ sexual attitudes or sexual orientation, even though those senior fans got to know danmei at the formative age themselves and apparently have not been harmed in any noticeable way. Therefore, it is not only the media and parents that are anxious about danmei’s supposed harm to minors (Liu 2009); danmei fans themselves also succumb to this moral panic, probably due to their shame and guilt about consuming danmei, as traditional morality has forbidden women to be active sexual agents or to treat men as sexual objects.

Transnational BL fandom has been celebrated as opening up a space for female sexual desires and fantasies, and constituting a “counterpublic” (McLelland 2005; Wood 2006) where hegemonic norms of gender and sexuality can be interrogated and subverted. While the said observation could certainly be applied to Chinese danmei, it is worth noting that such a counterpublic is by no means a conflict-free utopia, and transgressive sexual expressions have remained the most contested and policed site within the fandom. Therefore, like online fan communities in other parts of the world (McLelland 2011: 21–22), Chinese danmei fandom developed a set of
community guidelines about sexual content as early as the era of Lucifer Club (Wei 2008). In the next section, we will take a look at how different danmei communities regulate sexual content and react to the anti-porn campaigns.

Community policies about explicit content and reactions to the 2014 anti-porn campaign

Chinese danmei fandom is made up of three prominent circles: the original danmei circle (yuandan quan) that focuses on the production and consumption of original Chinese-language danmei novels, the Japanese circle (rìxi quan) dedicated to the translation of Japanese BL works and the fan re-creation of Japanese ACG series, and the Euro-American circle (oumei quan) devoted to the production and translation of “slash” – that is, male-male romance fanfiction relating to Euro-American media products. Unlike the original and Euro-American circles that tend to center around a single influential online base, the Japanese circle is scattered across various online forums and websites, as it is far more diverse than the former two circles and embraces a wide spectrum of popular forms. Fans of Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Euro-American pop stars and sports celebrities have also set up their own real person danmei/slash fanfic circles, but generally with less influence and narrower reach than the above-mentioned three circles. While some BL fans might have fixed attachments to certain formats, genres or fan objects, most are nomadic, constantly moving from one circle to another, bringing fan knowledge of previous circles to new ones.

Currently, the largest and most influential online danmei community in China is Jinjiang Literature City (Jinjiang in short), the hub of the original danmei circle and the host of numerous fanfictions from other circles. First established in 2003 as a website for amateur writers to share their works for free, Jinjiang later experienced financial difficulty and was purchased by Shanda Literature Co. Ltd. in 2007. In January 2008, Jinjiang launched a pay-per-view reading system and became commercialized amid strong objections from some of its loyal readers (Feng 2013: 54). Since its 7 million registered users are predominantly women, Jinjiang publishes a wide range of women-oriented literary genres, including heterosexual romance, danmei, and yuri, or baihe in Chinese (that is, female-female same-sex romance, also known as girls’ love, or “GL”), but is mostly known for its high-quality original danmei works.

After more than 60,000 websites were shut down in the 2010 anti-porn campaign, Shanda Literature established a comprehensive self-censorship system for its subsidiary websites, including the automatic filtering of sensitive words, a two-tiered review process to censor works manually, the encouragement of readers to tip off web administrators about inappropriate content, and the recruitment of a student jury and an expert jury to monitor ongoing works selectively and decide whether they contain any illicit content (Zhang 2014). Yet, despite years of implementation of Shanda’s self-censorship, Jinjiang still got into serious trouble in the 2014 anti-porn campaign.
On April 12, Jinjiang sent an urgent notice to all its contracted authors, warning them of the severe nature of the upcoming campaign and requiring them to revise or “lock up” (meaning disable Internet access to) any pornographic or political content in their works within 24 hours. During the campaign, works that involved incest, teacher-student love affairs, bestiality, and sex with minors were all banned on Jinjiang, as were those related to contemporary Chinese politics, modern Chinese history, the police, and underground society. While these censorship measures apply to all genres published on Jinjiang, the website also acted specifically on danmei and closed its “danmei tongren” subsite for a whole week. Unless readers had already bookmarked a work, they would not have been able to access it from Jinjiang’s homepage. This measure caused substantial financial damage to contracted danmei writers because they usually updated their works daily to attract new readers and sustain the interest of old readers. Once readers could not access a work for a period of time, they lost interest and stopped paying to read it. The contracted author, however, still had the obligation to finish her work, regardless of the decline in readership. Jinjiang did not issue a formal announcement about the temporary lock-up of the subsite. Apparently there was an implicit consensus between the management and writers/readers that this measure was highly necessary in the circumstances.

On May 21, The New York Times published an article on its website about Chinese danmei fandom, asserting that danmei is a unique way for women to explore their sexuality, and represents a sexual revolution with feminist sentiments (Tatlow 2014). Two days later, a partial Chinese translation of the article appeared in Cankao Xiaoxi, a newspaper belonging to the official Xinhua News Agency. The translation triggered widespread speculation in danmei fandom as to why the official media had taken a sudden interest in danmei and published a translated article that dealt with the touchiest aspect of the fandom – sex and sexuality – during the tense anti-porn campaign, not to mention the fact that web access to The New York Times had been blocked in China. Although the tone of The New York Times report is largely positive, unlike the stigmatization of danmei in Chinese media (Liu 2009; Yi 2013), Jinjiang nevertheless interpreted its translation as a menacing signal from the state and immediately changed the name of its danmei subsite to “chun’ai,” meaning “pure love.” A week later, Jinjiang manager “iceheart” announced a regrouping and renaming of Jinjiang subsites in order to downplay the website’s association with “danmei.” In an emotional public letter to danmei readers, “iceheart” begged them to understand fully the risk of the genre, citing the Shanda Literature president’s words that although web literature is a small business, it involves all sorts of large ideological issues (iceheart 2014).

Ironically, it is the traditional and presumably “safer” heterosexual romance, rather than danmei, that brought the real nightmare to Jinjiang. On July 2, the Office publicized a number of porn-related criminal cases. The first one was the arrest of well-known Jinjiang romance novelist “Big Gray Wolf”
who was accused of producing and selling obscene publications for profit through Jinjiang’s “print-on-demand” service (Xinhua.net 2014). To reduce her punishment, Big Gray Wolf not only turned in a couple of other Jinjiang writers, but blamed Jinjiang editors for goading her to write pornography. The management of Jinjiang was subsequently taken to the police bureau for investigation. After this incident, Jinjiang issued a stricter-than-government standard and banned any depiction of body parts below the neck. Other than mouth-kissing and hand-holding, no form of intimacy was allowed. The management also initiated a campaign to review manually all the works published on the website according to the new censorship policy. In light of the enormous volume of publications on the website – 26 billion words as of July 2013 (People.cn 2013), the review looked more like a publicity stunt, a gesture of kowtowing to the government, than a serious, long-term commitment.

At the time of writing this chapter in April 2015, the ban on explicit and political content was still in effect at Jinjiang, forcing some professional writers to switch from danmei to heterosexual romance. Those who continue to publish danmei works on Jinjiang have to confine themselves to a small number of apolitical subgenres and refrain from adult content, which results in a weary sameness and insipidity of many danmei works.

Yet not all danmei communities were broken up by the censors like the high-profile Jinjiang, nor did they react as frantically to the annual anti-porn campaign in order to survive. Take Jinjiang’s offshoot, Changpei Literary Forum, for example. The website was established at the end of 2010 by a group of hardcore danmei fans who became discontented with the monotonous commercial works and self-censorship at Jinjiang and attempted to revive the free – in the double sense of the word – spirit of early danmei writings. The website currently has about 60,000 registered users and accepts new member registration on the first day of every month. Works published on Changpei are classified into three categories based on the degree and nature of the sexual content. Conventional danmei works that contain some degree of sex are published in either the original fiction section or fanfiction section. Works that contain a large amount of sex but are still within the bounds of “normality” are published in the “braised fish” section. Works dealing with transgressive sexuality, such as sex/gender change, hermaphroditism, necrophilia and bestiality are stored in the “marginal library.” The latter two sections comprise the “inner area” of Changpei.

At the start of the 2014 anti-porn campaign in April, Changpei also sent a notice to its writers and urged them voluntarily to revise or delete sexual content in their works, or move the works to the inner area which only writers could access. As of April 2015, the inner area was still closed to both visitors and registered users, but writers were allowed to publish sexual content on other subsites and those sexually explicit paragraphs were accessible to registered users. Interestingly, Jinjiang’s excessive self-censorship in the 2014 campaign led to considerably more traffic on Changpei, with the average number
of users increasing from 300 per day to over 600. The overall quality of Changpei works has also enjoyed a boost, probably because some experienced Jinjiang danmei writers have migrated to Changpei for its relatively more free environment.

There are also danmei websites that remained unfazed by the 2014 campaign, such as the largest Chinese-language slash fanfic website, Suiyuanju (2005–). The immense popularity of the BBC TV series Sherlock and Hollywood superhero films in recent years have offered local danmei fans “a new cluster of fictional characters to engage with” (Wei 2014) and familiarized them with Western slash fanfic.

From 2010 to April 2015, members of Suiyuanju soared from 10,000 to over 312,000. Through annual fundraising among users, Suiyuanju has been able to purchase a server overseas and has been operating without external interference up to this point. Following the conventional practice of Western slash fandom, Suiyuanju has implemented a fanfiction rating system. On the first webpage of each fanfic posted on Suiyuanju, there is an information sheet that indicates the title of the fanfic, the work that the fanfic is based on, the name of the author, the rating, warnings, pairings and special notes. Fanfics on Suiyuanju are rated as G, PG, PG-13, R or NC-17. Warnings include such things as “non-consensual sex,” “graphic depiction of violence” and “PWP.” For translated fanfic, the translator also needs to provide the web link to the original fanfic and the proof of translation permission from the author.

The 2014 campaign has hardly made any dent in the operation of Suiyuanju. Although the administrators posted a short notice of rectification of the website on the first day of the campaign, they did not take any real action to “clean up” the website. Unlike Jinjiang and Changpei, which placed notices about the anti-porn campaign in the most conspicuous spot of the website policy section, Suiyuanju soon stopped mentioning the campaign at all. Even at the height of the campaign, there were still a large number of fanfics tagged “NC-17” on the website, accessible to registered users, and registration is quick, easy, and open to all.

Despite its sizeable readership and considerable artistic freedom, Suiyuanju is not the ideal publishing channel for danmei works, because it is a community specializing in slash fanfic of Anglo-American television shows and films. Original danmei works or fanfics based on non-Western media products are not welcome there. Hence, its influence in danmei fandom is still limited, compared to comprehensive danmei communities like Jinjiang and Changpei, which may explain why the website has not caught the attention of government censors.

Generally speaking, non-commercial danmei websites have allowed far more sexual freedom to their users than is permitted by government regulations, but those communal rules are constantly evolving so as to adapt to the changing local context and fan opinions. One salient example in this aspect is the tightening regulation of “liantong wen,” that is, pedophilia fiction, in
Danmei fandom. Pedophilia fiction is a danmei subgenre that specializes in the depiction of sexual relationships between adults/adolescents and children who could be as young as six or seven years old. Many pedophilia stories involve incest between (half/adopted) brothers, cousins, and fathers and sons. When danmei first emerged in mainland China in the 1990s, pedophilia fiction generated quite a number of well-known works and enthusiastic followers in danmei fandom. In the past ten years, however, the subgenre has received strong criticism from within the community as danmei fans become increasingly aware of the anti-child-pornography legislation and the “child protection” discourse in the West (McLelland 2011). Through numerous heated debates, it has been generally agreed that pedophilia is an obnoxious and unethical behavior that endangers minors. In Lucifer Club the number of works tagged as “pedophilia” has reduced sharply since 2004. Similarly, there is no tag of “pedophilia” on Jinjiang and few writers use the word “pedophilia” in the titles of their works, even though the website has published many incest stories that depict adults’ sexual attraction to young boys (Xu and Yang 2013). Since 2013 both Changpei and Suiyuanju have put a ban on texts, images or videos that depict sexual contact or acts involving persons under 14 years.9 Suiyuanju has also banned posts expressing sympathy or support for pedophilia, effectively making it a taboo subject in the forum.

As a matter of fact, Chinese danmei communities have taken a more drastic approach to combating child pornography than the government. Like the Australian child pornography law analyzed by McLelland and Yoo (2007), the Chinese legislation regarding pornography does not distinguish between sexual representations of real persons and those of fantasy. Yet unlike the Australian law that specifically prohibits sexualized representations of “underage” fantasy characters (either below age 18 or age 16 according to different federal and state legislation), Chinese legislation in general makes no mention of the age of the characters represented in the pornography. Despite becoming a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1992, China has not taken severe measures to prevent “the exploitive use of children in pornographic performances and materials” stipulated in the treaty. No legislative attempt has been made to regulate child pornography materials or enhance criminal penalty in such cases (Tencent Review 2013). Existing legislation mainly targets the distribution of pornography to minors. For example, Article 364 of the Criminal Law indicates that the dissemination of “pornographic materials to a minor under the age of 18 shall be given a heavier punishment” (National People’s Congress 1997). Article 34 of the People’s Republic of China Law on the Protection of Minors (first passed in 1991, revised in 2006 and 2012) “forbids any organization or individual to produce or sell, rent, or disseminate by any other means to minors” obscene, violent, horrible publications and web information that will harm minors (National People’s Congress 2012). Consequently, the holding, viewing and circulating of child pornographic materials are relatively common in China,
especially on social networking services such as Baidu Post Bar, Sina Weibo and QQ chat groups.

Although pedophilia fiction is banned in major online danmei communities, it continues to spread through online file-sharing services, bulletin boards and personal blogs. For some danmei fans, the debut and immediate popularity of the domestic boy band TFBOYS in social media in 2013 seems to have revived the specter of pedophilia in danmei fandom. The band consists of three members, all of whom were under 14 on the date of the debut. Originally marketed to teenage girls, the band turned out to attract mostly adult danmei fangirls and some male shotacon. While female fantasy of the homosocial and/or homoerotic relationships of the band members is still acceptable to the danmei community, as few women have been sexual abusers in reality, the existence of male shotacon puts some danmei fans on high alert, particularly after a high-level male fan of TFBOYS was exposed for circulating photos of half-naked young boys on the Internet. Pressed by the public censure led by female danmei fans, the male fan eventually announced his withdrawal from TFBOYS fandom.

Other than the outright ban on pedophilia fiction, there are also implicit rules concerning the depiction of physical abuse in danmei communities. Physical and sexual abuse is extremely common in danmei works. A plot that has been favored by many readers is that one of the two male protagonists is first raped, tortured and humiliated by either his love interest or a third party, but then manages to reverse the situation and gain the upper hand over his abuser. Yet the physical abuse is almost always inflicted on the male characters. If a danmei work depicts physical assault of a female character, no matter how minor that character, the author will most likely be vehemently attacked by the readers. Some readers not only have zero tolerance for violence against female characters, but also cannot understand why the uke (the “bottom” in male same-sex relationship) still falls in love with the seme (the “top”) after being cruelly treated by the latter, hence strongly objecting to the sadomasochistic love affairs portrayed in some danmei works.

Conclusion

The anti-porn campaigns usually begin with a bang but end with a whimper. The 2014 campaign, however, seemed to be an exception, as its deterring impact lingered on well after the official closure. Under the current legal and political circumstances, danmei communities have to practice either self-marginalization to protect their freedom of expression or self-censorship to gain wider readership, resulting in a rather paradoxical situation for danmei in China. On the one hand, danmei has infiltrated into mainstream youth culture and Internet culture and most urban youth are familiar with at least some danmei lingo. On the other hand, core danmei communities have been forced to stay out of the public limelight. In a study about American AMV (anime music video) fandom, Mizuko Ito (2012: 281) also points out that
fan cultures are simultaneously becoming more accessible and more exclusive,” but she attributes this twin dynamic to the internal mechanism of the fandom, such as the drive for quality and the competition for status, overlooking the political, legal and ethical constraints faced by controversial fandoms like danmei.

While we agree with Ting Liu’s (2009) observation that danmei fandom has used various tactics to resist censorship, we would like to note that it seldom openly confronts the state authorities for fear of punishment. Instead, the fandom has mostly taken up what James Scott describes as “the weapons of the weak” – that is, “cautious resistance and calculated conformity” (Scott 1985: 241), secretly nibbling away at government policy, voluntarily keeping a low profile, behind-the-back complaints and so forth. The nebulous landscape of resistance is further complicated by community regulations regarding explicit and transgressive content. Even without government censorship, there have been constant debates and negotiations within the fandom on the ethical limitations of literary and artistic representations, especially those concerning pedophilia and sadomasochism. As a fiercely contested “discursive battlefield where women’s fantasies and social realities clash” (Mizoguchi 2003: 65), danmei fandom is bound to continue to be restricted and animated by censorship from both without and within.

Notes

1 The word “danmei 耽美” is borrowed from the Japanese word “tanbi,” which looks very much like an original Chinese term to Chinese speakers and gives a sense of cultivated aestheticism. Chinese fans often use danmei and BL interchangeably.

2 The monthly magazine was published by an audio-visual publishing house and did not have an official permit for running publications required by the government (Wu 2011: 164). Despite being an illegal publication, the magazine managed to publish continuously until 2013.

3 In recent years, the Chinese airwaves have been dominated by anti-Japan propaganda. In 2012, more than 70 of the 200 or so domestic TV dramas aired during the primetime slots were themed on anti-Japanese war (1937–45) (East Morning Post 2013). With the advent of the 70th anniversary of anti-fascist victory in 2015, more anti-Japanese war dramas were expected to be aired in China.

4 After the Cultural Revolution, to build the rule of law instead of the rule of people, the People’s Congress passed its first Criminal Law in 1979 and since then has revised it several times. Both in the 1979 and 1997 versions of the Criminal Law, homosexuality was not explicitly penalized. However, Article 160 of the 1979 law includes a crime of hooliganism that refers to “group affray, picking quarrels and provoking troubles, humiliating women and other kinds of hooligan behavior.” In a legal document issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in 1984, “other kinds of hooligan behavior” was interpreted as “seducing multiple male adolescents or foreigners and having sex with them, … sodomizing children or adolescents by force.” The full text of the 1984 legal document is available at: www.law-lib.com/lawhtm/1984/2983.htm.

5 The word “original 原” here means original productions, as opposed to derivative fan productions. It does not imply that the circle was established earlier than other circles.
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6 “Tongren 同人” comes from the Japanese word dojin. It is the Chinese equivalent of fanfiction.
8 PWP means “plot, what plot?” It refers to a type of fanfic that consists solely of sex scenes.
9 In China, the age of consent for heterosexual sex acts is 14 years. According to a legal interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 2003, “if a person knows that a girl is under 14 years of age and has sex with her, whether or not she does so voluntarily,” the person will be sentenced for rape. “If a person does not know the other party is a young girl under 14 years of age and the two parties have sex voluntarily, which does not cause any severe consequence and the offense is conspicuously light, then the act does not constitute a crime.” The full legal document is available at: www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2003/01/id/34501.shtml. Chinese laws do not specify age of consent for homosexual sex acts, and rape is legally defined as an offense committed by a male person against the will of a female person (Du 2007: 161).
10 Shotacon is a Japanese portmanteau word that stands for shōtā complex, meaning a strong attraction to young boys. This Japanese slang, or zhengtai kong 正太控 in Chinese, has been widely used in Chinese ACG fandom.

References


9 Negotiating religious and fan identities
“Boys’ love” and fujoshi guilt

Jessica Bauwens-Sugimoto

Introduction

Works of Japanese pop culture, from media like manga (Japanese comics) to TV dorama (soap operas), are consumed by an increasing number of fans around the world. One reason for this may be the multimodal and interconnected nature of many works – a manga can be the basis for an animated TV series, of which the theme song is performed by a popular J-pop (Japanese pop music) band, and several members of this band may also be actors in dorama, commercials and musicals. Accessing one Japanese work is often a gateway to many more, across a plethora of different media. The popularity and therefore profitability of the J-pop genre (and to a lesser extent J-rock) is such that its winning formula – groups of young men singing and dancing in coordinated outfits – has been adapted by Korean music producers. K-pop (Korean pop music) is now a success not just in Korea, but globally, including countries in Southeast Asia (Korean Culture and Information Service, 2011). Many fans of the genre are young girls, because J-pop and K-pop bands provide their fans with images of masculinity that are non-threatening, “softer” than masculine images in popular media aimed at male audiences. In an analysis of the transnational popularity of K-pop duo DBSK (Dong Bang Shin Ki, or Rising Gods from the East), Sun Jung identifies this “soft masculinity” originally deriving from Japan as a pan-East Asian phenomenon (Jung 2009). In Japan, the popularity of DBSK rivals that of popular J-pop acts like the group EXILE.

Earlier this year, an incident that illustrates the pitfalls of transcultural fan activity made waves on Twitter and other social media. On January 11, 2015, K-pop group B1K4 came under criticism from Internet users who had seen a video of a Meet & Greet fan event where the band met with Malaysian fans in Kuala Lumpur (Malay Online 2015). Like many fans in other parts of the world, Malaysian fans participate in fan communities on the Internet, and have access to information about their favorite artists almost as soon as fans in the band’s home country. When fan activity stays within fan communities, there is rarely public uproar, but when incidents are reported in mainstream media and go viral, the response can be vitriolic and disproportionate. In this
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There was an uproar because the K-pop idols tried to hug, and in a few instances kiss (on the forehead, not the mouth), their Malaysian fans. At Meet & Greets with fans across the world, the idols re-create scenes from K-drama (TV series) that conclude with a hug or chaste kiss. For the band members this is part of a service provided to fans. Online, however, the idols were accused of molesting their fans, and a vocal minority called for the girls’ arrest, claiming their behavior was in violation of Sharia law.

Some commentators pointed out that the K-pop idols are from a different culture and do not know any better, but that Malay Muslim girls should know not to participate in an event involving physical contact with men. Some described the girls as “cheap” and “evil.” For the Korean idols, it may have been surprising that for some of their fans there is no such thing as a “chaste kiss.” Malaysian Youth and Sports Minister Khairy Jamaluddin weighed in on the issue on his Twitter account, calling the K-pop idols “pale, skinny & pretty” and “not real men,” in contrast to Malay men who are tall, dark and handsome (Khairy 2015). This effort publicly to emasculate the K-pop idols in question, ridiculing them by ascribing to them traits desirable in women, therefore making them (more) harmless and not a realistic threat to their girl fans, may have been his way of minimizing the negative effect the incident had on the girl fans, and the gravity of the sin/crime that public opinion claimed they had committed. Several days passed between the start of the online controversy and the decision that no arrests would be made, an undoubtedly highly stressful period for the fans involved.

The incident demonstrates that as pop culture from various cultures goes global, and fandom communities for many artists, works and genres spring up in geographically distant and culturally divergent localities, fans’ passionate dedication to their favorites might well be universal but their fan activities can become subject to severe judgment dependent on local mores and national law.

In this chapter, I will look at and discuss how some fans deal with religion, within their (offline) communities and as a personal faith, while constructing their identities as fans, and more particularly, as fans of works that, from a religious perspective, may be morally dubious at best or completely unacceptable at worst. This is the case for works of boys’ love (hereafter BL). BL (also called yaoi by some fans), is a genre of popular fiction, originally from Japan and written mostly by female authors for a largely but not exclusively female readership. It focuses on romantic and often sexual relationships between male characters. Commercially, until recently this genre was only viable in Japan. Its global proliferation, across cultures where sexual expression by women in this particular format is unheard of, is not always a smooth process.

The BL genre’s history starts in the 1970s, during the “shōjo manga revolution” (see Ishida Minori 2008, for an extensive (pre)history of the yaoi genre). Until the 1960s, most shōjo manga artists were male, but at the end of the 1960s and entering the 1970s, this situation changed rapidly. More and
more women were entering the field, and the narratives they created diversified to such an extent that they revolutionized the entire genre. The most popular shôjo manga artist group of this era is known as “The Magnificent 49’ers” (or hana no 24 nen kumi, most of them being born around 1949 – Shôwa year 24). Many artists of this generation started tackling taboos, themes never before dealt with in girls’ manga, like sexual abuse, or making the main character a boy. Some of these manga depicted romantic and sexual relationships between male characters, and since most of the characters were teens, this girls’ manga subgenre was called “shônén’ai” (literally boys’ love).

Manga artist Takemiya Keiko, who spoke at the “Manga Futures” conference at Wollongong University on November 1, 2014 (www.mangafutures.com), explained that she drew her first series with male characters in romantic relationships to teach girl readers about the difference between sex and love. She did not originally intend to use same-sex characters, but at the time of publishing, it was less of a hassle to draw two characters of the same sex in bed than to draw an opposite-sex pairing. Drawing a heterosexual couple in bed had also never been done in shôjo manga, and would have forced her publisher to submit a letter of apology to the police before getting the go ahead. This peculiar loophole, where depictions of opposite-sex activity in manga for girls was scandalous, but where same-sex activity was given the green light since no one had ever considered girl readers’ interest in it, and no one had ever thought to censor it, led to the birth of an entire new subgenre of shôjo manga.

Most BL narratives involve purely fictional characters, but many fans also write homoerotic derivative narratives (fanfiction) about the members of their favorite bands. Many manga fans in Southeast Asia are members of BL fan culture and engage in online reading and posting of stories and art work, as well as discussion and critique. Many fans do so not only in their own language but also in English (or other popular languages like Chinese), especially those who come from regions with a relatively high level of education. According to fans to whom I spoke from both nations, Malaysian fans interact frequently with Indonesian fans, since speakers of Bahasa Malaysia understand Bahasa Indonesia and vice versa. Malaysia’s population is much smaller than Indonesia’s (30 million vs. 255 million), and some encounters with Malaysian BL authors, like the group Black Monkey, who frequently travel to conventions in Indonesia and the Philippines, suggest that there is a considerable amount of BL fan interaction across Southeast Asia.

The incident described above, despite taking place at an event vetted by local organizers and sponsors, still led to calls to criminalize the actions of the fans participating, and draws attention to the danger fans expose themselves to when they participate in fan activity that may be acceptable in some cultures, but not in their own. Here the issue was that in the fans’ culture of origin, physical contact between men and women in public, especially the kind that suggests a romantic or sexual connection, is frowned upon.
Unintentionally violating this taboo is not just a risk in the real, physical world. Sexual expression in its many forms, including “born digital” format, is subject to legal or moral restrictions in most cultures, regardless of the gender of the participants in the sexual activity depicted. It is often the case that expressions of heterosexual relationships are less taboo than homosexual relationships, but many fans participate in BL fandom seemingly oblivious to, or perhaps tuning out the risk of, being exposed and judged, or in some cases arrested, for showing interest in same-sex attraction.

For women and girls in many cultures, sexuality is a minefield where guilt and shame are a constant. In BL fandom, fans may fear detection because of the potential shaming that would accompany exposure, with shame functioning as a mechanism to limit girls’ and women’s sexual agency. They may also experience guilt: guilt about looking at material on the Internet that potentially violates copyright, guilt about looking at explicit material, as well as guilt for objectifying gay men (see Ishida 2015), all of which have been touched upon to a certain degree within earlier BL research. What very few people have considered so far is religious guilt, not so much the guilt fans feel towards their families or religious communities, but guilt as a deeply personal feeling where their BL hobby may be in conflict with their own faith. Therefore, in this chapter I chose to focus on “religious guilt,” if it is present, and what its presence or absence means for the BL fans interviewed.

The content of this chapter is based on a small number of individual, unstructured interviews held over a period of several years, as well as an analysis of discussions of religious views and fan participation found in public forums online. All individuals interviewed were over 18. To protect them from any possible consequences from their fan activity, letters and numbers are used instead of names or fandom pseudonyms, and an approximation of their age is given. All subjects interviewed were introduced to me through the context of BL research, at related academic events or through mutual friends. Because of this, and the relatively small number of participants, these interviews have no statistical value, and there may be a significant bias because fans who feel religious guilt because of their hobby may be less likely to attend such events. Aware of these shortcomings, I nevertheless feel there were valuable insights in the personal narratives of those fans who did talk to me about how they reconciled their identity as religious individuals and BL fans. I hope these insights will provide a starting point for future BL research considering the issue of religion can only be briefly discussed in this chapter.

Transnational BL studies and religion

Since the 2000s, a growing number of papers and books published outside Japan have focused on BL (or yaoi and slash) fiction and fan cultures. Many of these have focused on fans in locations where the concept of, and laws protecting, “freedom of expression” are held in high esteem, and sometimes argued for passionately, by fans as well as by researchers. One important early
example is Rebecca Tushnett’s award-winning paper from 1997 defending fans’ right to play with copyrighted material. Many fans in online spaces where the majority of other fans they interact with come from these locations (common in English-language fan spaces online), regard the reading and creation of romantic and sexual narratives online as a right. They either ignore or are unaware that there can be real dangers to fans’ sexual expression, including in nations where citizens regard themselves as having a high degree of personal freedom, like Canada and Australia. Many participants in fandom are teenage girls, a considerable number of whom are under the age of consent or the age of majority. The objects of their fannish adoration, whether fictional or real, may also be considered minors. Reading, writing or drawing content in which their under-age favorites engage in sexual activity violates laws in some countries. Many are unaware of the existence of these laws, what exactly the restrictions are, and how vague and open to arbitrary interpretation definitions of obscenity can be (for a detailed discussion of depictions of under-age sexuality in BL manga and their legality within Japan as well as transnationally, see Zanghellini 2009; for an extensive discussion of the legal consequences fans risk, see McLelland 2013).

Even in countries where freedom of expression is considered a right, national law does not exist free from religious influence, since for many countries religion has been considered the basis of morality. In the case of Canada and Australia, as well as the United States, the main influence is Christianity and there has been a long tradition in all these societies of Christian groups campaigning against “obscenity” and sexual expression in the media more generally. While there are so far no high-profile examples of BL fans being publicly accused of immoral conduct due to fan activity, when it comes to religious background, there are two things fans may struggle with. The first is that many fans in deeply religious households or communities fear detection of their fan activity, by parents, siblings, friends or mentors. They are aware that many religions frown upon (homo)sexuality and its expressions, and that they may be judged harshly for what at first glance is interpreted as “gay pornography.” The second point is that they may struggle to reconcile their personal religious beliefs with their interest in content they feel is “sinful.” For example, some may agree with the notion that homosexuality is a sin, and struggle with the fact that they enjoy BL narratives. Some fans get into trouble online when they share that they love BL even though they think homosexuality is wrong. They are accused of caring more about escapist narratives and fictional characters than about real people with real struggles, a critique that perhaps is not entirely unwarranted. Members of certain subcultures curating fragmented identities dependent on physical or online location to prevent conflict is common, and not limited to BL fandom.

BL scholars like Mizoguchi Akiko (2009) have written about how BL fandom may contribute to young readers exploring and constructing their sexual identity, but so far very little has been written about how a fan’s religious faith influences their participation in BL fandom, or conversely, what
influence their participation in BL fandom may have on their identity as a religious person. This issue has not been considered within Japan, where the two most representative religions, Buddhism and Shintō, do not offer specific instruction on sexual morality, and where there is no deep-rooted concept of “original sin.” The lack of religious influence is evident in the criminal law too, since, except for a very brief time during the Meiji Period (1868–1912), male same-sex sexual relations have never been a criminal matter, and female same-sex relations have been overlooked entirely.

Unlike the United States, religious arguments are seldom tabled in Japan in relation to discussion of such things as sex education or sexual or violent content in the media, and there have been no religion-based campaigns against “immorality.” Yet despite the prominence of religious arguments in public life in the United States, such as recent Christian polemics against the recognition of same-sex marriage, little attention has been paid to the role religious beliefs play in BL fandom. One exception is Amy O’Brien, who in her 2008 MA thesis relates the fate of a young fan sent to a religious camp to “purge her of [her] deviance” after her yaoi manga were discovered by her Christian parents (O’Brien 2008: 113). O’Brien’s research explores the trials of fans who have to hide their (interest in) sexually explicit material from their parents to avoid embarrassment and punishment. In 2010, American BL author Yamila Abraham wrote about the Indonesian artists she works with, who are able to publish their BL art in the United States since it is legal there. Abraham’s paper does not mention the artists’ religious identity (or possible lack thereof), but it is important because it illustrates how artists – and in the case of BL, mostly female artists – can create a source of income that would be difficult to achieve if they were limited to their national market. Their ability to create sexually expressive material where it is illegal, and publish where it is legal, empowers these female artists financially.

At the Wollongong Manga Futures conference, Chinese scholar Ling Yang talked about how mainland Chinese BL artists and authors, censored by the government policies cracking down on sexually explicit content online, succeeded in saving part of their income by selling their works to Taiwanese publishers (personal conversation, November 2, 2014). China’s National Office Against Pornographic and Illegal Publications, however, is not religiously motivated, and used its wide definition of obscenity to ban websites and arrest 20 BL authors who write for them. An AnHui TV News Report (April 3, 2014) uploaded on Chinese website Youku, to date has over 6,000 comments discussing the crackdown and arrests. Abraham, too, worries about the artists she works with, since if their source of income is investigated, they might run afoul of the law in Indonesia.

The first researcher to pay closer attention to religious faith in BL fan communities is Tricia Fermin (originally from the Philippines), who writes:

To date, English language scholarly literature on the international Yaoi and BL fandoms have mainly documented cases from North America
(i.e. United States and Canada), Europe (e.g. United Kingdom, Germany, Italy), Australia, and Japan’s close neighbors South Korea and China. Apart from the Western bias in terms of research site and subjects, most of these studies do not carefully consider religion as an important variable in their analyses.

(Fermin 2013: 4)

During her research for her 2013 PhD thesis, Fermin asked members of the fan communities she interviewed about their religious affiliation, and accumulated some interesting data. Fermin’s analysis makes a distinction between subjects who are atheist and subjects who are not religious, based on the fact that many who identified as not religious do not feel the need to call themselves atheist. Of the nine BL fans from Singapore she interviewed, all identified as not religious, in contrast to the general population of Singapore, of which only a third is not religious (another third is Buddhist). In Indonesia, nine of the 14 interviewees identified as Muslim (reflecting the nation’s average, about 60 percent); however, two of them were only nominally so, and said they were not religious. Of the 30 subjects interviewed in the Philippines, 22 were Catholic, but nine of them only nominally so, and these too identified as not religious. Fermin concluded that religion is a significant aspect in the lives of Southeast Asians, and therefore deserves attention within research on BL fan communities (Fermin 2013: 85).

Local attitudes toward homosexuality and the prevalence of BL fandom

Of interest when talking about Southeast Asia is that high rates of approval or disapproval of same-sex romance and relationships do not seem to correlate with the existence and amount of activity of BL fandom. According to data from the Pew Research Center (2013: 22), in 2013, 93 percent of Indonesia’s population found same-sex relationships unacceptable (for comparison, the numbers for the United States were 37 percent, for Japan 31 percent, with Spain scoring the lowest negative attitude, with only 11 percent). In Malaysia, although described to me by nationals from both Indonesia and Malaysia as more strictly religious than Indonesia, a slightly lower number, 88 percent of the population, deemed same-sex relationships unacceptable (similar to Pakistan, with 85 percent). In Catholic-majority Philippines, one of the countries Fermin discusses in detail, the number was 65 percent.

There is no clear correlation between these attitudes and the existence and popularity of BL fandom. Large numbers of fans participate in BL fandom regardless of their fellow citizens’ attitudes toward homosexuality. What hinders or encourages fandom activity are not local attitudes toward religion or homosexuality, but apparently the degree of access to online fan communities. Over half of all Internet users are located in Asia (internetworldstats.com), and Internet traffic in Asia exceeds that of the rest of the world, including that of the United States, Europe and Oceania and Australia put together.
Wherever there is moderate to high Internet accessibility, young people can easily gain access to manga and anime content, including BL. This is true as well in nations that we regard as very repressive of women's and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) rights, and where we may not expect any BL fan activity to take place at all, like Iran, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.  

If I were to propose a tentative hypothesis on why there is BL fan activity in regions where a majority of the population has a negative attitude toward homosexuality, I would suggest that in conservative communities, *fujoshi* (lit. “rotten girls,” a pun on the homonym *fujoshi* [girls and women], a self-depreciating name for BL fans) are paradoxically relatively safe from discovery. Where female interest in sexuality and sexual expression is regarded as limited or even non-existent, accidental discovery of BL material, even on a girl’s personal device, like a laptop or a smartphone, might be dismissed as a virus or spyware, or something else “downloaded by accident.” Those with homophobic attitudes may well be unable to grasp that “normal girls” have an interest in what at first glance looks like “gay porn.” In these regions, the BL fan community can function like a secret society, with its own jargon and codes, and outside the community no one suspects the *fujoshi* disposition. For BL fans in these regions, networked with a larger, worldwide fan community online, living in a deeply religious environment is not necessarily a hurdle.

“Are you there, God?”

In this section I move on to discuss religious guilt fans may experience when active in BL fandoms. An Internet search with related terms brings up a number of blogs and message board posts where fans of two similar but different monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, say their anxiety drove them to prayer to ask God about whether reading *yaoi* is okay, or not. In almost every case, God produced no answers, and the *fujoshi* interpreted his silence as consent. To quote one example from a blog, written by a fan who accidentally discovered BL online after her parents cut off cable television and deprived her of Japanese anime series:

> Sometimes I feel guilty or something, you see in my religion Yaoi is unaccepted so I usually asked God, if He hates me or if He’s mad at me for liking yaoi. And of course I wouldn’t get an answer … […] So I’ll continue loving Yaoi!

Below are summaries of three long interviews with Indonesian and US BL fans, conducted between 2012 and 2014.

The first interviewee (hereafter S1) was in her mid-twenties, wearing hijab and dark clothes covering her entire body. Working as a semi-professional manga artist and creating manga for young girls, she initially hesitated to discuss BL at all, and did not broach the subject until a few hours after we met (at an event with a Japanese BL artist, whose work S1 enjoys). She insisted that she
only read “soft” BL (softcore, without graphic depictions of sexual activity). She agonized over whether this was immoral, and sometimes felt she should stop reading the genre. She stressed, however, that she did not judge others for reading BL. S1 felt moderate to strong guilt about her involvement in BL fandom.

The second interviewee (hereafter S2) was introduced to me through a mutual friend, another BL fan. S2 was in her mid-forties, had been in BL fandom for over a decade, and had recently returned from the Hajj to Mecca. She too wore hijab but dressed in brighter colors and patterns than S1, and called herself very religious. She described her pilgrimage as the most amazing experience of her life. As a professional woman with a relatively high income, she was happy being single and planned to stay so. She mentioned her difficult relationship with her mother (who would have preferred seeing her married), and her good relationship with her father and male siblings. She mentioned that one of her brothers knows all about her BL hobby, as he is an IT professional and does the maintenance on her PC. Less devout than his sister, he finds BL amusing and has never judged her for it, nor discussed it with anyone else. S2 talked about her religious faith with the same enthusiasm as she discussed her love for “hard” BL (hardcore, with depictions of sadomasochism and instances of sexual violence), and felt no conflict whatsoever between her identity as a religious person and a fan of explicit manga, anime and prose. For S2, her religion is a religion of love, and she was of the opinion that those who discriminate against LGBT individuals, or those who try to suppress expressions of same-sex relationships, are interpreting the teachings of the Prophet in the wrong way. S2 believes strongly that Indonesian society is heading in the right direction where LGBT rights are concerned, and becoming more progressive and tolerant. My interview with S2 shows that deep religious faith does not necessarily mean fans feel conflicted about their controversial hobbies, nor that depth of religious faith automatically correlates with conservative or fundamentalist views.

The third Indonesian interviewee (hereafter S3) was in her early twenties, and we met at a manga event (not focused exclusively on BL). She was nominally Christian but not religious, but I have included her here because she was still dependent on her parents, who are very devout. S3 respected her parents’ faith, and was happy her parents are more invested in her continued education than in her attending church. S3 talked at length about how she discovered manga and subsequently BL manga. She mentioned first seeing that same-sex relationships were perfectly natural not in BL manga, but in the girls’ anime series *Sailor Moon* (infamously edited/censored to remove instances or innuendo of same-sex romance when it was first adapted for the US market in the late 1990s). Because of the numerous LGBT characters in *Sailor Moon* (Sailor Neptune, Sailor Uranus, Star Fighter, Kunzite, Zoisite and Fisheye), S3 never found the BL genre particularly shocking or eye-opening, and enjoys BL narratives in the same way as she still enjoys other manga genres. Although of a different religious background from S2, she echoed the sentiment that she had high hopes for Indonesia’s LGBT
movement, and added that she was convinced that the popularity of manga, with its prevalence of same-sex relationships even in works that are not BL, had contributed to contemporary Indonesian youth becoming more tolerant of same-sex relationships. S3 was agnostic, experienced no religious guilt, and was sure about manga fandom having a positive influence on public opinion regarding LGBT issues.

I talked to several other Indonesian BL fans, but none of them was religious, and they felt the religious background of their family was of no relevance to their fandom experience. In other cultures too, I had trouble finding BL fans whose religion was a core part of their identity. The one deeply religious US fan I talked to (hereafter U1) had been active in slash and BL fandom for over two decades. Being “old school,” she started out reading and writing slash, and moved into manga fandom later. U1 was in her late forties and very active in her local (Protestant) church community. Much like S2, she felt very secure in her religious identity as well as her fan identity, saw no conflict between the two, and freely discussed both her volunteer work for the church as well as her activity as an author of hardcore, explicit homoerotic fiction. She is an enthusiastic supporter of LGBT causes, like the push for legalization of same-sex marriage across all US states. Unlike S2, U1 is married with almost grown children; her children and husband know about her hobby and support it. At the time of the interview, she was moving out of fan writing and launching her first e-books with original slash or BL stories. Although they are from different cultures and with different religious affiliations, the similarities between S2 and U1 were interesting. These similarities are possibly based on their age as well as the length of time they have spent active in their fandoms; they also have supportive family members in common – S2 her brother, and U1 her husband and children. As O’Brien pointed out, many young fans in the US have no one they feel they can talk to offline about their BL hobby, which creates feelings of isolation and may enhance anxiety and feelings of guilt.

**Conclusion**

The interview with S3, in which she mentioned how the series *Sailor Moon* had introduced her to same-sex pairings, making her receptive to more narratives in the same vein, echoes *shōjo* manga scholar Fujimoto Yukari’s comment:

> Right now, the people with the most understanding for (although sometimes this understanding is problematic) people who transcend gender differences, like cross-dressers and homosexuals, are the readers of *shōjo* manga.

(Fujimoto 2008 [1998]: 178)

Fujimoto points out that this understanding is not without problems and is far from perfect, but it is a start and provides readers with a way to look at gender issues from a multitude of perspectives.
The “flying under the radar” that the genre does – people who are unaware of the genre cannot imagine that girls would be interested in what at first glance looks like “gay comics” – is one reason why girls can enjoy it in secret, and are often invested in keeping it that way. Paradoxically, it can mean that in cultures where girls’ and women’s interest in sexual content is seen as significantly lower than men’s, the genre may go undetected to outsiders much longer.

Based on the small number of interviews, I would say that for those fans who are moderately to highly religious, religion is a more important part of their lives and identity than being a (manga/BL) fan. However, those with moderate to no guilt do not feel they have to make a choice between the two, and being highly religious does not correlate with high levels of guilt, nor does it correlate, in the case of those BL fans who agreed to be interviewed, with conservative political ideology. For S2, a Muslim fan, and U1, a Christian fan, their love for the BL genre and their religious faith coexisted without conflict.

In my argument above I have pointed to the important place that religious sensibilities can hold for some fans in highly religious societies. Yet even in countries such as the United States which have a nominal separation between the private sphere of religion and the public sphere of the State, religious values play a very important role in how media content is received. Given the prominence of religious figures and groups in the United States who actively campaign for religious values across all forms of public life, the impact of religion on fandom is clearly in need of investigation. Laura Miller, in her chapter in this collection, does point out how in conservative American states the content of some Japanese pop culture texts, particularly those dealing with sexuality or the supernatural, has proven contentious, but there is as yet no specific study of the way in which Christian sensibilities influence the reception of cultural material from Japan. This is an important issue given that the United States is home to a large population of fans who live in a nation where religious values often inform the law-making process for legislation regulating sexual activity, sexual reproduction and sexual expression – especially of a non-marital or same-sex kind. I hope that by raising the issue that religious sensibilities play across Japanese fandoms, further research will be dedicated to this important topic.

Note

I am unable to detail my sources here in order to protect my informants, given that things like apostasy still carry the death penalty in these countries.

References


Is there a space for cool manga in Indonesia and the Philippines?

Postcolonial discourses on transcultural manga

Kristine Michelle Santos and Febriani Sihombing

Introduction

The vibrant landscape of youth culture in Southeast Asia is representative of the transcultural flows that pass through the region. From American movies to Hong Kong comics, various fan events celebrate popular media from all over the globe. The largest fan event in the region is Singapore’s Anime Festival Asia (AFA), a Japanese pop culture event with almost 145,000 attendees across a span of three days. In recent years, AFA has expanded into Thailand and Indonesia, making the event and its stars more accessible to fans in the region. Apart from industry booths by Japan’s state broadcaster NHK and various animation companies, there are also artist tables where fan artists sell fan goods and fanzines, expressing their love for their favorite series using graphic styles that resemble Japanese animation (anime) and Japanese comics (manga). Anime Festival Asia is indicative of Japanese popular culture’s reach across Southeast Asia. However, although the event gives the impression that Japanese cultural industries such as anime and manga have become a part of Southeast Asian culture more generally, the extent to which these Japanese cultural industries are welcomed by local cultures is a complex story. This chapter looks specifically at how the surge of manga and local comics that “visually resemble” manga, which we will refer to as mangaesque works, have raised transcultural tensions in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Prior to the impact of contemporary manga, both Indonesia and the Philippines already had rich comic cultures. Much like Japan, the Philippines developed a comic culture at the turn of the twentieth century, during the American occupation (1898–1946), when modern print technologies and media became available in the country. Indonesia’s comic history, on the other hand, started in the 1930s with comic strips published in daily newspapers during the latter part of the Dutch occupation (1800–1942). The comic cultures of the Philippines and Indonesia were tied to colonial machineries that used popular culture to disseminate information to the public. Hence, when the Japanese occupied these two countries during the Pacific War (1941–45), they also used comics to disseminate information (Cheng Chua 2005; Okamoto 1997). However, after the departure of the colonial powers, both
countries began to reclaim all forms of cultural expression in order to construct their new imagined national identities.

To a degree, in the postwar environment, comics in these two nations became tied to national culture. For decades, local comics in Indonesia and the Philippines were developed in relation to national aesthetics, symbols and narratives featuring local heroes who possessed remarkably Indonesian and Filipino characteristics. This nationalist phase, however, began to change when manga were introduced into these local comic cultures in the 1990s. Japanese manga introduced new narrative and aesthetic styles to younger readers who, in turn, adapted and appropriated manga elements in the development of their own comics. These developments transformed the face of local comic culture, rattling the local artist communities that had been instrumental in developing the national comic cultures. These local communities feared that manga represented a new form of cultural colonization that threatened their local comic cultures.

This chapter examines the discourses surrounding local comics in the Philippines and Indonesia, looking particularly at how local comic communities have questioned the validity of manga’s influence on local comic cultures. As most studies on Japan’s transcultural power focus on East Asian, Anglophone and European communities (Iwabuchi 2002; Allen and Sakamoto 2006; Allison 2006; Berndt and Richter 2006; Napier 2007; Cooper-Chen 2010; Brienza 2015), this look at Japan’s transnational cultural presence in Indonesia and the Philippines offers further insight into the mixed reception that Japanese cultural power faces in postcolonial societies. Given that Indonesia and the Philippines were both occupied by Japan for a short period during the Pacific War, we argue that manga’s presence in these nations has triggered postcolonial sentiments that have led to a re-evaluation of the position of local comics in national culture.

**Nationhood, transnationalism and Japanese “imperialism”**

As Franz Fanon has noted, “national culture is the whole body of efforts made by people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify, and praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence” (Fanon 1995: 154). In his study of nationhood in Southeast Asia, Benedict Anderson has described how the nation exists as an “imagined political community” (Anderson 2003: 6–7) because the nation in itself does not exist outside the various ways it is imagined in culture, in particular print culture. At the heart of this imagined community is “print capitalism” (ibid.: 44–47), a publishing industry that produces and disseminates texts that build on a “national fantasy” (Berlant 1991). These printed texts not only encompass vernacular literature but also include historical and ethnic images that capture the community’s imagination – from flowers on a national stamp to heroes in a local comic. The role these symbols play in building the national imagination leads people to invest in and protect these symbols as national icons.
This process is true for nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines which have used local culture to legitimize their existence as a nation in response to colonial powers. As Fanon would argue, national culture is a “literature of combat” (Fanon 1995: 154), one that strengthens and invigorates the national imagination to the extent that people will fight for it. Anxieties around the protection of national culture stem from an acknowledgement of how easy it is to disrupt this imagined nation. In a world that has become increasingly globalized, where a range of images and texts offer different ways of imagining, some citizens can feel that their local culture is under constant threat. In particular, this threat seems more real when young people, the future of a nation, appear to consume and connect more with foreign influences, as is the case for youth all over Asia who appear to be immersed in Japanese popular culture.

The popularity of Japanese popular culture across East and Southeast Asia highlights the decentralization of global media, steering cultural power away from the West, primarily America (Iwabuchi 2001; Iwabuchi 2010). To a degree, one can see the surge of Japanese popular culture as transnational. Appadurai saw transnational cultural flows as cultural exchanges that are deterritorialized – unbound and free from nation-states – but which are nevertheless transacted between individuals or institutions from different nations (Appadurai 1996: 201–202). In most transactions, these exchanges are usually bilateral, but as Iwabuchi argues, Japanese transnationalism can be seen as an extension of Japan's “postcolonial desire for ‘Asia’” (Iwabuchi 2001: 202). Iwabuchi regards the export of its popular culture across Asia as an opportunity for the Japanese government to “articulate a distinct ‘Japaneseeseness’ in popular cultural forms, to raise Japan’s position in Asia, and to (re)assert Japan’s cultural superiority” (ibid.: 202). This argument is reminiscent of Japan’s imperialist ideology during the Asia-Pacific War where Japan positioned itself as culturally superior to the rest of Asia. Rather than relying on military force, Iwabuchi (2010) argues that Japan is now using soft power to push a new form of imperialism which he terms brand nationalism.

Brand nationalism is made possible through the efforts of national governments and transnational corporations that work hand in hand to promote and distribute goods while tying them to a national culture (Iwabuchi 2010: 71). Iwabuchi points to cool Japan policies as an example of how the Japanese government is working with various companies to export and promote Japanese culture – ranging from food and fashion to media in an attempt to change the view of Japan in Asia to one that is more “‘liberated’ and ‘humane’” (Iwabuchi 2010: 72). The White Paper on cool Japan titled the Cool Japan Initiative lists the various projects and companies supported by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). An example of a project under the Cool Japan Initiative is the establishment of Japan channels, media gateways that promote Japanese media all over the globe, especially Asia. This was spearheaded by Japanese broadcaster NHK in 1995, and has been extended to other media outlets in the region since 2009. Since 2013, the Cool Japan Initiative
has supported Indonesia’s Gramedia Digital Comics, a web and mobile platform that distributes digital manga to Indonesian readers. Elsewhere in the region, the Cool Japan Initiative is also affiliated with the AFA where events called CoFesta (Japan International Contents Festival) sponsor talks by Japanese animation directors and manga artists. As seen in the Cool Japan Initiative, most efforts are directed toward Asia (METI 2014). However, this kind of “soft imperialism” interacts in complex ways with Asian audiences.

The irony of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in Asia is how the sense of the “Japaneseness” of its products is transformed as they cross cultural borders. Part of the Cool Japan Initiative involves localization of Japanese content, specifically manga and Japanese television programs such as anime and television drama (METI 2014: 15). In 2013, the Japanese government established an agency named Localization & Promotion of Japanese Visual Media (J-LOP), which provides subsidies for promotion and localization of Japanese media overseas (J-LOP 2015). While J-LOP provides opportunities for overseas companies to introduce Japanese media to a local market, it does not oversee how these media are translated or localized. Likewise, J-LOP has no control over how these localized Japanese media are subsequently consumed by foreign audiences. Accordingly, these media are transformed in the hands of their foreign localizers and audiences who determine the local meanings of these Japanese texts (Iwabuchi 2001: 210).

John Fiske has argued that popular culture is “formed always in reaction to, and never as part of, the forces of domination” (Fiske 2010: 43). Hence, regardless of any sense of Japaneseness that the Japanese government may hope attaches to anime and manga, in order to become popular culture texts, any intended meanings are poached, redefined or reimagined by audiences in order to make these texts more meaningful in their lives. The most fervent of these consumers are the fans who poach these original texts and remix them into fan works (see Jenkins 2013). For some of these fans, rather than seeing Japan as culturally superior, Iwabuchi notes that there are audiences who connect with Japanese popular culture because of its perceived cultural proximity and similarity to other societies in Asia (Iwabuchi 2001: 205). While Iwabuchi’s claim may seem more likely in more closely related East Asian countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, the same argument can be made about fans of manga in Southeast Asia. If anything, the consumption and production of manga and mangaesque works in the Philippines and Indonesia also evidences a complexity that unearths colonial memories among these three nations. It also highlights postcolonial responses that structure these transnational cultural flows.

This chapter outlines the tension surrounding manga and local comic cultures in Indonesia and the Philippines even before Japan developed the Cool Japan Initiative. If anything, this history stresses Japan’s “imperialist” reputation in the region and points to how postcolonial societies, such as the comic communities of Indonesia and the Philippines, are sensitive to even the softest manifestations of colonialism.
“Japaneseness” in Philippine komiks

Prior to the surge of anime shown on Philippine television in the late 1990s, Japan’s reputation in the Philippines was not at its best. Despite all of Japan’s postwar aid to the country, many Filipinos primarily thought of Japan in terms of the scheming yakuza who abuse Filipino migrant workers, especially the female entertainers called Japayuki (Mackie 1998; Suzuki 2011), and the atrocities Japan committed during the Pacific War (Yu-Jose and Ikehata 2003; Yu-Jose 2008).

Both the media and the education system have played a critical role in shaping Japan’s negative reputation. Television news and soap operas often feature narratives about abused migrant workers in Japan. In schools, curricula on Philippine history, from primary to tertiary level, cover the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Asia-Pacific War. These classes often focus on Japanese war atrocities and local victories, strengthening not only nationalist pride but also condemning Japan’s imperialist past. While Japan is not the only colonial power that occupied the Philippines, the Japanese occupation is the most vilified in most Philippine historical narratives (Maca and Morris 2015). Despite Spain and America’s own colonial atrocities, narratives of these periods in Philippine history often highlight their contributions to society rather than their crimes. In the case of America’s occupation of the Philippines, history classes, especially in primary and secondary school, often praise American imperialism, highlighting America as the Philippines’ “savior,” especially during the Asia-Pacific War. This further denigrates Japan’s image, polarizing indigenous nationalism, while celebrating American presence in the Philippines. The Philippines’ love affair with America extends to popular culture which includes local comics, or komiks.

In an effort to tie komiks to Philippine national history, various literature about the development of Philippine komiks claims that the first komik was written by Philippine national hero Jose Rizal (Redondo 1979; Roxas and Arevalo 1985; Lent 2015: 187). This comic was based on a Spanish-Philippine folktale called Ang Buhay ng Pagong and Matsing (The Lives of the Turtle and the Monkey, 1889). While this story follows the sequential graphic structure of a comic, Rizal’s comic cannot be considered a piece of popular culture as it was not widely distributed since it was originally written for his friend’s wife. Komiks, as a form of popular culture, emerged during the American occupation (1898–1946). Various American comics were imported during this period. Much like other comic cultures, Philippine komiks evolved from early political cartoons in local newspapers and magazines (McCoy and Roces 1985). Tony Velasquez (1910–97), the father of Philippine komiks, was initially an illustrator and cartoonist for the Tagalog-language magazine Liwayway (1922–). In 1928, along with Romualdo Ramos, Velasquez illustrated Ang Mga Kabalbalan ni Kenkoy (The Antics of Kenkoy), the first komik in print.

Kenkoy, as the comic’s main character was fondly called, was an interesting example of American influence on everyday Philippine life. Kenkoy had
cartoonish features and was often dressed in a Western suit and spoke in garbled localized English, highlighting local enthusiasm for American culture. Kenkoy was a fitting visual example of American culture crossing Philippine cultural borders. There were no strong sentiments against Kenkoy’s transcultural identity and he eventually became an icon for the modern Filipino. Interestingly, the characters that followed Kenkoy after the Pacific War lost this transcultural identity. Instead, komik heroes were drawn from local folklore and epics that helped strengthen the Philippines’ national imagination.

The local komik scene after the Pacific War is seen by many komik scholars as the “golden age” of Philippine komiks (Roxas and Arevalo 1985; Lent 2004). During this period, comics flourished as a popular entertainment medium with narratives that drew heroes from folklore and local culture. In 1946, the Philippines declared its independence from the United States. Rather than connecting to the West, Philippine komiks went on to make links with the indigenous past. As Fanon has argued, claiming links with the past helps justify a national culture (Fanon 1995: 154). Hence, in a country devastated by the Pacific War, these komiks offered an escape from reality, and images of a fantastic past that was distinctly Filipino. While Kenkoy continued to appear with his garbled mix of English and the local vernacular, these postwar komiks were mostly written and distributed in Tagalog, the main Filipino dialect. The art styles of these comics also copied the realistic graphics of early American comics such as Dick Tracy. However, artists such as Francisco Coching (1919–98) used this realism to illustrate Philippine landscapes, visually offering readers a shared local space. Komik writers also appropriated many American heroes – Wonder Woman (1941) became Darna (1947), and Captain America (1941) became Captain Barbell (1963). As interest in komiks grew during the 1950s, artists such as Velasquez established komik publishing houses where they published a variety of komik magazines of various genres for all kinds of audiences (Lent 2009). At this point in time, Philippine komiks superseded the artistry in American comics. The artistry was so good that some komik illustrators were hired by comic publishers in America (Lent 2015: 194). The success of Philippine komiks continued well into the 1970s until some of the major komik publishing houses closed and the industry suffered creative stagnancy, due in part to the emergence of new media such as television (Roxas and Arevalo 1985: 4–49; Lent 2009: 94–95). While komik strips continued in newspapers, some allude to this period as the death of Philippine komiks (Mijares 2007; Alanguilan 2007b).

However, the collapse of the Philippine komik industry did not entail the death of comic creativity in the Philippines. Rather than turning to local comics, a new generation of children looked to other media for inspiration. In the 1980s, American comics were always readily available but their prices made them accessible mostly to children from middle-class and elite families. Chinese editions of Japanese manga were also available but only for children living in Chinese communities (Cheng Chua and Santos 2015: 190).
contrast, Japanese animation could be seen for free during the 1980s by people who had access to local television.

Not unlike the representation of Japan in the education system and media, Japanese animation initially had a bad reputation, being criticized as being too violent for children. After receiving various complaints from the public, then President Ferdinand Marcos banned Japanese animated shows such as Chūdenji Mashin Borutesu V (Super Electromagnetic Machine Voltes Five, 1977–78) and Mazinger Z (1972–73) in the 1970s (Fondevilla 2007: 445). These robot animation series had been clearly identified and tied to Japanese culture, hence, subsequent Japanese animated shows such as Candy Candy (1976–79) and Sekai Meisaku Gekijō (World Masterpiece Theatre, 1969–2009) were not marketed as Japanese-produced shows. It also helped that these other shows were based on Western classics, set in some Western town or city, and were dubbed in English or Tagalog.

By the end of Marcos’ regime in 1986, Japanese animated shows were reintroduced to Philippine television, although they were still not clearly identified as deriving from Japan. That said, viewers managed to find ways to identify these shows as Japanese. Some viewers who had witnessed the banning of Japanese animated shows formed small university clubs that either imported fansubbed or -dubbed anime and other anime-related media from the United States or China. Viewers who came from families with migrant workers in Japan also had access to various untranslated anime. These viewers eventually formed underground communities of anime fans and they became critical in educating younger viewers on the Japanese origins of these shows. By the 1990s, these communities held private anime film showings and nurtured a subculture surrounding anime. In 1998, in an effort to acknowledge this youth subculture, a local channel, GMA 7, brought back previously banned Japanese animated shows on local television specifically designating them as Japanese anime. This was part of GMA 7’s We Are Anime campaign that sought to promote their afternoon programming featuring Japanese animated shows. These efforts sparked a Japanese popular culture boom in the Philippines which eventually led to the creation of komiks with manga aesthetics.

Before 1998, access to manga from Japan was limited as there was no local publisher that distributed localized manga. There were untranslated manga brought in as souvenirs by tourists, research students or migrant workers who returned from Japan. In the mid-1990s, the only manga in the market were expensive English-translated manga in bookstores or Chinese-translated manga circulating in Chinese communities. These three versions of manga circulated only within a small group of readers and were not widely available. After the success of We Are Anime, access to manga increased somewhat as members of the anime fan community capitalized on this new interest and opened pop-up shops in shopping centers or at private film showings. These shops sold mostly Chinese-translated manga and pirated VHS tapes of fansubbed animated shows. Although “scanlations” (fan-translated comics) were
already being distributed online in the late 1990s, internet access in the
country was still limited to the middle class and elite. Hence, manga online
would have been accessible mostly to middle-class and elite youths.

*Culture Crash* (2000–05) was the first nationally distributed local magazine
that embraced manga aesthetics. As its editor-in-chief argued in the maga-
azine’s maiden issue in 2000, “this comic is a direct result of the crash of cul-
tures that we have been exposed to. We’ve based our work standard on those
already established by publishers in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, but still
produce them in a very Filipino way. We try to retain that Filipino character
at the very heart” (Palabay 2000: 1). The magazine’s choice to include manga
aesthetics in their works stems from their creators’ own interest in manga,
reflecting the increasing popularity of anime – and by relation manga – in the
country.

From the outset, *Culture Crash* embraced the transcultural nature of the
magazine while tying it to Philippine culture. The stories featured in *Culture
Crash* were mostly written in Tagalog. Its narratives ranged from fantasy
adventures to *shōjo*-like school romances set in the Philippines. One of the
stories even had a mascot based on the Philippine dwarf buffalo known as a
tamaraw.

Similar to American comics, all of the magazine’s pages were in color. Yet
unlike most comics available at that time, the authors of *Culture Crash* used
visual aesthetics and semantics seen in popular Japanese anime and manga
titles which featured large expressive faces and dynamic panels. The comics
also used storytelling techniques closer to Japanese comics (McCloud 1994:
78–82). After *Culture Crash*, other local comic magazines that featured visual
and narrative aesthetics from manga also emerged. While *Culture Crash* never
claimed to be a manga magazine, other magazines such as *Mangaholix*
(Figure 10.1) were not shy in associating themselves with manga. Local cul-
tural scholar Emil Flores called these *mangaesque komiks* “Pinoy manga”
(Flores 2004, 2008), distinguishing them from local *komiks*. An interesting
reaction to the surge of *komiks* with manga aesthetics was the re-emergence of
interest in national *komiks* but stalwarts and fans of the old *komik* industry
did not take this development well.

While there were other local comics that were neither a part of the old
*komik* industry nor the emerging *mangaesque* industry, the realization that
*komiks* were changing (and for some, that *komiks* were dead) inspired mem-
ers of the *komik* community to look back and examine the history of Phi-
lippine *komiks*. While there were books on Philippine comics, most of which
were accessible in libraries, it was websites such as komikero.com by Gerry
Alanguilan, a Filipino comic artist for DC and Marvel, and PilipinoKomiks.
blogspot.com by Dennis Villegas, a *komiks* enthusiast, that revived interest in
older *komiks*. In 2005, these two men started discussions on their blogs,
looking back at the greatness of old *komiks*. Alanguilan, in particular, had
written about preserving this legacy, especially when younger artists who
approached him to look at their works were drawing comics with Japanese
Figure 10.1 Cover of chapter one of *Ninja Girl Ko* by Kriss Sison, a *Mangaholix* comic
(Dimaano and Sison 2008. Image courtesy of the artist)
aesthetics. This made him realize that komiks had been forgotten by a younger generation of fans and it was “about time to make Pinoy komiks ROCK again” (Alanguilan 2005). Alanguilan’s call sparked a discourse both online and within the komik community, which now began to question the presence of manga-like works in local komiks.

In a lengthier essay, Alanguilan argued that manga had such a distinct visual style that those who ascribed to this aesthetic could be lumped together under that one “group style” (Alanguilan 2007a: 98–99). This style was described as alien, disproportionate (Turda 2007) and unrealistic (Chua 2007). However, just as importantly, many of these critics mentioned that manga style was connected to a Japanese identity. As Alanguilan went on to argue, the use of Japanese art in Filipino comics did not mean that the artists were less Filipino, but rather highlighted the fact that Filipino comic artists did not have a voice of their own (Alanguilan 2007a: 105). This illustrates that the presence of mangaesque art in Philippine komiks was viewed as a loss of national culture by some. While there were others who contested this stance and considered the nationalist argument against mangaesque works to be a very generalized view of the medium (Calingo 2007; Cheng Chua and Santos 2015), by the late 2000s komiks were framed within this nationalist philosophy. Books on the history of komiks (Flores 2009; Lent 2009), the komiks industry (Valiente and Salvador 2007), and komik narratives tied to local folklore and culture began to emerge during this period. While most of these komiks were published independently, more local publishers took interest in printing komiks with local themes. Some received national awards (Chikiamco et al. 2010; Pata 2014), while others felt more validated as they won international recognition. This counter-movement against mangaesque work in the Philippines was not coordinated but emerged collectively among members of the komik community who took Alanguilan’s position to heart. National consciousness in komiks was raised although, as Calingo would argue, mangaesque works could still be considered Filipino comics because they “are comics created primarily for Filipino consumption” (Calingo 2007: 107).

Melvin Calingo was one of the artists working at Culture Crash who extended the discourse on mangaesque comics beyond artistic styles and even considered the contributions of foreigners and non-locals who were engaging with local audiences. He added that “to disregard manga as a possible evolutionary step to your art style just because it is ‘distinctly Japanese’ would be folly, as you would be denying yourself the opportunity of learning new ways of presenting your comics” (Calingo 2007: 112). Calingo understood that the engagement of artists with manga did not necessarily dilute national culture but these techniques and aesthetics could be used to develop local comics. To a degree, Calingo saw this transcultural engagement as a reinvigoration of local komiks which were suffering from stagnancy at the time.

However, as Calingo and other mangaesque artists moved outside Alanguilan’s comic circles, their achievements went unnoticed and their voices were stifled by the outburst of enthusiasm for national komiks. The voices for
nationalist komiks were so strong that exhibits featuring Philippine komiks included classic komiks and contemporary nationalist komik works, but works from Culture Crash, Mangaholix and other subsequent mangaesque works were not included. In books and texts about Philippine komiks, mangaesque works also receive little attention (Lent 2009, 2014, 2015). Even when government agencies, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, got involved in promoting Philippine komiks abroad, the selection hardly featured any mangaesque komiks (DFA 2013; GeekMatic! 2013b, 2013a).

At komik conventions mangaesque works are divided from local komiks across alleys. Some artists find this discriminatory while others believe that this is the best way to divide audiences with different interests. Some artists who produce mangaesque komiks have tried removing the term manga from their works in an effort to appeal to a larger komik-reading audience. However, they can still sense the community’s low esteem for their works as the komik community continues to exclude their works from local komik exhibitions and activities. The local komik community still believes that the consumption and production of these mangaesque works is a corruption of a rich local comic culture. However, when members of the komik community work for American comic publishers or use American comic aesthetics for their works, they are not considered to be traitors but are seen as heroes who stand on an equal basis with US artists. This bias against local artists with mangaesque interests highlights some of the postcolonial anti-Japanese sentiments that are present in the contemporary Philippine komik community.

“Japaneseness” in komiks in Indonesia

In a similar manner to the Philippines, comic scholars in Indonesia tie Indonesian comics to an historical past. Pre-colonial art forms such as the bas-reliefs of ninth-century Candi Borobudur (Bonneff 1998: 16), as well as the shadow puppet theater (Bonneff 1998: 16; Ahmad et al. 2006: 61), are considered to be a part of Indonesia’s comic prehistory. Indonesian comics, as a modern medium, originated from Put On (1931–61) by Kho Wan Gie, an Indonesian writer of Chinese descent. Put On was a Malay-language comic about the humorous life of a Chinese Indonesian in Jakarta that was serialized in Sin Po newspaper from 1931 and continued for 30 years. After Put On, there were other titles with similar formats and humorous premises published in various newspapers and weekly magazines. Bonneff has designated Put On as the first “oriental comic” that was published in Dutch East Indies-Indonesia. Other comics published before Indonesian independence were all imports, such as Dutch Clinge Doorenbos’s Flippie Flink (1933) and translations of Flash Gordon, which were serialized in newspapers. After 1945, Indonesia continued to import subtitled American comics such as Tarzan and Rip Kirby, until the newspaper Keng Po started publishing the Chinese adventure comics Sie Djin Koei to counterbalance the number of Western
comics. Bonneff observes that this title inspired a generation of martial arts (*silat*) comics in Indonesia during the 1950s (Bonneff 1998: 22).

After Indonesia declared independence in 1945, Indonesian comics took a different turn when R.A. Kosasih published a superhero comic titled *Sri Asih* (1954). Kosasih was the first indigenous comic artist who printed his works in a comic book format and published works outside newspapers and magazines. Kosasih wrote over 100 comic books with a variety of themes – from superhero, to folklore, to science fiction and adventure (Ferdianto 2012). He is renowned as the pioneer of *wayang* (puppet theater) comics (Ahmad et al. 2006: 68), a genre in Indonesian comics with narratives based on tales deriving from traditional Javanese shadow puppet shows. By the 1960s, *wayang* comics became the largest produced comics Indonesia (Bonneff 1998: 29). Comic scholars valorize Kosasih as the father of Indonesian comics, a model author who used comics to display true Indonesian identity (Ajidarma and Gumira 2011: 7; Ferdianto 2012).

National identity became crucially important in Indonesia after President Sukarno’s 1959 *Manifesto Politik* cultural policy. This coincided with the emergence of indigenous comics such as *wayang* comics alongside published Western comics in the market. Sukarno himself disapproved of comics, accusing them of being “garbage and a medium of Western-induced poison” (Berman 1998: 20). This was echoed by other government institutions such as Lekra (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat* or the Institute of People’s Culture) – a cultural organization that was associated with the then ruling Indonesian Communist Party – which condemned comic media as heavily influenced by Western culture (Ferdianto 2012). Unlike the Philippines, Indonesians did not appreciate the transcultural nature of comics. Indonesian comic scholars continued to express concern over the influence of foreign comics on local comics (Ahmad et al. 2006; Putranto and Puwanti 2012). They used Bonneff’s argument developed in his chapter on “Western and Chinese Comics Influence” in Indonesia (Bonneff 1998: 19–27) as a framework to describe Western influence on some local comics. In that chapter, Bonneff emphasized how local comics were parodies of American comics, as was the case with *Kapten Komet* (Captain Comet) which referenced *Flash Gordon*, and *Garuda Putih* (White Hawk) which parodied *Superman*. In the same book, Bonneff validated *wayang* comics as an Indonesian comic style independent (*mandiri*) of foreign influence. After Kosasih’s success, new local comic genres emerged, such as those that applied local folklore (for example Medan comics) and traditional martial arts (*silat*) comics. Scholars have used this division of works as the basis for dividing Indonesia’s comic history into two periods: the period when local comics imitated foreign comics is considered to be the first generation of Indonesian comics (1930–54), while the period when new genres, such as *wayang* comics, emerged is referred to as the second generation (1960–70) (Ahmad et al. 2006: 64–72).

The second generation of Indonesian comics is commonly identified as its golden age (Ahmad et al. 2006: 62; Giftanina 2012; Putranto and Puwanti
2012). Sugathi Putranto and Nita Puwanti consider this to be the case because of the popularity of titles by local artists such as Kosasih, Ganes TH, and Wid NS during this period (Putranto and Puwanti 2012). Bonneff also considers the aesthetic contributions of other local comics, such as those that come from Medan, as significant.\(^8\) Another significant contribution of this generation is the emergence of the uniform comic book format in Indonesia, which began in 1967. From then on, most comic books were sized 13x18 cm, with 64–94 pages. They had full-color covers and monochrome pages. Comic books were also written either as one-offs or as continuing series.

The golden age of Indonesian comics declined at the end of the 1970s in a similar manner to the Philippines. During this period, new comic book titles were not produced, although reprints of second-generation Indonesian comics were still being circulated via obscure taman bacaan (rental libraries) and old-fashioned book kiosks. The only new comics available were serializations of editorial cartoons and comic strips in magazines and newspapers. In the 1980s, translated foreign comics continued to enter the Indonesian market, further washing away local comics.

Following the waves of previously distributed Western and Chinese comics there came translated Japanese comics, which rode the momentum of Japanese dramas and anime being aired on Indonesian television stations, and made available in VHS rental shops. Between 1985 and 1994, the most prolific comics publisher, Elex Media Komputindo (EMK), published 1,500 titles, 606 of which were children’s comics, and 90 percent were licensed Japanese comics (Sen and Hill 2006: 80). In 1995, translated Japanese comics were selling as many as 85,000 copies per volume, four times more than the most popular Indonesian novels at that time (Kuslum 2007). By 2003, some translated manga were among the top five in the book sales chart in Indonesia (Kuslum 2007). These translated Japanese comics enjoyed a print run in Indonesia five times higher (15,000 copies per title) than any other books (3,000 copies per title) (Indonesia Today 2012). The sales of a single translated manga can reach up to 32,000 copies, a number that general Indonesian fiction (including novels) cannot achieve (Kuslum 2007). By this time manga had gained sufficient recognition for Indonesian national newspapers to add the word to their lexicon.

The influx of Japanese comics in the Indonesian comic market during the early 1990s revitalized Indonesia’s comic industry. A new wave of indigenous comics came after the surge of Japanese comics in the Indonesian market. Indonesian comic scholars have called this the third generation of Indonesian comics (1990–present) (Ahmad et al. 2006: 76; Sihombing 2014). In a similar manner to young Filipino artists, this new generation of Indonesian comic artists were not familiar with the history of Indonesia’s local comics and learned a new literacy from overseas comics. Their exposure to foreign comics such as manga made them more familiar with the semantics and aesthetics contained in foreign works. Thus, when they created their own comics, they used these foreign design features rather than referring to the established
traditions of local comics. In particular, Indonesian comics began to mimic the format of Japanese manga. Local comics published by EMK had the same book size, page length, ink, paper and, more importantly, “style” as the Japanese imports.

The extent of Japanese influence also moved beyond the style and design of the comic books themselves. Starting from the late 1990s, female Indonesian artists were publishing comics under Japanese-sounding pseudonyms. Prior to this period, female artists had been unusual in the Indonesian comic world, but after having found a space in local mangaesque comics, their numbers now almost equal male writers. Most of these female artists create pure-hearted romances set in daily life situations reminiscent of Japanese shōjo (girls’) manga, such as Magic of Love by Anzu Hizawa (Figure 10.2) and Past Promise by Callista Takarai. They also borrowed shōjo aesthetics and semantics including irregularly shaped panels, decorative screen tones and big-eyed characters. These developments in local Indonesian comics further diversified Indonesian comics and its industry. However, rather than embracing this diversity, these mangaesque works were criticized by Indonesia’s comic community.

The first group to react to the “Japanization” of Indonesian comics that was taking place were the students of Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), who published an independent coterie magazine called Qomik Nasional. These magazines had been published for distribution at student conventions since 1995, based on American and European comic formats. Their aim was to challenge the influence of foreign conventions on Indonesian comics; however, they themselves were also criticized for imitating foreign “styles” (Berman 1998: 22).

The Indonesian term for “style” is gaya. Gaya is another term that is vital yet problematic in the discourse of Indonesian comics. It is similar to how comic artists like Alanguilan in the Philippines attribute a particular visual “style” to a national identity. There is much discourse in Indonesia around these “styles,” finding ways to categorize the aesthetic influences in emerging new media.

The discussion of “style” as a form of categorization in Indonesia can be seen in Nanda Giftanina’s thesis, where he argued that the Indonesian comic industry collapsed because its products lacked consistency in style, as opposed to Japanese and American and European comics (Giftanina 2012). Giftanina further categorizes the style according to how the characters are drawn: the large-eyed characters of Japanese style, the realistically drawn heroes of American comics, and the cartoonish characters in European products (Giftanina 2012). In their book Histeria! Komikita, Hafiz Ahmad, Alvanov Zpalanzani and Beny Maulana also categorize local comics based on their foreign influence. Their categorization of comic “styles” based on foreign influence does not come without a theoretical basis. Bonnefi’s scholarship provided the initial framework for segregating works based on foreign influence. Later on, comic scholarship, such as McCloud’s Making Comics, helped delineate
Figure 10.2 Magic of Love by Anzu Hizawa
(Image courtesy of Elex Media)
various comic styles from different artists and, to a degree, their cultural origins (Eisner 2008; McCloud 1994; Schodt 1986). These styles are European, American and Japanese. Publishers and comic artists have consciously absorbed this categorization. Publishing companies indicate comic styles in their submission guidelines as a category for the inclusion or exclusion of a work for publication (for example, Makko.co and Terrant). Readers are also informed of a book’s “style” because it is indicated on the back cover.

This “categorization” of “styles” is practical with regards to connecting artistic capabilities with the demands and stylistic preferences of readers. However, in terms of cultural context, it is problematic because it politicizes comics by tying them to a national identity. As if echoing cultural views during Sukarno’s reign, Indonesian discourses on comics after the 1990s consider these “stylized” comics to be inauthentic and imperial. Histeria! Komikita highlighted the cultural imperialism present in Japanese and Japanese-style comics which feature Japanese customs as a cultural norm (Ahmad et al. 2006: 21). Thus, the appropriation of Japanese phrases due to manga exposure – such as the use of “itadakimasu” instead of the Indonesian “mari makan” (“let’s eat!”) – may be regarded as cultural imperialism. For Giftanina (2012), the real problem lies with the appropriation of visual aesthetics where local culture is represented by a foreign “style.” Japanese manga, which entered the Indonesian market much later than more familiar Western and Chinese comics, face the fiercest criticism from comic observers. Manga-style comics are distinct from other comics because of their conspicuously big-eyed characters and their lanky anatomy. It is argued that the presence of foreign comic aesthetics has cut “Indonesian identity” from Indonesian comics (Giftanina 2012). Hence, comic communities have attempted to identify “authentic” Indonesian comics. The activities and events of these comic communities have played a crucial role in shaping the face of Indonesian comics.

In Indonesia, the debates surrounding comics are often driven by communities that share similar interests in comics. An example of this is the student community behind Qomik Nasional. Other comic communities are Masyarakat Komik Indonesia (MKI) and Akademi Samali, which advocate for Indonesian comics free of any foreign influence. Artists in these comic communities often collaborate with high-profile art and cultural institutes to create comics-related activities, such as symposiums and exhibitions. These public exhibits later became central in Indonesia’s comics discourse. For the purpose of this discussion we look at the exhibits Eksposisi Komik DI:Y [Daerah Istimewa: Yourself] (DI: Y [Special Region: Yourself] Comics Exposition) in 2007, and Pameran Komik Bara Betina (Female Flame Comics Exhibition) in 2011. These examples represent the two sides of Indonesia’s comic discourse. The former represents the independent/underground comic scene which considers foreign comics to be a threat to national culture. The latter represents the position of Indonesian comics produced by mainstream publishers which see foreign influence as an opportunity for the diversification of Indonesian comics.
The 2007 DI:Y Exhibition introduced comics as an artistic form. Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta) listed the exhibition under the category of Fine Arts and it was curated by journalist and critic Hikmat Dar- 

The exhibit itself vilified foreign-influenced mainstream comics, arguing that Indonesian comic artists were being stifled by the aesthetics and production cycles of Japanese and American comics. On the other hand, as seen in DI:Y, underground and alternative comics were free to express themselves, unbound by foreign rules. The curators of the exhibit implied that comic artists working for mainstream publishers lacked self-identity and creative free will. DI:Y’s statement was a pivotal contribution to Indonesian comics discourse because it differentiated underground/alternative comics as examples of high culture and nationalism, from mainstream comics (which includes Japanese-style comics) seen as low culture and foreign.

Bara Betina Exhibition (BBE) in 2011, on the other hand, featured the works of comic artists who primarily worked for mainstream publications. BBE highlighted the role of female characters in Indonesian comics. The exhibition was curated by Gupta Mahendra, the editor of KOLONI (Komik Lokal Indonesia – Indonesian Local Comics), a subsidiary group of media company Gramedia which owns publishing houses like EMK. Even though the exhibit featured male and female artists from mainstream publishers, the exhibition was organized as a project of the Salihara community. The Salihara community is not a comics community like Akademi Samali, MKI or Komik Indonesia, but a group of high-profile cultural critics, authors, artists and journalists who push for the development of high art. Yet, despite the connection of the exhibition with a community that revered high art, BBE was an exhibit that wanted to veer away from the pretentiousness of a stance that sought to transform comics into a higher art form. Instead, BBE was an exhibit that wanted to celebrate comics on their own merit, as a genuine art form that had brought increased visual literacy to Indonesian readers (Dewanto 2011: 54). Just as importantly, BBE was an exhibit that recognized the various transnational cultural elements seen in comics and demonstrated how they had enriched the works of local comic artists (Mahendra 2011: 55–60). Despite its reverence for these “stylized” comics, the exhibition also spoke highly of previous popular Indonesian comics without demanding that younger Indonesian comic artists create comics in a manner that only illustrated Indonesian culture. Unlike other communities, Salihara’s BBE embraced these different styles, encouraging younger artists to explore a broader creative space.

The creation of styles based on the cultural origins of different comics reflects the awareness of transnational cultural imperialism among various
groups in Indonesia. The introduction of foreign comics drove the local komik community to develop a kind of style they could identify as uniquely Indonesian. The discourse surrounding Indonesian comics was critical in defining boundaries between national and foreign art. When Japanese comics became a part of local comics culture and began to influence the comics created by young Indonesians, the established Indonesian comic community devised “styles” as a means of immediately categorizing and segregating those comics that displayed even the faintest foreign influence. As Sihombing argues, this categorization gives Indonesian comics a nationalist purpose and identity (Sihombing 2014: 81). Yet, in a medium born of transnational cultural flows, defining “authenticity” in local comics will always be problematic.

Manga as a transnational medium in postcolonial Southeast Asia

Years of colonization have made many communities in the Philippines and Indonesia sensitive to foreign influence. The histories of comics in Indonesia and the Philippines discussed above highlight how remaining postcolonial tensions are liable to erupt in the face of any cultural encroachment reminiscent of the imperialist past. While it is encouraging that the comic communities in both countries are crafting distinct local identities, it is problematic when arguments for the pursuit of an authentic comic “style” stifle the creative freedom and imagination of younger artists. The search for authenticity serves to exclude other creative pursuits simply because these styles are considered to have been corrupted by imperialist culture. While younger artists in the Philippines and Indonesia do not necessarily feel this way about overseas influence, the frequent recourse to postcolonial arguments highlights local sensitivities over foreign cultural influences on national culture. In young countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, the development of local culture has been a necessary step in helping keep their sense of the nation alive. Having long been immersed in transnational cultural flows due to waves of colonization, these countries are keen to protect the culture they once lost. These countries immediately raise their coat of arms at any sign of foreign influence, even the softest kind of cultural power. In the case of the Philippines, the education system and to some extent the media have painted Japan as the ultimate villain. In Indonesia, the influence of Japanese culture threatens some comics communities’ desire for cultural control. It does not help that there is the perception that Japan views cultural exchanges with other countries as an extension of their imperial past.

Over the last few years, Japan has been pushing the export of various Japanese goods as part of the cultural campaign called cool Japan. While this chapter tackles discourses prior to the Cool Japan Initiative, the fact that these discourses are still present highlights the ongoing postcolonial tensions that arise from the renewed presence of Japanese culture in Indonesia and the Philippines.

In the case of the Philippines, while the rest of the country has no problems with the various ramen and tonkatsu food outlets opening left and right, the
comic community still takes issue with the authenticity of *mangaesque komiks* which are neither fully Japanese nor aesthetically Filipino. Some artists of these *mangaesque komiks* have strengthened their resolve and continued to pursue comics in a wider context where the transcultural nature of their works could be embraced. On the internet, these artists have an audience that does not judge their *mangaesque* aesthetics. Outside the Philippines, *mangaesque* artists such as Elmer Damaso and Tintin Pantoja create comics for American publishers. On the local scene, since 2014, large publishers such as Black Ink and PSICOM have engaged with *mangaesque* artists to produce local *Pinoy manga* and light novels. These publishers often tap the fan community which produces fan works mostly around Japanese anime and manga series. The decision to produce these comics was based on the continued demand for *mangaesque* works. Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines came rather late to the *manga* game but should *mangaesque komiks* persist, Philippine *komiks* and the local community will definitely need to revise their stance against the foreign influence on *Pinoy manga*.

As for Indonesia, the local comic scene has recently been following the framework developed in the *Bara Betina Exhibition*. The prejudice against foreign comics has been cast aside in the face of the need for readers to be free to support the creation of comics in Indonesia. Comic artists have been more vocal in supporting aspiring comic creators to write and draw interesting comics, regardless of the style they use. Comic editors are encouraging publishing companies and editors to create a healthy environment for comic creators to make their comics. Unlike the Philippines, Indonesia has opened a space for *mangaesque* works as many recognize their contribution to the industry while supporting new styles of visual literacy among their audiences.

**Notes**

1 These include a limited selection of manga titles and may be accessed as a Google Play application download. For a list of titles, see www.mnc-comics.com/digitalcomics/category/23/Jepang (accessed November 24, 2015).

2 *Ang mga Kabalbalan ni Kenkoy* was initially published in Tagalog, a Filipino dialect. As the popularity of *Liwayway* grew, the magazine was repackaged for distribution to other provinces. Its popular contents, like *Kenkoy*, were reprinted in other Filipino dialects.

3 This is in consideration of artists such as Robert Magnuson and Tintin Pantoja who were more comfortable with tackling narratives outside these local themes because they were raised in multicultural families and environments, hence they are disconnected from Philippine culture.

4 Jhomar Soriano, Elmer Damaso and Kriss Sison all had winning entries in Japan’s International Manga Award but their success was not publicized to the same extent as the achievements of artists whose energies are directed towards local *komiks* (such as Alanguilan and Tan).

5 *Sin Po* was a newspaper written in the Malay language as there was no national Indonesian language at the time. It was founded by a person of Chinese descent dwelling in Dutch East Indies-Indonesia. It was one of the three newspapers with the highest readership at that time, and played a role in spreading the Indonesian
language to the public later on (see Pandiangan 2003). *Put On* was serialized in another newspaper, *Warta Bhakti*, after the *Sin Po* newspaper was forcefully closed down, as cited in Bonneff (1998: 21).

6 Bonneff used the term “*Komik Timur,*” referring to the term “*strip jang berdjiwa Timur*” (East-spirited strip) from his article source (*Pantja Warna nomor khusus*, October 1, 1957), as cited in Bonneff (1998: 214).

7 *Wayang* comics are seen as a successful example of appropriating Western formats to Indonesian culture. See Ajidarma and Gumira 2011: 8.

8 The format of Medan comics was significantly different from that of Indonesian comics circulated in Java. Medan comics, started by publishing companies based on Sumatra Island, were re-creations of Sumatran folklore. Medan comics had parallel vertical panels that created long horizontal layouts. This contrasted with the long vertical layout seen in comics from Java. Medan comics are highly regarded for their aesthetics, careful drawing, intimate detail, and usage of screen tones that were never used in any other Indonesian comics. The example of this aesthetic contribution can be seen in Zam Nuldyn's *Dewi Krakatau* (Goddess Krakatau).

9 There are mentions of Hong Kong, manga and *man hwa* styles in *Martabak: Histeria! Komikita* (Ahmad et al. 2006) and in Makko.co submission FAQs (makko.co/submission; accessed July 12, 2011). However, in terms of general mentions and number of publications, this chapter considers the three styles to be the most significant in the recent publication of Indonesian comics.

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Kristine M. Santos and Febriani Sihombing


Appendix I

A bestselling manga artist in Japan in the early 1980s, Uchiyama Aki helped popularize lolicon works featuring cute girl characters in erotic situations. Uchiyama reportedly produced 160 pages of manga a month, which were published not only in niche magazines such as Lemon People, but also mainstream ones such as Shonen Champion. Disappearing from the scene after the end of the lolicon boom in 1984, Uchiyama today lives a reclusive life and publishes only fanzines. In this interview, he explains how editorial and market demands shaped his work. It all began with a fateful decision to sex up a submission that he originally made to a shōjo (for girls) manga magazine.

PATRICK W. GALBRAITH (PG): Tell us a little about how you got started.

UCHIYAMA AKI (UA): I started drawing when I was in college. I was in the manga club, and producing fanzines [...]. There was a guy in the manga club who was drawing shōjo manga. He said, “I’m going to submit something, so why don’t you submit, too?” I wasn’t particularly interested in shōjo manga, but I wanted my work to be published and shōjo manga magazines take a lot of reader submissions. So I drew shōjo manga and submitted it to Ribon, which is a pretty famous shōjo manga magazine, but they rejected me. I had put a lot of work into it and didn’t want the manuscript to go to waste. I started to think of places where I could resubmit. At the time, publishing companies could make money selling a variety of niche magazines. Sex sells, of course, and that was what most niche magazines were dealing in. So I added some pages of nudity and submitted my manuscript to a niche magazine, which accepted it. I submitted similar manuscripts to other magazines, all of which were accepted. Then publishers started coming to me with requests.

PG: What did these editors ask of you?

UA: The request would be for eight, 16 or 32 pages, and would include how many of those pages had to include nudity. I think the average was about 30 percent. That was the minimum, but the policy seemed to be the more nudity the better. Apart from the obligatory nudity, I could do whatever I wanted with the pages. It was really an incredible amount of creative
freedom, if you think about it, and I wish I had made better use of it, but I was just struggling to get my work done. I really needed the editors to tell me what to do.

PG: Even for *Andoro Trio*, your manga serialized in *Shōnen Champion*?

UA: Yes. The editor came and told me what he wanted. It was already set. He came up with the idea of putting the character into a diaper, but now I am remembered as the king of diaper manga. I couldn’t think on my own back then, because I was drawing so much to fill all the requests from magazines.

PG: You weren’t at all interested in what you were drawing?

UA: Actually, I didn’t like the nudity that much. At the start of my career, I didn’t have any intention of drawing naked girls. I tried to draw *shōjo* manga and failed. I was a fan of Azuma Hideo and thought that I could eroticize cute girl characters the way he did […] Like Azuma, I ended up in the genre that people call *loli*con, but I didn’t even know the term at the time. I was just doing what the editors told me to do. I think my situation is similar to Dan Oniroku, who became famous for writing S/M novels that were turned into Nikkatsu porn films. Dan had no interest in S/M – he just did his job. I understand that people generally think that manga artists draw whatever they like, but that’s just not the case. When you’re a professional, you need to draw what sells.

PG: *Loli*con was a trend that was bigger than you.

UA: Of course it was bigger than me. You know *Lemon People*, right? It was a niche manga magazine that focused on *loli*con, but it was very popular at the time. I published there, and so did big name erotic manga artists such as Dirty Matsumoto and Makimura Miki. The early 1980s is remembered as the *loli*con boom, and I was just part of it. Let me give you an example. I was paid 10,000 yen [about US$100] to lend my name to an erotic animation that was all about Lolita characters. My name appears in the credits of this work, but I had nothing to do with its production and have never even seen it. My name was used to sell the work. That’s all. It was the *loli*con boom, and I was filling a huge demand, even when I wasn’t there. I’ll say again that I had no interest in *loli*con personally. But now I am remembered as the king of *loli*con. You see what I’m saying? I have become a symbol of something that was way bigger than me.

PG: Did you receive complaints about *Andoro Trio*?

UA: Yeah, sure. The work was labeled *loli*con, even though it was in a mainstream *shōnen* (for boys) magazine. Some people treated the work as if it would immediately pervert anyone who read it. I tried to keep it light and humorous, because if I had been at all serious about girls in diapers the bashing would have been more severe. There were complaints, but I never personally read them. My editors handled them. To tell you the truth, they seemed to like getting complaints. It was as if this response indicated the popularity of the work, or at least the editors seemed to think that
way. People were looking at my work, and also at the magazine, which made them happy.

PG: Why did you stop submitting to magazines?
UA: There were personal reasons. My father died, and we had to close down the family business. Then my mother got sick, and I had to take care of her. She never really got better, so I continued to live with her. I do accept commissions, but I have to draw at home, which is not the best work environment. Then there were the professional reasons that I stopped submitting my work. The lolicon boom ended and demand declined. Niche magazines were discontinued and specialty stores closed down. I think that those of us involved with erotic manga in the 1970s and 1980s were sort of ghettoized due to the work that we did, even though that was a different time. Some found a way out in the computer game industry, but I had no transferrable skills. I can’t get used to digital production, which is the norm now. Self-publishing work is the only option left for me.

PG: I understand that you still actively sell at zine markets.
UA: Yes, I do. I use the format of zines to experiment with different styles and techniques. I also try to draw things that are topical and popular, so I incorporate characters from Miyazaki Hayao’s animated films or Spider-Man. I sometimes use different names, too. For example, I publish as Sayaka, who is the daughter of Uchiyama Aki. I have a website now, and the artist image for Uchiyama Aki is a girl character that I drew.

PG: Did you ever want to draw male characters?
UA: No. I have absolutely no interest in drawing male characters. Only girls. The only time I ever really drew male characters was Andoro Trio, but that wasn’t my choice.

PG: How do you think that people remember you today?
UA: They don’t remember me. People would rather forget the lolicon boom. These days, older manga is often repackaged and resold, but my work receives no such treatment. My work went out of circulation before the establishment of the market for second-hand manga, so most of it will just disappear and be forgotten. I publish my own zines, but each only sells about 300 copies. The same customers come find me year after year. They buy my self-published books without even looking inside them. It’s their way of supporting me, and my way of showing them that I am still alive. We’re all getting older now, so it’s a reunion.

PG: Do you feel uneasy being remembered as the king of lolicon?
UA: Well, I never called myself such a thing. People started calling me that and I was like, “Oh, whatever!” You can’t do much about what people say. I just go with the flow. I sometimes write on my zines that I am a lolicon pioneer, but it’s just a marketing gimmick and a way to be remembered.
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